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  • How criminals are setting up fake banks on Companies House

    How criminals are setting up fake banks on Companies House

    Anyone can set up a company on Companies House, and say it’s a bank. We’ve written an automated tool that smokes them out. In three minutes, it identified sixteen “banks” with fake assets.

    Today we’re publishing our analysis of the sixteen fake banks, together with full instructions on how to use our tool to find companies with fake accounts.

    The trick here is a simple one: you need permission from the Financial Conduct Authority to have the word “bank” in your company’s name, but you don’t need permission to categorise the company as a bank on Companies House.

    And fraudsters are taking advantage of this “trick” – creating companies, categorising them as “banks”, and filing fake balance sheets that make the companies look hugely valuable.

    These aren’t just accounting anomalies. Fake banks can be used to launder illicit funds, deceive investors, and give credibility to fraudulent schemes. We have evidence that some of the firms we’ve identified have done just that; the likelihood is that others are doing it as well – they just haven’t been caught yet.

    This follows our previous reports: the fake £59bn balance sheet of Avis Capital Limited, and fake venture capital companies including the UK’s largest (and fakest) company, the £100 trillion Novateur International Ltd.

    Finding fake banks

    Our search tool is conceptually simple. It searches for companies by their standard industrial classification (“SIC”) code, and then looks for anomalously large balance sheets.

    We’ve made the tool freely available here, with full installation and usage instructions. You will need some command line experience, and a reasonably powerful PC.

    In this video, the tool is used to find companies who categorise themselves as “banks”, have large balance sheets, but aren’t FCA-regulated. That ought to be impossible. Turns out, it isn’t:

    And here’s the output from that session. Sixteen companies who list themselves as a “bank” or “central bank” but aren’t FCA regulated, and claim to hold £10m in cash, or have other balance sheet items over £100m.

    (You can view the table fullscreen here or download here.)

    The fake banks we found

    1. Islamic World Economic Cooperation Organization Ltd

    The company claims to have £499.5bn of cash in the bank, which would make it three times as valuable as AstraZeneca. It says its activities include central banking, banking, being an open-ended investment company and being a fund manager. There’s an active proposal to strike it off. It claims to be controlled by a Professor Ali Ehteshami, who lives in Iran.

    Ehteshami seems to exist, but isn’t a professor – he has a business selling fake degrees in Iran, as part of which he makes an array of patently false claims about his background. Ehteshami sold the degrees from a “college” that was a UK company, until the company was dissolved last year.

    It’s unclear what the purpose of the “Islamic World Economic Cooperation Organisation” is, but it certainly doesn’t own $499.5bn.

    2 and 3. Avis Capital Ltd and Avis Global Green Energy Fund.

    As discussed in our recent report, these seem to be part of an international fraud.

    4. Good Luck Grant Ltd

    This claims to be a bank and a central bank. It files accounts as a dormant company with £9.2bn of cash in the bank and £80bn of unpaid share capital. Its website says it is “a UK group SPV registered legally within the United Kingdom with HMRC for gold transactions under Central Banking Registration Number 64110”. There is, of course, no such registration.

    This looks very much like a scam.

    5. Credit London Ltd

    The company claims in its accounts to have had £648m of liquid assets, mostly in German government bonds which it acquired in exchange for shares in 2022. But if that was true, there would be balance sheet changes reflecting the return on the bonds. The company would have income, and it would have to be audited.

    The sole director is an Italian, Damiano de Iuliis. The company is said to be owned by an Italian, Ciro Liccardi, but most of the shares in the company are said to be held by “D&G International Law Firm Sh.p.k.”. We’re not sure it exists (the letters at the end are the initials for an Albanian LLC).

    We can’t see evidence of the company’s existence outside the Companies House filings, but the peculiar list of shareholders suggests there is something untoward going on.

    Note that this is one of the more uncommon “fake account” companies that doesn’t file accounts as a dormant company. That feels sensible if you want to fool people – filing “dormant” accounts might raise questions.

    6. Savings UK Ltd

    Its website and LinkedIn and Facebook pages say it’s a “leading investment banking company” and is regulated. It has the credible address of 40 Bank Street in Canary Wharf.

    But the company is entirely unregulated, and has for five years filed accounts showing that it’s dormant but somehow nevertheless holds £100m in the bank (on which it receives no income).

    The company is owned by a Pakistani “investment expert”, Dr Hassan Khan, who claims to have personally funded the £100m. There are a number of other UK directors, but we would query if they actually exist.

    This has every sign of being an investment fraud.

    7. Terra Nova Holding Group Ltd

    The accounts claim the company is sitting on £95m cash, although there’s no sign of any income. It filed only one set of accounts in four years.

    There are a number of businesses called “Terra Nova”, most of which appear legitimate, and none of which trace to this company – so the purpose of the company is unclear.

    8. Crown FMB Ltd

    Its accounts for 2020 and 2021 showed £80m of fixed assets. In the 2022 accounts this magically changed to £80m of cash, retrospectively rewriting the 2021 accounts.

    The company’s registered office was originally 20-22 Wenlock Road, London, a well-known virtual office address. This apparently wasn’t authorised, so last year Companies House used its new powers to change the registered address to the default address of Companies House itself. The company promptly changed it back to 20-22 Wenlock Road, London. And did this twice, for some reason.

    The company has one director – Dr Adalberto Caccavelli, an Italian living in France. Mr Caccavelli owns the company, and is also company secretary, but there are two additional current company secretaries, something that our team has never seen before.

    Again, it’s not clear what the purpose of the company is.

    9. EULERM Ltd

    This is, according to its website, the global market leader in credit insurance. Our contacts in that market have never heard of it.

    The company seems more than a vanity website/plaything, because in 2020 it applied for and obtained a Legal Entity Identification Number – something that’s required for a company to enter into regulated transactions.

    EULERM Ltd was incorporated in 2020 by a Cuban resident, Imara Frometa Matos, who claimed to pay EUR72m for her shares. The 2021 accounts claimed the company was just sitting on the cash. It was still sitting on the cash in 2022, according to the accounts, but had magically changed to sterling – £72m.

    We assume this is a scam of some kind.

    10. Ban Credit Ltd

    This is a dormant company whose accounts claims it’s had £30m of cash in the bank for every year since 2011. No interest, no expenses. It has one director, Ihor Karpau, a Belarusian resident in the UK, and one owner, Alena Khaletskaya, also a Belarusian resident in the UK.

    We can find no other trace of this company.

    11. GB Morgan Ltd

    According to its website, GB Morgan “was established in 2018 as a result of co-operation and merging in between a group of companies and field expertise as a new era of digital offshore investment banking, money markets, FX and cryptocurrencies investment”.

    In reality, it’s a dormant company established in 2020 with (supposedly) $10m of cash, which has just been sitting in the bank ever since. Its most recent accounts show $26.5m of cash, and no other balance sheet items.

    The similarity of the company’s name to JPMorgan may not be an accident.

    The company’s sole director and owner is Ismail Shaikhoun, an Egyptian living in Turkey who says he’s an “arbitration counsellor”.

    Rather brilliantly, the company’s majority shareholder is itself, which is unlawful.

    The website’s certificate is invalid, so – if this is a fraud – it may have ended, or have been aborted.

    12. Goldbank UK Limited

    The company claims to be a “central bank”.

    It was incorporated with £2 of shares. It issued 12 million unpaid shares in 2011, and properly accounted for them as not paid for the next few years. Then, from 2015, it started accounting for the £12m as if it was actual cash in the bank. The company has always been dormant, and given the lack of any balance sheet changes, the company is most unlikely to actually have £12m cash.

    We don’t know if this is an accounting error or fraud. But one thing is clear: Goldbank UK Limited is not a central bank.

    13. 1 Stallion Ltd

    This one is more complicated and sophisticated.

    1 Stallion Ltd doesn’t file as dormant – in fact it’s filed audited accounts showing £4bn of assets, a £12.5bn turnover and offices on four continents. Its registered office is in a terraced house in Bolton, and its website is very basic, and under construction.

    The accounts have the surface appearance of normal audited accounts. But they contain numerous oddities, not least a reported audit fee of £888m.

    The companies’ claimed activities vary wildly between website, page 5 of the accounts and page 9 of the accounts.

    So who audited these transparently fake accounts?

    Nobody. The accounts name an individual auditor and an audit firm, but it’s a lie: neither ever saw these accounts, and the named individual never even worked at the named audit firm.

    The company claims to be owned by a Mrs Marrine Isaq, who lives in the UK. She holds £4bn of shares, but it’s not clear where they come from – there are no records of shares being issued.

    The accounts say the company is owned by “BCGI International Group LLC” which claims to be incorporated in Abu Dhabi, but isn’t. BCGI has a fake website, and claims to own four more companies:

    • At the same address as 1 Stallion Ltd is Avantulo SA Ltd, another vague oil/gas company but an even larger one: £26bn turnover, £12.5n share capital. We’ve spoken to someone who received a business proposition from this company (which they wisely turned down).
    • Also at that address, e-bank Ltd. Despite the name, it’s not regulated by the FCA. This appears to be its website. It claims to make £952m of turnover – all from the UAE – with nine employees. It has almost zero profit. To have the word “bank” in your company name, you need a “letter of non-objection” from the Financial Conduct Authority. Query how that happened in this case.
    • And previously at that address, but now dissolved, Kinpro Holding GmbH Limited. The dissolution would have been a huge disappointment to BCGI (if they existed), as the documents claim they’d invested £8.5bn into it.
    • Next door is “XYZ Investment Holdings Ltd“. The accounts claim it’s a financial business with a £15bn turnover and £5bn of net assets, but this is rather spoilt by other text which says “Our strategy is to create shareholder value through being a leading international supplier of components to the door and window industry”. Its previous name was “Stallion Holdings Ltd” and, under that name, it has its own fake website and a fake bank website. We called their phone number; it gives the option of “sales” or “customer services”, but both just go through to a maillbox. Surprisingly, the VAT number on the website really is registered to Stallion Holdings Ltd.
    • And there is a BCGI International Group Ltd, whose balance sheet shows it’s worth £650m and has a turnover of £190m (but it still files unaudited accounts).

    These companies all falsely claim to be audited by the same firm as 1 Stallion. They also all name that same firm as their company secretary – the firm tells us that’s not true (and we believe them).

    These companies are connected to Stallion Financial Investments plc, which was incorporated in 2016, claimed a £12m balance sheet (we expect fraudulently), and applied to the FCA in 2017 for permission to carry on regulated business. This was refused because the company stopped responding to the FCA’s questions, and Stallion Financial Investments plc failed to file accounts and was dissolved soon after.

    They responded by establishing a new company a year later, AR Worldwide Services Ltd which applied for, and obtained, FCA registration as a small payment institution. This is an area notorious for money laundering risk. We know AR Worldwide Services Ltd is connected, because its first director was Stallion Holdings Ltd It is worrying that the FCA did not notice that one of the directors of AR Worldwide was a company with obviously false accounts, and with a name very similar to that of a company whose application they had rejected in suspicious circumstances.

    AR Worldwide Ltd’s Companies House entry shows its owner is a man called Ahmed Shah Rasooli. We would generally not trust any of the names listed on these companies to represent real people – but in this case it would seem likely that the FCA conducted at least some checks in 2019, and therefore that Mr Rasooli is really involved in the company.

    The phone number on AR Worldwide’s website doesn’t work. Their regultory registration also covers “Prompt Remit”, who have their own (partly unbuilt) website. Both claim to operate out of this office in Harrow – there is certainly a payments business there, but we don’t know if it is actually connected to AR Worldwide.

    Linked to all these companies is an individual called Ali Hassan, who gives his address as 102 Chorley Old Road, Bolton – the same address as most of the companies are registered too. Fake companies are often registered to addresses owned by completely unrelated people. However, in this case we can be reasonably confident the address is linked to Hassan, because he made a planning application for that address, in the name of Stallion Financial Holdings Ltd (which doesn’t appear to exist).

    The first draft of this report said we didn’t know if these companies were created for fraud or as the product of someone’s fantasy. However the additional information we’ve received (the bank website, VAT registration, and the attempt to win business for Avantulo SA Ltd) makes reasonably clear this is a fraud. The domain records for the two Stallion Holdings websites suggest the fraud is ongoing.

    14. ADCOF Exchange Limited

    Another company claiming to be a central bank – it looks like it actually may be a scam cryptocurrency exchange.

    The company was previously called “TDSL Finban UK Ltd” and was the subject of a warning from the FCA in December 2022. It almost immediately changed its name to “TSDL Financial Corporation UK Limited” and in 2024 changed its name again to ADCOF Exchange.

    The website which says it is “Revolutionizing Global Monetary through blockchain for Digital Assets management First Exchange operates on cutting-edge robotic and AI systems”. But the website is mostly unbuilt – many of the links (e.g. “about us”) goes to a separate website with placeholders. It’s only really the homepage that works.

    The odd style of wording on the website is repeated in the accounts. They look like accounts for a real company, but the grandiose descriptions of their activity is at odds with the small reported turnover of £1m. The high level of intangibles is not explained; nor are the references to “off-ledger funds” (odd for a non-bank). And the numbers in the balance sheet are all very round – not how real balance sheets look.

    The website suggests the company is regulated – it is not. Its consumer-facing activities, and the financial instrument-holdings described in its accounts, suggest that it should be.

    The company may have falsely claimed to have had a banking licence.

    ADCOF/TDSL is run and owned by a variety of individuals in Singapore, India and Dubai.

    15. P&O Property Accounts Ltd

    Finally we get to a real, non-fraudulent company. P&O Property Accounts Ltd is an administrative company in the P&O group, ultimately owned by Dubai World.

    It appears in this list because, for unknown reasons (possibly a harmless mistake), it was incorporated with the SIC code for “bank”.

    16. Bangko Maharlika Ltd

    The website says it’s the “bank of humanity”, offering various crypto products, but with a strange lack of the legal, contact and privacy information you’d see on a real bank or crypto exchange.

    The company filed bizarre accounts in October 2024 claiming that, as at 30 June 2023, it had £50m exactly of investments, £183m of current assets, and £239 of creditors. Not £239m, or £239k, but £239.

    The company claimed to have lost £250m yet it somehow also claims to be a small company which doesn’t need to file audited accounts. That means turnover of no more than £10.2 million, and assets worth no more than £5.1 million. Needless to say, you cannot lose £250m on a turnover of less than £10.2m.

    Then, two months later, it replaced these with amended accounts for the same period. Investments were now £5bn (exactly). Creditors were £4.95bn – unexplained, but conveniently cancelling out the increase in investments.

    We spoke to one forensic accountant who said he’d never seen more obviously fraudulent accounts.

    The company says it’s owned by a Filipino man called Paul Armand Infante Monozca. The directors are a variety of other individuals – but in reality query if any of these people exist.

    The directors also run a company called Formula Green Corporation Ltd, which appears to have similarly fake accounts.

    Update: the company has written to us complaining about this article. Their head of Public Affairs told us they’re not fraudulent, but she wasn’t able to explain the numbers in the accounts, the way the numbers changed so dramatically, or why they filed as a “small” company. We will keep an open mind as to whether this really is a fraud, or merely people with no understanding of law or accounting.

    17. Genius Bank Ltd

    This company has a billion shares, each with a value of £0.000001 each – so £1,000 in total. The high number of shares triggered our code to shortlist the company, but there are no signs of fraud. It is, however, an unusual arrangement, and it’s unclear how the company was permitted to incorporate with the word “bank”.

    The company’s been dormant for the seven years since it was incorporated, and is owned by a French woman living in the UK.

    We’re guessing it’s an aborted startup, and entirely legitimate.

    18. Suria Global (L) UK Trusted Limited

    This is another more complex and sophisticated arrangement.

    The company’s website describes the business as providing “financial and high-level networking resources for large scale opportunities in South East and North Asia, Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Islands, Europe and ultimately in the United States of America”. This doesn’t mention the UK, but the title of the website is “Suria Global (L) UK Trusted Limited”, which is peculiar.

    The UK business has a separate website which says it “maintains a strategic office” at 27 Old Gloucester Street London WC1. It’s not very strategic, because it’s a postal address, shared by (amongst others) House of Burlesque. The website is unusual for a bona fide business in what it lacks: the company legal name and registration number, any identifiable individuals, or a privacy policy.

    The websites are superficially plausible, much more so than the others in this report. But our contacts in the hedge fund and investment world thought the text was were deeply suspicious: not just the vague language, but the lack of any kind of sector focus. And none of them had heard of Suria.

    The accounts of Suria Global (L) Trusted Limited present £100m of current assets, but this is illusory. The incorporation documents show that the £100m were shares issued to the sole shareholder/director, Omar Yassin Bin Abdullah, for nothing. And that explains why, year after year, the company reports £100m, with no income or expenses. The cash doesn’t exist.

    But this isn’t just a paper company.

    Suria Global (L) Trusted Limited owns a Malaysian company called Suria Global (L) Ltd (although there’s no sign of this in the UK accounts). That Malaysian company previously owned an Australian company called Suria Global (L) Pty Ltd, which went into liquidation amidst accusations of fraud. Its sole director and shareholder was a John Ata Alan Lutui (we don’t know how that is consistent with Suria’s supposed ownership). Lutui failed to attend the court and an arrest warrant was issued; he promptly fled Australia for the US.

    We’ve have heard from a reliable source that Suria has very recently been touting for business.

    So our assumption is that this is an active fraud.

    We wrote to Suria asking for comment, and didn’t hear back.

    The limitations of our approach

    The approach taken by our automated tool is exceedingly simple. It catches just one type of fraud: suspiciously large balance sheets. There are myriad other accounting frauds it can’t begin to identify.

    Inevitably, our approach will also shortlist companies that (like P&O Accounts) are entirely innocuous. So please use the tool with care.

    There are also two significant technical limitations.

    First, the tool only searches accounts filed last year. If a company didn’t file last year, it won’t see its accounts. And the tool isn’t designed to deal with more than one year’s of accounts. It could be modified fairly easily to look across multiple years – at an obvious cost of storage and speed.

    Second, and most importantly, the tool can only access accounts filed electronically. A more sophisticated approach would deal with accounts submitted by post – that’s as many as a third of all companies. There is, however, one benefit of this limitation – larger/complex companies tend to be unable to submit electronically and have to post their accounts to Companies House. So our approach means we are using a set of accounts that omits many legitimate large balance sheets. Of course, if this report becomes widely known, and Companies House doesn’t change its approach, then we may find fraudsters moving to posted accounts to avoid easy electronic scrutiny.

    The response from Companies House

    A spokesperson from Companies House told us:

    We take fraud against the register seriously and all allegations are fully investigated.

    Companies are responsible for filing accounts that are compliant with the law. Where incorrect, suspicious, or fraudulent filings are made, we will take appropriate action. We proactively share information with other relevant government agencies and law enforcement.

    “We are developing systems and processes to enable more checks to determine the accuracy of information delivered to us before it is placed on the register.

    How should the law change?

    But we believe some of our findings in this report suggest the law should change.

    First, companies should be prohibited from choosing the category of “bank”, “central bank” (or other SIC codes that relate to regulated business), without a letter from the Financial Conduct Authority (in the same way as a letter is already required if you want your company to have the word “bank” in its name). Falsely using the word “bank” is a criminal offence under section 24 of FSMA – certainly for the company and plausibly for Companies House as well.

    Second, the current rules exempting small companies from audit are too generous. A company can have a balance sheet of any size at all – even £100 trillion – and , as long as it has fewer than 50 employees and a turnover no more than £5.2m, it’s a “small” company and doesn’t need audited accounts. That creates a loophole that’s being ruthlessly exploited to create fake companies that look like they’re worth a fortune. It’s easy to fix – amend the legislation so that a company with balance sheet assets over (say) £10m always has to file audited accounts, regardless of how recently this happened and regardless of turnover and number of employees.

    Third, to prevent this new rule being subverted, Companies House should introduce verification that a named auditor has actually audited the company’s accounts. As we note above, there are signs that some companies are already faking audits. We’ll be writing more about this soon.

    What should Companies House do?

    Nobody expects Companies House to undertake a detailed audit of the millions of registered companies. But they should be able to use an approach similar to ours to identify companies with obviously suspect accounts.

    Swift action can then be taken:

    • The Companies Act imposes civil penalties where the accounts rules are not followed. A company that’s filed false accounts for years will have incurred multiple £3,000 penalties. These should be immediately charged.
    • The directors have committed a criminal offence unless they can show they “took all reasonable steps” to comply with the rules. That defence seems unlikely to be available for companies with false billion pound balance sheets. The consequence is an unlimited fine and even potential imprisonment.
    • Most important: Companies House has a duty to ensure the integrity of its records. It should use its powers to remove the false accounts from the register. People using the register will then be alerted to the fact the company has not filed accounts.
    • It would be sensible for the false accounts to be still available for viewing, but with a health warning that they have been withdrawn.

    The fraudulent use of UK companies will continue until there are clear adverse consequences for fraudsters.

    There’s no excuse for inaction. Companies House has the data, the legal tools, and now the evidence. The question is: will they act?


    Many thanks to the accountants and forensic accountants who assisted with this report, particularly P and J. Thanks also to J (a different J) for looking through an early draft. And thanks to yet another J who provided us with some important information. Thanks to S for the research on the fake Iranian professor.

    Thanks again to Companies House and the Financial Conduct Authority for their commitment to public access and open data. It’s very possible that other countries have registers as full of frauds as Companies House; but Companies House’s openness means that we in the UK are unusual in being able to spot the frauds so easily.

    Footnotes

    1. A quick note: we provide links to websites for many of these companies. Please exercise extreme caution before clicking on them, given the risk they could contain malware – we would not recommend using a normal desktop browser. We use a dockerised Firefox browser through a VPN. All the website links are set to “no-follow” so we don’t boost their google rankings. ↩︎

    2. Companies can buy their own shares for certain limited purposes, but at that point they must be cancelled (unless acquired out of distributable profits and held “in treasury”, which these clearly aren’t). ↩︎

    3. The website gives an email address, but emails sent to it just bounced. ↩︎

    4. There is a real “Stallion Group” – a West African manufacturer, but its website shows no UK operations and we don’t believe it has any connection to 1 Stallion Ltd. There’s also a Stallion Finance (which may or may not be connected, but also has suspicious accounts) and 1 Stallion Capital (which seems unrelated). ↩︎

    5. Some examples:

      Profit of £190k on a turnover of £12.5bn is very unlikely, and would normally require some explanation. Turnover jumping from £811m to £12.5bn in a year is again very unlikely, and would usually be explained.

      The operations are outside the UK so ordinarily dividends would be received; there’s no sign of them – subsidiaries aren’t even mentioned.

      The accounts show £784m of tangible assets; £516m of capital allowances are claimed; there is an almost identical figure for non-deductible expenses. There is no sign of any return on investments of £583m. Share capital increased from £100m to £4bn with no explanation and no issuance of shares.

      The auditor is far too small for a company of this size. The registered office address is misspelt.

      The company lists numerous global offices and substantial operations in Africa, the Middle East, and beyond, but there’s no sign of this in the financials. The office locations change from page to page. The head office in Dubai does not appear to exist. There are numerous typos. The company claims to have 198 employees. We can’t locate any of them. The figure implies turnover per employee of around £63m. For context, Shell has turnover per employee of about £2m, and this is remarkably high. JPMorgan, about $500k. All in all, the accounts have every appearance of a forensic accounting examination question. ↩︎

    6. That suggests to us that this section of the accounts was copied from real accounts with audit fees of £888,164; the fraudsters then added a ‘000’ so everything would be a thousand times more impressive, but forgot to dial down the audit fees. ↩︎

    7. The business description on the website (a “financial intermediary dedicated to providing innovative solutions to meet your financial needs” is completely different from the description on page 5 of the accounts (“management, trade commission of oil & gas commodities, government securities derivatives and financial instruments”) and different again from that on page 9 (“exploration, procurement, and trade liaison activities”). ↩︎

    8. The firm once provided tax advice for a related company, and presumably that’s when its identify was stolen – but sloppily: the accounts give the wrong address for the firm. We won’t name the firm or individual here – it seems unfair to associate either with a fraudulent use of their name. ↩︎

    9. The company was incorporated with £1 of share capital. There are no records of further shares being issued. Mrs Isaq, lives in the UK and is registered as controlling the company. Until 2024, £3.9bn of shares were held by GCGI Group International LLC and £100m by Ali Hassan, a British citizen living in the UK. The accounts show the shares as fully paid up – Mrs Isaq is a very wealthy woman. ↩︎

    10. Misspelt as Stallion Holding (without the “s”) Ltd in its registry entry, but the company numbers are the same. ↩︎

    11. Compare, for example, with other crypto exchanges. ↩︎

    12. Interestingly, even most of the fraudulent websites we see have a privacy policy; such is the fear of GDPR. ↩︎

    13. A real person wouldn’t do this, save perhaps for a very short period, because it creates a large legal liability. Mr Abdullah owes £100m to the company – an exceedingly unwise thing for a normal person to do. Of course, he may not exist at all. ↩︎

    14. It’s a breach of accounting rules to show unpaid shares as current assets. Under FRS 102, “current assets” are assets that a company could realise within a year. ↩︎

    15. Which means interacting with the Companies House API, downloading a PDF and scraping it. Not that difficult, but much much slower. ↩︎

    16. Potentially only requiring a Minister to put Regulations before the House of Commons ↩︎

  • The £58bn company that doesn’t exist

    The £58bn company that doesn’t exist

    Avis Capital Limited is one of the largest companies in the UK. It says it was spun out from Avis (the car hire company), is FCA-regulated and has £58bn of net assets. It promises investors a 31% return. But all of this is a lie.

    Avis Capital’s accounts are a work of fiction. It’s completely unregulated, and the financial products it sells appear to be fraudulent. It has no connection to the real Avis group. All of this has been facilitated by Companies House accepting filings and accounts which are false on their face, and by accounting firms who failed to notice obvious signs of fraud.

    Companies House’s failure to identify and act on this is a scandal. It could be taking simple steps to stop UK company law being used and abused by criminals. But it isn’t.

    We are aware of even worse cases, and will be reporting on them shortly.

    Avis Capital – the 13th wealthiest company in the UK

    Here’s Avis‘ Capital‘s 2021 accounts – it made a £48bn profit on an initial £10bn, resulting in £58bn of net assets. That would make it the thirteenth biggest company on the FTSE.

    The 2020 column to the right is cut off, but the numbers are almost the same.

    The company then repeated this magic trick in 2022 and 2023: the accounts are identical, to the pound, for each year:

    Trade debtors and creditors, fair value of investments… it’s all the same, every year.

    All while showing no sign of paying any tax on its £48bn profit, and all while claiming the company is dormant.

    Avis Capital is claiming that a multimillion pound business was in exactly the same financial position for three successive years (and almost exactly the same for the previous year). That is not possible – all that cash and other investments will yield a return, that will be taxable, the company will have expenses… all mean that the numbers will inevitably change from one year to another. One expert told us that, for any company with real activities, it was “essentially impossible” for every line on a balance sheet to be unchanged from one year to the next. That’s true for a coffee shop: it’s certainly true for a £58bn financial giant.

    Avis Capital Limited applied Section 1A of FRS 102, simplified accounting standards for small companies. These are inapplicable to a large company like Avis Capital. More significantly, accounts for large companies are required to be audited. Avis Capital Limited filed unaudited accounts.

    The accounting experts we spoke to were certain these accounts are fraudulent.

    Avis Capital – in reality

    We have extensive contacts in banking and finance, in the City and across the world. Nobody has heard of Avis Capital.

    The company’s website says it has 150,000 employees. This is its registered office: an estate agent in Brixton:

    Avis Capital has almost no internet presence aside from its own website, which is full of claims like this:

    The website says Avis Capital was spun out of “the AVIS Car corporation” in 2005. There is no “AVIS Car corporation”; the well-known car-hire business is Avis Budget Group, and it has no connection to Avis Capital.

    There’s also a LinkedIn page boasting that it has “twelve digits of construction cash”…

    The company has a YouTube channel, with 105 subscribers. The most recent video contains vague claims about a “quantum banking system” delivered by an AI generated voiceover…

    Older videos promote financial services through “Avis Bank”:

    And, from 2014, there’s a video promoting the “Avis Humanitarian Foundation”, complete with a music video covering Michael Jackson’s “We Are The World”.

    Aside from Companies House filings and websites/YouTube, the only evidence we can find of Avis Capital’s existence is that on two occasions it was taken to a county court for not paying a debt, a judgment was issued against it, and it didn’t pay:

    The Avis Group

    There are a series of related Avis companies with similarly suspect accounts:

    • Avis Global Green Energy Fund has £19bn of assets and £510m of net assets on its 2023 balance sheet. Its 2022 and 2021 balance sheets are identical.
    • Avis Global Energy Ltd holds Avis Capital Limited and so should have at least £85bn of net assets; but its accounts instead show that its investors put in £5bn, and the company is now worth slightly less than that. Its balance sheets are duplicated from one year to another.
    • Avis Congress Hotels plc is a dormant company with £1bn in cash, and identical balance sheets from 2018 to 2023.
    • Avis Fintech PLC supposedly has £100m of cash, and has done every year since 2019, with no change in its balance sheet.
    • Avis Global Group PLC supposedly has £8m cash in the bank, with its balance sheets never changing.
    • Avis Magnetic Technologies PLC supposedly has £10m cash.
    • Avis Logistic Ltd has £1m in unspecified current assets.
    • Avis Atom Threads PLC has £2bn in “called up share capital not paid” – in other words, the shareholders acquired £2bn of shares but didn’t pay immediately. That is less obviously fraudulent than claiming to have £2bn in cash, but is still not very plausible (normal people don’t agree to acquire shares which means they owe large sums of money to a company).
    • Avis Noage PLC, Avis Vortex Industries PLC, Avis Nuctron PLC – all have £1bn in “called up share capital not paid”.

    Since we published this report, Ray Blake has noticed a 2024 incorporation from the same people:

    • Join Asset Ltd was supposedly incorporated with £1bn paid up shares. It has a website with the same peculiar art style as Avis Capital, and similar vague business descriptions (“tokenised assets”). The website says their values are “honesty, integrity, and transparency”.

    The fraud

    Why would someone, or a group of people, create a ring of fake companies?

    The most likely scenario is that these companies are part of an attempt to defraud investors..

    We see two potential frauds here.

    The first involves Avis Global Energy Ltd, the holding company of the supposedly extremely valuable Avis Capital. Its 2022 confirmation statement shows 70 shareholders, mostly small investors who’ve acquired shares from 2017 to 2022. If these investors paid money for their shares then that could be the fraud: create a fake company, and convince people to buy shares in it.

    The second is more complex, and is revealed by legal documents listed on the Avis Capital website, all of which suggest it is selling sophisticated financial services. The documents are superficially plausible but contain mistakes and oddities. For example, the call option is headed “Institutional Acquicition” and says it is subject to “the laws of the State of United Kingdom”.

    Most notably, there’s a detailed fund memorandum – the kind of document produced when a private fund is being marketed to investors. Here’s the full document, dated 2022:

    The document refers throughout to UK financial services and tax legislation, and may therefore be targeted at UK investors. However it is also possible that the fraud is targeted at foreign investors, with the UK being used to add credibility to the business.

    The key claim in the document is a promise of very high returns:

    The high “gross equivalent” return is because Avis claim that their fund qualifies for a 30% tax relief “offered generally from governments”. This claim is false. Most governments do not offer relief for funds like this, investing in large, well-established companies.

    So, whilst the claim of a 17.1% return is (at best) highly optimistic, the claim that tax credits boost the gross return to over 30% is false.

    We can be reasonably confident that the arrangement is fraudulent from this paragraph alone:

    The Financial Services Authority ceased to exist in 2013, and was replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. None of the Avis companies are authorised by the FCA or the PRA. There is no such thing as a “registered financial management company”; interestingly, the websites using that term all appear to be scams.

    Given that the Avis entities are not regulated, this paragraph is untrue:

    The Financial Services Compensation Scheme does not apply to unregulated providers.

    Many of the fund’s investments are into supposed nanoparticle production by Avis companies, and there’s a nanoparticle catalog on the website dating from 2017. On the left, below, is one page from that catalog. On the right is a page from a 2013 nanoparticle catalog published by Skyspring Nanomaterials, Inc.

    It’s a crude copy. They didn’t even change the fonts or shading.

    It therefore appears likely that the web of fictitious companies was created as part of an investor fraud..

    We have not been able to determine if the fraud was successful. They applied for a LEI (the “legal entity identification” number a company needs to acquire securities). There are suggestions that those running this operation tried, and failed, to register as a bank in Zimbabwe (but we do not know how reliable those reports are). An archived website shows what looks like a fake portal for “Avis Bank”, and there is a discussion on an internet forum where someone says they considered signing up for services from Avis. An online website claims that the Avis entities and individuals are linked to a series of frauds – we cannot verify if the information on the website is correct, and our attempts to reach the authors of the website were unsuccessful.

    From 2020 to 2023, Avis operated a website claiming to help victims of fraud recover their funds (the website is down; that’s an archive link). The style of the website is very different from Avis, but its email domain records were the same. So this appears to have been a separate “line of business” for Avis.

    Avis Capital, and many of the other companies, have recently failed to file accounts and/or confirmation statements on time. This may be a sign that the fraud has ended (successfully or unsuccessfully; we do not know).

    Who is behind Avis Capital?

    The owners

    The directors of Avis Capital and many of the other companies are Gerda Maria Koenig (an Austria resident), Jairo Restrepo Chavez (a UK resident), Alfred Schedler (an Austria resident) and Rosemarie Schell (Austria resident).

    The links in the previous paragraph are to the individuals’ entries in the Paradise Papers, which show them to be owners of a Maltese company called Avis Global Energy Ltd. Ms Schell has a LinkedIn page describing her as “Director Controller & Ambassador of the Avis Global Green Energy Fund, Avis Global Energy & Avis Global Humanitarian Foundation”. Aside from that, we have no information on these individuals.

    The “person with significant control” of Avis Capital Limited is said to be Ms Koenig, both directly and via Avis Global Energy Ltd.

    We wrote to Avis Capital asking for comment and received this:

    We then heard nothing further.

    The facilitators

    The registered office for Avis Capital and the other Avis companies is 102 Acre Lane in Brixton, which is an estate agent, Technoestates. One of the two directors of Technoestates Ltd is Andrew Restrepo Oviedo. Mr Oviedo is also a director of Avis Fintech PLC (the company with £100m of (likely) fictitious cash on its balance sheet), and a minority shareholder in Avis Capital’s parent company, Avis Global Energy Ltd.

    Mr Oviedo owns a separate company called Tabono Corporation Limited. There are two directors: Andrew Restrepo Oviedo and Jairo Restrepo Chavez, who is a director of Avis Capital and most of the other Avis companies. Given the coincidence of names, and the Spanish custom of the father’s surname becoming a child’s first surname, it may be that Andrew Restrepo Oviedo is Jairo Restrepo Chavez’s son.

    We wrote to Mr Oviedo via Technoestates asking for comment; we didn’t hear back.

    We don’t know how involved Mr Oviedo is in the Avis companies; at a minimum he is the director of a company which has filed false accounts, and has missed obvious signs of criminality in that company and the many others that use his office as a registered address. It is also possible he is a victim – particularly if he paid cash for the worthless Avis Global Energy Ltd shares.

    An ICAEW-regulated accounting firm called RMR Partnership LLP provided company secretarial services, and a registered office, to Avis Capital (and other Avis companies) from 11 June 2020 to 24 August 2023 (either through the LLP or via one of their partners, Ragen Amin). It was during this period that Avis Capital Limited filed unaudited accounts claiming implausibly large asset holdings, and repeating balance sheet entries from one year to the next. An accounting firm should have realised these accounts were false, and that they should have been audited.

    Mr Amin also appears to have acquired five million shares in Avis Capital’s parent company, Avis Global Energy Ltd. If he paid money for these shares, it may be that he is a victim of the fraud.

    We wrote to RMR asking for comment; we didn’t hear back.

    We don’t know how involved RMR and Mr Amin were in the Avis companies. At a minimum, an accounting firm was the company secretary of companies that filed obviously false accounts, missed obvious signs of criminality, and in acting for what appears to be a criminal enterprise, may have breached anti-money laundering rules.

    Before RMR Partnership LLP’s involvement, the company secretary to Avis Capital and other Avis companies was Derek Williamson, a forensic accountant who runs Williamson Consultants Ltd. Mr Williamson was appointed in September 2018 and resigned in May 2020.

    We asked Mr Williamson for comment – he sent us the following reply:

    The statement that Avis Capital’s balance sheet was “merely issued share capital” is not correct. The accounts filed with Companies House in 2019 when Mr Williamson was company secretary, show £10bn of shares issued for £10bn cash. If Mr Williamson had checked the 2017 statement of capital, he would have seen that the shares were stated to be issued for cash. We would expect a forensic accountant to have understood this.

    So again, an accountant appears to have missed obvious signs of criminality, and may have breached anti-money laundering rules. On Mr Williamson’s account, he has responded to subsequent signs of improper behaviour, although we are unconvinced that “chasing the company” is a sufficient professional response to the situation.

    Mr Williamson didn’t reply to further enquiries from us; we therefore don’t know who the “accountant” was, or who “Mr H Konig” was. It may have been this individual: H K Koenig, “a pivotal member of the Board of the AVIS Umbrella”, who was jailed for fraud in Austria in the 2000s.

    The PDF metadata for the fund memorandum shows the author as “Helmut Koenig”.

    What offences have been committed?

    The failure by Avis Capital to file audited accounts means the directors committed an offence under section 451 of the Companies Act. There’s a defence where the directors can show they took all reasonable steps to file accounts; that seems unlikely to be relevant in this case.

    There is also a general offence of delivering false documents and/or making false statements to Companies House without reasonable excuse. The company itself and its directors are liable.

    It is an offence under FSMA for a person to claim to be authorised by the FCA when they are not. It is also an offence to market regulated financial products when not authorised.

    What should Companies House have done?

    Avis Capital explicitly uses its Companies House entry as evidence that it is a substantial business. We expect many unsophisticated investors would take Companies House accounts at face value. That is why it’s so important that Companies House maintains the integrity of its records.

    It has always been a criminal offence to knowingly file false accounts or other documents with Companies House. Historically, these rules were almost entirely unenforced. We are aware of only one successful prosecution; it involved someone making prominent politicians directors without their knowledge. This gives the unfortunate impression that company law breaches will only be prosecuted when they affect prominent individuals.

    Since last year, Companies House’s role has been expanded – its statutory objectives include ensuring the integrity of the register, and preventing companies from carrying on unlawful activities. Companies House now has wide powers to correct information and serve binding information requests on directors. It says it’s acted against 75,000 companies.

    These powers should have been used in this case. Avis Capital and the related companies raise numerous red flags that should have triggered action:

    • It is technically straightforward to automatically flag companies with anomalously large balance sheets, and submit them for manual review. Clearly Companies House doesn’t do this.
    • It would also be straightforward to flag companies with large balance sheets and turnover which aren’t filing audited accounts.
    • Avis Capital’s stated areas of business are: “banks”, “financial leasing”, “mortgage finance”, “securities dealing”. These would require a banking licence and/or regulatory authorisation – which Avis Capital doesn’t have. It would be straightforward for Companies House to flag companies whose stated activities conflict with their regulatory status. It would be equally straightforward for the FCA to scrape this information from the Companies House API (the interface that lets computers easily access the Companies House database).
    • We identified Avis Capital by looking at our automated webpage showing PLCs that failed to file accounts on time. Companies House should be able to do this in a much more sophisticated and efficient manner.

    But the most important failure is a failure to enforce the rules.

    If blatant abuses like this were routinely identified and prosecuted, then we’d no longer see fraudsters (and worse) exploiting UK company law.

    What should happen next?

    We believe the information in this report provides enough basis for a criminal investigation into those behind Avis Capital. There have been flagrant breaches of company law and regulatory law. We hope the relevant authorities will take action.

    If a case like this can’t be prosecuted, then the offences in the Companies Act may as well not exist.


    Many thanks to the accountants and forensic accountants who assisted with this report, particularly P and J. Thanks to V for company law input and to K for research and review.

    Footnotes

    1. The accounts say the directors were satisfied the audit exemption in section 477 of the Companies Act applied. Section 477 provides an audit exemption for “small companies”. To be a small company you must satisfy two of the following three tests: fewer than 50 employees, turnover not more than £10.2m, balance sheet not more than £5.1m. Avis Capital Limited has balance sheet and turnover well in excess of these figures. It should have filed audited accounts. Indeed Avis Capital isn’t a “medium-sized company” either – to be a “medium-sized company” you must satisfy two of the following three tests: fewer than 250 employees, turnover not more than £36m, balance sheet not more than £18m. ↩︎

    2. The accounts for previous years are also suspicious. Avis Capital Limited started out in 2017 with £10bn cash in the bank from its shareholders. The statement of capital filed by the directors shows 10 billion shares subscribed, for £1 each, with zero unpaid. It is very strange for a company to just put £10bn in the bank and do nothing with it.

      The company’s accounts were exactly the same in 2018. Even a 1% return would produce £100m each year; any commercial business would expect a much higher return than that. Yet there is no sign of any income at all, or any tax or expenses.

      There was an injection of £23.7bn of debt in 2019, but again the company just sat on the cash for two years, with no change in the balance sheet. The 2019 accounts also rewrote history so that the £10bn in previous years became an amount owed to the company. Perhaps they were claiming the £10bn of shares were not paid up, but the return of capital documents say that they were.

      And the “cut off” 2020 balance sheet columns in the 2021 accounts completely contradict the actual 2020 accounts. ↩︎

    3. The Avis Capital homepage shows the same registered address as we see on Companies House, so there’s little doubt this is the same company. ↩︎

    4. We asked the Avis Budget Group for comment; they have not responded. ↩︎

    5. Some people we spoke to thought it might be money laundering. We don’t believe that’s likely. The aim of money laundering is to take “dirty” money and place it into the financial system in a way that ends up looking like “clean” money. So, for example, setting up what looks like a legitimate business, and intermingling the “dirty” money with the “clean” profits of the real business. The Avis companies don’t look like legitimate businesses and don’t appear to have any legitimate income. ↩︎

    6. The call option also refers to “Central European Time (London Time)”. Other documents are said to be subject to “United Kingdom law” (which does not exist; the law of England and Wales is different from the law of Scotland or Northern Ireland) and refer to “state and federal courts located in the United Kingdom”. The fund memorandum refers throughout to a “tax treaty” without ever saying which treaty is means, or why it a tax treaty relevant. The document uses the term “tax treaty qualifying shares” (which is not a term of art) and says, very optimistically, “An investment in the Fund is expected to benefit from the tax advantages offered generally from governments”. There are many more oddities, all of which suggest the documents may have been plagiarised from real legal documents. ↩︎

    7. In the UK, tax relief is available for “venture capital funds” investing in small companies; the Avis companies are (supposedly) much too large to benefit from this. ↩︎

    8. This is a very obvious point, which we’re embarrassed to have missed in the first published version of this report. Thanks to the many people who wrote pointing it out. ↩︎

    9. RMR’s registered office, Vyman House, is named in the fund memorandum and other documents on the website; it’s also listed in the “Avis Bank” YouTube video. ↩︎

    10. A prosecution of Sanjeev Gupta was recently instigated; again, it seems only the highest profile cases are prosecuted. ↩︎

  • How to reform capital gains tax and cut income tax

    How to reform capital gains tax and cut income tax

    Capital gains tax (CGT) is currently both too high and too low. It taxes investors at too high a rate when they’ve put capital at risk, only to see it eroded by inflation. But it enables a very low rate of tax for people who haven’t put capital at risk, but are able to pay capital gains tax (rather than income tax) on what’s realistically employment income.

    We can fix both these problems by raising the rate but reforming CGT so investors pay a lower effective rate. That could be pure tax reform, or it could potentially raise up to £14bn. Or – my preference – it could be used to cut the rate of income tax and also raise around £6bn. This article explains how.

    This Government was elected on a platform of kickstarting economic growth. It has a large majority, and four or five years until the next election. It’s a rare chance for real pro-growth tax reform. That’s all the more necessary if we are going to see tax rises.

    We’ll be presenting a series of tax reform proposals over the coming weeks. This is the fourth – you can see the complete set here.

    This article is based heavily on a recent IFS paper by Stuart Adam, Arun Advani, Helen Miller and Andy Summers, and a Centax policy paper by Arun Advani, Andy Summers and Andrew Lonsdale.

    The proposals here are also consistent with those in the Mirrlees Review, the magisterial 2010 review of the UK tax system chaired by Nobel laureate James Mirrlees.

    The rate of CGT is too low

    Capital gains tax will raise about £15bn this year.

    The highest rate is usually 20%, but it’s 24% for residential property and 28% for the “carried interest” which private equity fund managers receive from their funds.

    That’s a lot less than income tax, where the highest rate is 45% (48% in Scotland). There’s an even greater gap with tax on employment earnings, where the 45%/48% top rate of income tax is on top of 2% employee national insurance and 13.8% employer national insurance.

    This creates two problems.

    First, many people think it’s intuitively unfair for a wealthy person making a large gain on their shares to pay less than half the tax rate of someone with normal employment income.

    Second, it creates a massive incentive to transform income into capital gains, to reduce your tax. For people who run a business in their own company, this can be as simple as: don’t take dividends out of the company, take loans from the company for now, and in the long term expect to sell the company and make a capital gain. There are many more complicated schemes.

    So we should raise CGT.

    The rate of CGT is too high

    Economic theory says that, if investors put capital at risk, we shouldn’t tax them on the “normal return” (i.e. the risk free return, broadly equivalent to bank rates). If we do, we discourage investment – the investor has done worse than if they’d put cash in the bank, but we’re taxing it anyway.

    We should instead only tax the “super normal return” (i.e. if an investor’s investment pays off).

    CGT does the opposite of this, because no allowance is given for inflation.

    Take an example where I make a less than normal return. Say I bought an asset for £1,000 in 2014, and I sell it for £1,250 today. On the face of it I’ve made a £250 gain. But inflation since 2014 accounts for £230 of that “gain” – I’ve really only made a gain of £20. So if I pay 20% capital gains tax on £250, that equates to an effective tax on my “real” gain of 250%.

    The longer an investor holds an asset, the greater these effects become. If the investment doesn’t pay off, I’ve made no money (in real terms), but pay tax anyway. I may decide I’m better off spending the money.

    Another bad feature of CGT is that I’m taxed on any gain, but if I make a loss then I can’t use that loss to reduce my general tax burden. HMRC takes a slice out of the upside (fair enough) but won’t share in the downside (unfair).

    All of this means that CGT in its present form discourages investment, particularly long term investment. It acts as a disincentive to people putting capital at risk, which is something we want to encourage.

    By contrast, take an example where I make a super-normal return. Say I buy an asset for £1,000 last week, and sell it for £2,000 today. The normal return is (almost) nothing, and I pay 20% CGT on my super-normal return.

    This is not how a tax system should work.

    So we should cut CGT.

    How to raise and lower CGT at the same time

    How do we cut CGT for people putting capital at risk, but raise it for others?

    Surprisingly that’s simple: we simply increase the rate, but create a new allowance for the “normal return” on the original investment.

    We used to have an allowance for inflation; this would work precisely the same way, but with a different rate. And in the internet age, applying an uplift to acquisition prices in peoples’ tax returns is trivially easy.

    Say we raise the rate to 40% and create a normal return allowance:

    • In the first example above, where my gain is swallowed by inflation, the normal return over 2014-2024 would be something like 40%. So we have to compare my acquisition cost uprated by the normal return (£1,000 x 1.40 = £1,400) with my sale price (£1,250). I’ve made a loss – no CGT to pay.
    • In the second example, the rate increases from 20% to 40% – a sensible result.

    So we have succeeded in cutting and raising CGT, at the same time.

    This is too complicated. Why not just raise the rate?

    If you take the current top rates to 45% then simple arithmetic suggests that would raise about £14bn per year. Why not?

    Because it would be a very bad mistake.

    It would greatly exacerbate the current effect of CGT to discourage long term investment.

    It also won’t raise anything like the £14bn figure. It could lose money

    Simple arithmetic often fails to sensibly estimate the yield of tax changes, because it doesn’t take into account “behavioural effects” – people doing things differently, in response to the tax change.

    The £14bn figure comes from an Office of Tax Simplification paper, which makes clear that the behavioural effects would be extreme:

    What are these behavioural effects? Some mixture of:

    • If you announce a CGT change in advance of it taking effect (which is what’s always happened in the past), then people sitting on large unrealised gains can sell their property before the rate changes. They “accelerate” their gain.
    • Once the change comes into effect, people who want to sell could take the view that the rate is bound to come down again soon, and “defer” their gain. This is particularly likely if there have been many recent changes in tax rates, or the Government is not expected to last many more years.
    • What if someone has a very large gain (e.g. an entrepreneur about to sell their company for billions of pounds), but can’t sell before the rate changes? They have another option. They can leave the UK for somewhere that doesn’t tax foreign gains (and many countries fit the bill here). Then sell and pay no tax.
    • There’s a very similar result if, instead of leaving the UK, a taxpayer dies. When the children (say) inherit the asset (which will often be exempt from inheritance tax), all the historic gain is wiped out. Any future sale by the children is taxed on the capital gain from the point they inherited. So an elderly investor facing a CGT bill has a powerful incentive to simply not sell their assets.

    This isn’t theory – we can see these effects with each of the many, many, changes to capital gains tax over the last 25 years. Massive taxpayer responses:

    CGT is particularly susceptible to these issues, because people control when they sell assets.

    There’s more evidence of that in a recent paper by Arun Advani, Andy Summers and others. People who’d received income into companies were liquidating them to make a capital gain. Then the Government announced that, from 6 April 2016, this structure would no longer work. That prompted a huge rush of people liquidating companies to beat the deadline:

    And this is why HMRC’s “ready reckoner“, showing the effect of changing tax rates, shows that an increase to the top rate of CGT will lose significant amounts of revenue. That was the problem with the Green Party’s general election proposal to raise the rate.

    The lesson is: any increase in capital gains needs to be made very carefully indeed.

    How to avoid leaking tax

    There is a significant risk of tax leakage, as taxpayers think they’ll lose out and take steps to avoid the new higher rate. So any rise in CGT needs to be accompanied by a policy package:

    • There should be an “exit tax”, like many other countries already have, so that gains made in the UK are taxed in the UK. And, to be fair and coherent, we should stop taxing people who’ve moved to the UK on gains they made before they came to the UK (in the jargon, we should “rebase” their assets when they arrive here). I talked about exit taxes and entry rebasing in more detail here. But, in short, people would usually opt for the exit tax to be deferred to the point they actually sell the asset. Given the number of other countries that have exit taxes – the US, Australia, France, Germany – for us to create an exit tax shouldn’t put the UK at a competitive disadvantage.
    • Instead of death erasing historic capital gains, anyone inheriting an asset should also inherit its embedded capital gain. So, when they come to sell, they pay on the asset’s original capital gain as well as the capital gain during their own period of ownership. It is only fair that any inheritance tax is reduced to reflect this practical reduction in the value of the asset (so there is no double tax here).
    • Capital losses should be fully utilisable against other income/profits.
    • Abolish the existing Business Asset Disposal relief, whose initials tell you precisely what its reluctant creators thought of it..

    And there has to be an allowance for the normal return, otherwise the rise in tax will harm investment.

    The rate change, and the reforms, need to apply immediately after the Budget speech, so people can’t accelerate sales to keep the old rate.

    It would be a very serious mistake to increase CGT without these changes. Investment would suffer, and CGT revenues would likely fall. Winners from the new system would benefit; potential losers would avoid the tax.

    The authors of the recent Centax paper agree. Andy Summers said:

    Our proposed package of reforms is about much more than just raising rates. In fact, there’s a big risk that if this is all the government does in the upcoming Budget, it will seriously backfire. There’s big money available, but only if the government is bold and takes on major reform.

    Arun Advani is more blunt:

    if they hike the rate without doing anything else that is a terrible idea. It would be easy to avoid and be bad for growth.

    Winners and losers

    Tax reforms almost always have winners and loses.

    The clear winners are people who hold an asset which has risen in cash terms, but fallen in real terms (after inflation). Right now, they pay CGT when they sell. They’ll pay less tax. Better than that; they’ll get a loss they can use to shelter other income/profits.

    Also winners: people whose assets have risen in real terms, but beat the normal return by a sufficiently small amount that they benefit more from the normal return allowance than they lose from the rise in rates. They’ll pay less tax.

    So for many investors, large and small, and in shares and property, these reforms represent a tax cut.

    But people who significantly beat the normal return will pay more tax.

    We can quantify this. Say the new rate is 40% and the normal return is 5%. Anyone making an annualised return of less than 10% wins from the proposal; anyone making a return of more than 10% loses.

    You’d be forgiven for thinking that this is such a high break-even point that hardly anyone would be paying capital gains tax under our proposal. The surprising answer (from this Advani/Summers paper) is that nearly half of all capital gains are from shares in private companies where the annualised return was over 100%:

    The reason is simple: these are cases where someone starts a company with little or no capital of their own, works for it for many years, and then sells it at a large gain. This wasn’t a return on their financial capital; it was a return on their human capital – remuneration for their labour. But it’s currently taxed as a capital gain, at a lower rate than tax on normal income. It shouldn’t be.

    And private equity executives’ “carried interest” is also in this category. They pay next-to-nothing for interests in their funds which become incredibly valuable if the funds succeed. Currently taxed as a capital gain at a lower rate than income but, again, it shouldn’t be.

    People in these scenarios would pay significantly more tax than at present. If rates were equalised, it would potentially raise £14bn – and most of this new tax comes from these people.

    What does this do to incentives for entrepreneurs?

    I would say: very little. Very few people starting a company today think about what the CGT consequences would be when they sell it in say fifteen years time. If they did think about it, they’d sensibly conclude from history that CGT rates today are no guide to where they will be in fifteen years time.

    There is very little evidence that lower rates of CGT influence entrepreneurship/company start-up rates – our literature search found none. There is, however, evidence that few entrepreneurs consider CGT when they start up a new business – see this IPPR report.

    There is also detailed analysis in the Centax paper (starting on page 32), looking at studies of historic CGT changes in Canada and the US.

    But there would be very real and positive effects for investors who put capital at risk. There is good evidence that has a significant and positive effect on startups, because it makes it easier for them to access capital.

    What should the rate be?

    There are three approaches:

    One answer is to simply equalise rates to the appropriate income tax rate (45% for most assets; 39.35% for shares) whilst creating an investment allowance. The Advani/Summers paper plausibly estimates that would raise £14bn (and that’s a real £14bn, which fully accounts for behavioural effects).

    Another answer would be to raise the rate of CGT less than this. Enough to make the proposals break even, or further – but not to 45%. We’d improve incentives to invest, and reduce the incentive to avoid tax. Raise some lesser sum than £14bn.

    But that loses the wider benefits of equalising rates – an end to income-to-capital avoidance, and considerable simplification (given all the anti-avoidance rules that would become irrelevant).

    So, if the aim is (at least in part) tax reform rather than revenue-raising, a better idea is to equalise rates but reduce the rate of income tax. For example, cutting all income tax rates by 2% would cost about £14bn – so doing this, and raising CGT to that point would, therefore, be broadly neutral.

    Or we could cut all income tax rates by 1% and raise CGT to that point. This would raise around £6bn of additional tax: that would probably be my preference, given the fiscal constraints.

    So why not?

    There are political challenges here.

    The first is that a headline CGT rate of 45% would be the highest in the developed world:

    The effective rate would be much lower, because of the normal return allowance, but that may be too subtle a point to affect perceptions.

    The second is that the losers, entrepreneurs who start a company with nothing and make a very large gain, have a powerful political voice. I don’t see how these proposals would change their incentives – but I expect many entrepreneurs will disagree.

    The third is the risk that politicians see the large figures in the Advani/Summers paper, and think that a simple rise in CGT is the answer, without reform. That would be a disaster.

    The fourth is that the numbers are dependent on the Advani/Summers research. I’ve been through it in detail and am convinced; in fact it appears overly conservative in places. But I am not an economist. HM Treasury would need to undertake a very serious analysis before committing to this kind of reform.

    With these caveats, I’m strongly in favour of proceeding with reform. In the present environment, I’d cut income tax by 1%, raise CGT to the new income tax levels, and then book the c£6bn of proceeds as additional tax revenue.


    Many thanks to Arun Advani and Andy Summers.

    Photo by Austin Distel on Unsplash

    Footnotes

    1. Leaving aside for now the very high top marginal rates that can apply. ↩︎

    2. You can use a capital loss against a capital gain, but only a capital gain – not normal income. ↩︎

    3. NB this is only for UK residents; non-residents aren’t subject to UK capital gains tax, except on land and property. ↩︎

    4. Great care would need to be taken structuring the exit tax, so that people couldn’t escape it using double tax treaties. Treaties are supposed to stop people being taxed twice on the same income/gain, but are frequently used to stop people being taxed even once on an item of income/gain. ↩︎

    5. An interesting consequence is that anyone in this category who tried to “beat the Budget” by selling property ahead of it, to book a gain before the rate went up, will actually have lost money. ↩︎

    6. The formula to give the breakeven return for a new tax rate t and normal return n is: (n x t) / ( t – 20%). ↩︎

    7. It’s sometimes suggested that this is a special kind of labour, because an entrepreneur is taking a small salary in the hope of a large future payoff, but with a significant risk that payoff never comes. However, this situation is by means unique to entrepreneurs. There are many careers where people are gambling that their small initial income will be compensated for by a large payoff in later years, and therefore they accept the opportunity cost of failing to receive an income from a “normal” job. Think: actors, sportspeople – even some legal careers. ↩︎

    8. In particular, I think they underestimate the value of the US “buy, borrow, die” strategy because they assume that assets are subject to US estate tax. In practice, nobody of means pays US estate tax – it is even more full of loopholes than our inheritance tax. ↩︎

  • GC Wealth – the £bn tax avoidance scheme that could be fraud

    GC Wealth – the £bn tax avoidance scheme that could be fraud

    We’ve been investigating a Belize company called GCWealth. It says its offshore trusts can eliminate tax on your assets, and prevent your spouse or creditors ever accessing the assets. And GCWealth claims that billions of pounds have been put into their schemes in the last fifteen years.

    Our experts believe GCWealth’s claimed tax, divorce and insolvency benefits don’t actually exist. The schemes only work if the authorities don’t find out about them. That suggests this may be fraud, not avoidance.

    The GCWealth schemes, like others before them, shows that the current approach to dealing with tax avoidance isn’t working.

    Promoters remain free to push highly aggressive schemes that border on fraud. They do so from offshore companies that – they think – make them untouchable. And we believe that this kind of avoidance/evasion is part of the reason why the small business “tax gap” is so large. It’s time to make promoters of such schemes pay, with harsh penalties and criminal sanctions.

    This report outlines the GCWealth schemes, explains why they don’t work under current law, and proposes specific changes to criminalise promoters like GCWealth.

    The two schemes

    This is GCWealth’s document promoting its “business asset trust” (PDF version here):

    The scheme works like this:

    • GCWealth’s client declares a trust over property (or indeed any asset), so that it remains in the taxpayer’s name, but beneficial ownership passes to a Belize trust.
    • The taxpayer sets up a new UK company which becomes the beneficiary of the trust (i.e. it’s a trust inside a trust).
    • Then, through steps that are not set out in these documents, the asset supposedly becomes free from income tax, capital gains tax and inheritance tax.
    • GCWealth also claim that the trust means that your “assets protected from 50/50 split upon divorce”. In other words, if you divorce, and a court split the marital assets, you’d keep all the assets in the trust.
    • And GCWealth say the “assets [are] immediately sheltered from bankruptcy, insolvency proceedings”. So if you owe your creditors money, but have put assets in trust, your creditors wouldn’t have access to them. 

    These are bold claims.

    Here is the document promoting a second scheme, the “creditor protection trust” (PDF version here):

    This second scheme works like this:

    • The client has a pre-existing small business run through a company.
    • Normally the company would pay corporation tax on its profits, and pay dividends to the client – with the client paying income tax on the dividends.
    • Under this scheme, all the profit made by the client’s company is contributed to the trust.
    • GCWealth say the company’s payments to the trust are deductible for corporation tax purposes. So the company pays zero corporation tax.
    • The money, now in the trust, is then lent by the trust to the client under successive ten year interest-free loans.
    • And GCWealth say that the client receives the loans tax-free.
    • GCWealth say the structure “spans over a hundred years in its use”. We don’t know what that means.

    Again these are ambitious claims.

    The PDF metadata of both documents show that they were created by “Bobby” in 2021; we have received reports of the scheme being promoted in 2022, 2023 and 2024.

    Both schemes have a fee of 15% of the amounts put into trust. That will be a very large amount. If the claim that billions of pounds have gone into these schemes is correct, then over £100m of fees will have been received.

    Why the schemes fail

    We’ve spoken to leading private client tax advisers, and they believe the claims made in the two documents are fictitious.

    The documents say that the taxpayer retains control of his assets at all times, despite the trust arrangement. That suggests that the arrangements may in fact be a “sham“, and there is no trust at all.

    But a sham may be the best-case outcome for GCWealth’s clients. If it’s not a sham, the first scheme (the “business asset trust”) won’t be effective, and may trigger large up-front taxes:

    • The transfer of assets to the trust will likely result in an immediate 20% inheritance tax charge (once beyond the £325k nil rate band). The trust would be subject to a 6% charge every ten years and on any exit of any assets from the trust.
    • We’d expect capital gains tax to be triggered on the transfer of assets to the trust unless “hold-over relief” applies. Whether hold-over relief would in principle be available isn’t clear from the description in these documents, but it requires a taxpayer to make a claim to HMRC, and we suspect users of this scheme wouldn’t be minded to tell HMRC about it.
    • The client (as settlor) or company (as beneficiary) would ordinarily be subject to capital gains tax on the trust’s capital gains, and the trustee subject to income tax on the trust’s income. We’ve no idea why the document says “any rental stream for the asset is now tax free” and “any sale of the asset is free from CGT”. Possibly there are mechanics behind the scenes that supposedly prevent the usual trust tax rules applying. We are doubtful this is possible in principle, but even if it was, we would expect the general anti-abuse rule (GAAR) would apply.
    • Where the assets consist of land in England or Northern Ireland then the trust’s acquisition of the interest in the assets may trigger a stamp duty land tax charge on the market value of the land. If the property is residential then the rate could be up to 17%.
    • Where the assets consist of UK shares and (as the document suggests) the beneficiary is a connected company, there will be a stamp duty reserve tax charge equal to 0.5% of the market value of the shares.
    • The document says “It does not matter if the asset has borrowing/mortgage. The lender does not need to be notified as the beneficial title of the net equity is transferred to the client’s own UK new company”. We’ve seen these claims before and they are usually false. That’s our view, and also that of the mortgage lenders’ industry body. So, if a mortgaged property is put into trust, the mortgage will probably be defaulted.

    We expect the second scheme (the “creditor protection trust”) also fails to provide a tax benefit, and may trigger large up-front taxes:

    • The contribution to the trust by the client’s company will be non-deductible for corporation tax purposes, because it isn’t made for wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the company’s trade. Indeed it’s nothing to do with the trade.
    • After the most recent wave of attempts to avoid employment tax, the “disguised remuneration” rules were introduced. If you are a director, and receive what is in substance a reward, via a third party, then you get taxed. These rules will apply here. Possibly there are mechanics intended to defeat the disguised remuneration rules – it is not obvious how even in principle this could be achieved but, even if it was, we expect the GAAR would apply, as it already has to another variant on a remuneration trust structure.
    • Realistically, the contributions to the trust by the company are gifts. We expect they will be subject to a 25% inheritance tax entry charge in the hands of the company’s shareholders (beyond the £325k nil rate band).

    Both schemes end up being a tax disaster for GCWealth’s clients.

    Failure to disclose the scheme

    DOTAS

    Tax avoidance schemes are required to be disclosed to HMRC under the DOTAS rules. Given that the two GCWealth schemes have a main benefit of creating a tax advantage, and there is a 15% fee, it is in our view reasonably clear that the schemes should have been disclosed. We asked GCWealth on three occasions if they disclosed and they failed to answer. We therefore believe that GCWealth unlawfully failed to disclose.

    Where an offshore promoter fails to disclose a scheme, the clients themselves are required to disclose. The promoter can also be subject to penalties of up to £1m.

    IHTA return

    There is a special reporting rule that applies to anyone who, in the course of their trade/profession, is involved in the creation of an offshore trust for a UK settlor, but inheritance tax isn’t paid when the trust is established.

    We expect no inheritance tax was paid on the establishment of these trust structures, which means that this rule will have applied, and a return should have been made to HMRC. We doubt that it was.

    Other registration rules

    Any offshore trust/settlement owning UK real estate is required to register with the Trust Registration Service. Does GCWealth register its trusts?

    Offshore entities with beneficial ownership of land in England & Wales are required to register with the Register of Overseas Entities. Does GCWealth do this?

    Tax avoidance or fraud?

    There are a number of signs that the promoter either has no understanding of tax, or is engaged in a deliberate deceit:

    • The claim that this is “not a tax avoidance scheme” is laughable. The only purpose of this arrangement is to avoid tax and other legal obligations.
    • The first document (“business asset trust”) says that “HMRC are bound by the validity of the structure”. They are clearly not, and we don’t believe any competent lawyer or tax adviser would think otherwise.
    • The second document (“creditor protection trust”) says that “HMRC accept the validity of the structure”. Either HMRC have been shockingly negligent, or this is a lie.
    • The description in the second document says “the client will also be a beneficiary to the trust ie a creditor”. A beneficiary is not a creditor. Perhaps this is a deliberate attempt to muddy the waters, or perhaps the author does not understand trusts.
    • The documents claim that “The very nature of the structure means that it is not subject to the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR)”. The GAAR guidance contains numerous examples of the GAAR applying to trusts and the GAAR advisory panel has issued a decision on an offshore remuneration trust structure. Why wouldn’t the GAAR apply to these variants? And any tax adviser knows it is the general anti-“abuse” rule.
    • We see no proper basis for a DOTAS disclosure not being made.
    • We are confident HMRC would challenge these schemes if it became aware of them (and we are aware of one case where HMRC did become aware and did challenge). But the way the first scheme works, with a “silent” trust that operates behind the scenes, means that it will be very hard for HMRC to discover the existence of the schemes unless they are properly disclosed in tax returns. We expect that scheme users do not properly disclose the scheme, with either no disclosure or misleading disclosure. Deliberate concealment is potentially tax fraud.

    How much have these schemes cost taxpayers?

    GCWealth says that the structure has “Protected several £Billion wealth since 2009” and that their clients includes “business owners in every major industry sector; some of the UK’s wealthiest families; some of the UK’s leading sportspeople; property developers and investors”.

    We don’t know if these claims are true. But if they are, we expect that the schemes have resulted in a cost to the taxpayer of around £1bn, thanks to GCWealth’s clients having failed to pay tax that in our opinion was legally due.

    Divorce protection

    GCWealth claims the first scheme, the “business asset trust” means your “assets protected from 50/50 split upon divorce”. It’s a variant of the “deed in the drawer” structure that’s been used for centuries. As one judge recently summarised it:

    “The phenomenon of the “deed in the drawer” is one that is now frequently encountered. X appears to be the owner of a property, and people lend to him or otherwise deal with him on the footing that he owns it. But if X becomes bankrupt or the subject of enforcement proceedings a deed is produced which shows that in truth he holds the property upon trust for somebody else. In some cases these deeds are simply not authentic. In other cases they are authentic, but simply not noted in any public register.”

    We spoke to barristers and solicitors specialising in chancery law, family law, and nuptial agreements, and they all expected the trust would fail to achieve this:

    • As noted above, it could be attacked as a sham on conventional Chancery principles (because in a real trust the settlor does not have full control of the assets).
    • If not a sham, the fact the client has control of the assets suggests that it is simply the “property and other financial resources of the client, and part of the “matrimonial pot” in the same way as any other asset. The arrangement achieves nothing.
    • If not a sham and the client somehow doesn’t have influence/control, the question is whether the trust was created “with an intention to defeat” the spouse’s financial claims. If it was, then the court could make an order to set it aside under section 37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act. There is a rebuttable presumption that the trust was created with such an intention if it was created less than three years before the date of the court application. Even after three years the experts we spoke to thought that the structure was plainly motivated by a desire to defeat a claim for financial relief, and therefore it would be hard to resist a section 37 order..

    The specialists we spoke to concluded from this, and the incorrect reference to the “50/50 split”, that the promoters of the scheme have no expertise in this area and did not take appropriate advice.

    Insolvency protection

    The documents also promise that the trusts mean your assets are “immediately sheltered from bankruptcy, insolvency proceedings”. This claim is false.

    Gifts into a trust will be set aside if made within two years of your bankruptcy, or five years if you were insolvent at the time. And a gift made at any time can be set aside if a court is satisfied that the gift was made for the purpose of putting assets beyond the reach of a person who is making, or may at some time make, a claim against him.

    The confidence with which a clearly incorrect claim is made again suggests that the promoters have no expertise and did not take appropriate advice.

    Bobby Gill

    The man behind these companies is a British solicitor called Bobby Gill.

    Gill says he’s “been a leading international corporate lawyer for over 2 decades”. He is indeed a solicitor (non-practising) but, whilst we have extensive contacts in international and offshore law firms, we couldn’t find anybody who’s heard of him. He has no web presence except amateur looking Wix and WordPress sites, and what look like paid-for profile pieces on obscure websites.  

    Gill’s sole public visibility arises from his ownership of a business called Swisspro Asset Management AG which attracted investors on the basis it would undertake currency trading and pay them a 2% per month fixed return (which equates to a 27% annualised return). We’ve spoken to FX traders and fund managers – none regard this as plausible.

    Swisspro became insolvent in 2019, as did a related UK funding entity called GCW Funding Limited. The Swiss financial regulator issued a “cease and desist” order to Gill, requiring him to cease accepting investments (machine translated version here). According to Bloomberg, the Swiss regulator said in a letter to creditors that the business “appears a Ponzi scheme”. Ordinary investors lost large sums.

    Gill gave a personal guarantee for £1.5m borrowed by Swisspro. Swisspro started to get into financial difficulties in 2017 and the lender called on the loan in 2018. Gill tried to argue that, because the guarantee had been signed electronically, he wasn’t bound by it. The dispute ended up at the High Court, which wasn’t impressed with Gill’s attempt to escape the guarantee he’d signed.

    It’s hard to understand why Gill ever thought his business could produce such high returns for investors. He told us that the failure was the fault of an FX trader engaged by Swisspro, who has since been convicted for fraud and money laundering and is currently an international fugitive. That doesn’t explain why Gill made the claim of a 2% return per month, or why he continued to take customer money well after the point that Swisspro was unable to repay the £1.5m loan.

    As a non-practising solicitor, Gill remains bound by SRA rules which prohibit solicitors from promoting aggressive tax avoidance schemes. We have reported Gill to the SRA.

    GCWealth

    GCWealth has no online presence (the similarly named company that does is completely unrelated). It reaches clients and wealth advisors through direct sales.

    Gill established GC Wealth Limited as a UK company, and in 2016-2018 it had significant fee income. But its accounts for 2019 appear to be badly wrong, with the 2019 balance sheet identical, to the pound, to the 2018 balance sheet:

    It also looks as those there may have been aggressive tax avoidance to prevent the company’s profits being taxed. At some point around 2019 that company became dormant and the business moved to “GCWealth Administrators Limited” and two associated companies in Belize:

    Has the scheme been challenged?

    One client sued Gill and his associated companies for negligence back in 2018. We don’t know the outcome, but infer from the lack of action that it was settled. There was another case against Gill around the same time; we don’t know what it involved.

    There are signs that HMRC is aware of GCWealth’s activities. We believe there is one live case where HMRC is challenging a UK taxpayer who used a GCWealth scheme. And HMRC applied at the end of last year to wind up GCWealth RT Limited (but we don’t know why, or what that company did).

    However, Gill and GCWealth are not on HMRC’s list of named promoters and avoidance schemes, and aren’t subject to a “stop notice” making promotion a criminal offence. They should be.

    Links to other schemes

    Bobby Gill appears to be connected to notorious tax avoidance scheme promoter Paul Baxendale-Walker. We understand that Gill used to sell PBW remuneration trust schemes, and the trust schemes described in this article are very similar to PBW structures. We do not know if this is coincidence, if PBW helped create the schemes or if Gill just copied/modified existing PBW structures.

    There also a surprising connection to the OneCoin Ponzi fraud we covered earlier this year, through the “C” in “GC Wealth” – a lawyer called Robert Courtneidge. Gill’s original UK company was once called Gill & Courtneidge Wealth Limited (although Courtneidge no longer appears directly involved), and Courtneidge was described by the High Court as a friend of Gill. Courtneidge was a lawyer to the OneCoin Ponzi fraud and has been associated with other failed businesses (although he has not been accused of any wrongdoing).

    The other individual known to have been involved in GCWealth is a woman called Marianna Timmini. We don’t know anything about her.

    We are working on an application that will visualise connections between individuals linked to UK companies – it’s not quite ready for public consumption, but the GCWealth connections look like this:

    Bobby Gill’s response

    Gill sent us a response in which he said “The company has never engaged in any form of ‘tax avoidance’, aggressive or not. Indeed it has never engaged in any form of tax planning.”

    We view that as completely untrue. The trusts have no purpose other than to avoid tax and hide assets from creditors or a spouse. We believe any reasonable tax adviser would see this as highly aggressive tax avoidance.

    We put to Gill that the structure was technically hopeless. His response was that we’d only seen two page summaries. In many cases that would be a fair criticism: it would be unwise to judge the efficacy of (for example) Google’s tax structure, or the Duke of Westminster’s inheritance tax planning, on the basis of a two page summary. However just as a physicist would feel confident dismissing a miraculous perpetual motion machine on the basis of a two page summary, we feel reasonably confident dismissing a scheme that achieves the fiscal miracle of nullifying all tax from an asset. We have also seen correspondence between Gill and advisers acting on behalf of people interested in the GCWealth schemes. The pattern is always the same: when advisers ask technical questions, Gill stops responding to emails.

    We asked Gill three times if the trusts had been disclosed under DOTAS. He avoided answering directly, but instead said HMRC were aware of the trusts,. That is not the same thing. The requirement to notify HMRC of a tax avoidance scheme applies regardless of whether HMRC are “aware” of the scheme. We infer from Gill’s response that no DOTAS notification has been made. And that’s what we’d expect for this kind of scheme – marketing it is much more difficult if it’s been disclosed to HMRC as a tax avoidance scheme.

    We set out our correspondence with Gill in full here.

    How can these schemes be stopped?

    We have three recommendations:

    First, use and expand existing powers

    HMRC needs to be more proactive identifying and naming schemes. We believe HMRC is aware of the GCWealth scheme. Why isn’t it on HMRC’s published list of avoidance schemes?

    When schemes are put on the list, it’s only for twelve months. That’s a silly limitation of current law – the law should be changed.

    Second, make it a criminal offence to fail to disclose avoidance schemes

    One constant in all the tax avoidance schemes we see is that none are disclosed to HMRC under DOTAS, the rules requiring notification of tax avoidance schemes. The technical basis for this is either non-existent or nonsensical. The real rationale is that nobody can sell an avoidance scheme that’s been disclosed under DOTAS

    This needs to change.

    It should be a criminal offence to fail to disclose a scheme under DOTAS where no reasonable adviser would have thought there was a reasonable basis for failing to disclose. It would be important for HMRC to make clear that the offence would never be applied to a genuine mistake; the measure would be a failure if it concerned normal tax advisers. The offence should be carefully calibrated to only impact the cowboys, and there should be a defence where the breach occurred despite a person taking reasonable steps to comply with DOTAS.

    Third, end the offshore promoter loophole

    Many of HMRC’s powers are hard to enforce against offshore promoters of tax avoidance schemes. Obtaining an offshore promoter’s client lists and documentation is, for example, very difficult.

    Tax avoidance scheme promoters have taken ruthless advantage of this by moving their businesses offshore. We would speculate that this is why Gill moved his GC Wealth business from the UK to Belize in 2018.

    The obvious solution is to simply prohibit offshore entities from promoting tax avoidance schemes (broadly defined), with criminal penalties for breach, and enhance penalties for taxpayers using such schemes.


    Many thanks to all the experts who contributed to this report, including: O, M and James Quarmby (personal tax), Elis Gomer (chancery law), S (SDLT and general technical review), N (divorce law), K (insolvency law), C and P (accounting), E (additional research) and O, F and B for their FX and fund management insights. As is always the case, Tax Policy Associates Ltd takes sole responsibility for the content of the report.

    Documents © GCWealth Administrators Limited, and reproduced here in the public interest and for purposes of criticism and review.

    Footnotes

    1. The document actually says that “the beneficial title sits” with the company. That can’t be right, because it implies the arrangement is a bare trust, which would have no tax effect. Probably the author doesn’t understand the difference between a beneficiary and beneficial title. ↩︎

    2. The document expressly says the company is the beneficiary of the trust. But it also says, in the previous sentence: “The trust structure is set up so that the power in the trust to hold the assets are held by the client in a UK new company specifically set up as part of the structure, of which the client is the sole shareholder and director” which is incoherent, but perhaps suggests the company manages the trust? ↩︎

    3. These steps sometimes include an intermediate non-UK company which acquires the asset and makes the contribution to the trust. This appears to be an attempt to fool UK settlement rules – it won’t work. ↩︎

    4. Metadata is the data created when by software that creates or edits documents, but which is not visible onscreen when you view the document. The metadata in a PDF file can, for example, be seen in Acrobat by selecting File/Document Properties. It is important not to read too much into metadata – if I set up a computer as belonging to Napoleon then PDFs created on that computer by Acrobat would (by default) show Napoleon as the author. And the author, data and other metadata in a document can easily be manipulated. So metadata should be regarded as no more than indicative. ↩︎

    5. It looks like GCWealth accept that VAT should be paid on 5%, but then try to argue the remaining 10% is exempt. That is in our view incorrect – it’s all realistically a fee for advice, and VAT therefore applies. ↩︎

    6. The incoherent sentence noticed above (“The trust structure is set up so that the power in the trust to hold the assets are held by the client in a UK new company specifically set up as part of the structure”) also adds to the feeling that this is not a real trust. ↩︎

    7. This is just a short summary; there are a large number of anti-avoidance rules which may apply here, not least the transfer of assets abroad rules ↩︎

    8. The settlor interested trust rules would seem to apply to tax the income in the hands of the client, as if there had been no trust ↩︎

    9. The GAAR doesn’t care about how clever your technical argument is, which is one of the reasons why we are reasonably confident this scheme doesn’t work despite not having access to those technical arguments. ↩︎

    10. The rules in Scotland and Wales are different; we expect there would be adverse effects, but we have not discussed with Scottish and Welsh tax experts. ↩︎

    11. The deemed market value rule in s53 will apply if the purchaser for SDLT purposes is a connected company. The rules as to who is the “purchaser” in para 3 Sch 16 Finance Act 2003 have the effect that, if the beneficial owner under the trust is the company, then the company is treated as the purchaser.  GCWealth’s promotion document suggests that “the beneficial title sits with the client’s own UK new company.”  If that is the effect of the documents, then large SDLT liabilities are likely to arise. ↩︎

    12. i.e. 3% above the normal rate if a company holds the property, and 2% extra if the company/ trust/new owner is treated as non-UK resident for SDLT purposes. The flat 15% rate could apply if an individual dwelling were worth over £500K, although though with reliefs, eg for a property rental business. The non-resident 2% rate applies on-top of the 15% rate. ↩︎

    13. Broadly speaking – it’s a little more complicated than this ↩︎

    14. Payments to a trust for the benefit of employees are only deductible when and if the employees are taxed on the payments. However that’s only if the payments are deductible on general principles. Here the document goes out of its way to say that the loans “aren’t in any way connected in (sic) the client’s capacity as employee/director of the business”. That is supposed to help the analysis. It doesn’t – but query if it would prevent the company obtaining a deduction, even when (inevitably) the client is taxed on the loan. ↩︎

    15. The claim that “The loan is taken by the client in his capacity as a creditor to the trust (ie not in any way connected in the client’s capacity as employee/director of the business)” is presumably an attempt to avoid these rules, but it is obviously untrue. Of course the loan is connected to the client’s capacity as a director – the company only made the contribution to the trust because the client/director knew he would receive it back as a loan. ↩︎

    16. Which may mean it falls within the DOTAS employment income hallmark – see 5.8 ↩︎

    17. In such a case, the usual 20% rate is grossed-up to 25%. ↩︎

    18. Assuming the company is close, which seems likely. More details here, with an example here. ↩︎

    19. The penalties for a breach of section 218 are ludicrous – £300 plus £60/day. It is, however, unacceptable for a solicitor to ignore a legal requirement. ↩︎

    20. The courts have found trusts to be “other financial resources” in numerous cases of “real” trusts where the settlor influences the trustees, but does not have complete control. The test in Charman v. Charman [2006] 1 WLR 1053 is “whether, if the husband were to request [the trustee] to advance the whole (or part) of the capital of the trust to him, the trustee would be likely to do so”. ↩︎

    21. Note that if there is sufficient evidence then there is no limitation period for s37. ↩︎

    22. i.e. because the divorce “advantage” is specified in the promotional material for the trust, and further evidence would likely emerge from disclosure (including the client’s correspondence with GCWealth. Indeed it is unclear what purpose the client could say the trust had, other than tax avoidance and “asset protection”. ↩︎

    23. There is one an additional point that probably isn’t relevant, but some arrangements of this kind get caught by. If the wife were a beneficiary of the trust, even to a small amount, that the trust could qualify as a “nuptial settlement”, which the court has almost unlimited powers to vary. ↩︎

    24. Such an improper purpose will exist even if there are other purposes, such as tax avoidance. ↩︎

    25. The Lemos judgment provides a useful example of how the courts apply section 423 in practice. ↩︎

    26. Gill tells us he doesn’t own GCWealth Administrators Limited but is merely a consultant. The reports we’ve received of GCWealth’s sales efforts only mention Gill. Gill clearly was the owner of GCWealth’s predecessor UK company (of which more below), which appears to have transferred its business to the Belize operations. Obfuscation of ownership is a common tactic of tax avoidance scheme promoters. ↩︎

    27. Aside from the Swisspro High Court case we mention below. ↩︎

    28. Gill says that, until 2009, he was an associate at Allen & Overy and Mallesons in Sydney, and then a partner at an unspecified top 20 international law firm. The internet has no evidence of any of this, although companies House suggests that from 2006 to 2010 Gill worked for a boutique law firm called iLaw. ↩︎

    29. An obvious caveat is that we cannot know whether Gill actually created these pages or someone else did; it is, however, difficult to see what motive anyone other than Gill would have to write them. Gill may have been conned by one of the firms like Mogul Press that promise to raise their clients’ profiles, but actually just publish poorly written articles on low impact websites. ↩︎

    30. There was also a UK company, Swisspro Asset Management AG Limited, owned by Gill, which appears to have been dormant – if we can trust the accounts. And a Canadian company, Swisspro Asset Management Inc, which was dissolved in 2022 for non-compliance after failing to file any accounts since its incorporation in 2017. ↩︎

    31. Which suggests Swisspro wasn’t originally established as a fraudulent enterprise. ↩︎

    32. Gill continued “There is an ongoing police investigation, and me, my family and many others are victims of this fraud. I have assisted the police to the best of my abilities and been praised for my support and assistance. I am unable to comment much further on this given the ongoing investigations”. ↩︎

    33. This is on the basis of the 30 January 2019 balance sheet, which show £1,252,124 cash at bank, £351,007 debtors, and almost all of that (£1,602,985) owed to creditors (of which HMRC account for only £11). The figures in the 30 January 2018 balance sheet are exactly the same, to the pound, which the accountants we spoke to thought was likely a bad mistake (it is just about possible in principle for a company with so much cash to have no balance sheet movements at all from one year to the next, but none of the experienced accountants we spoke to had ever seen such a thing). The 30 January 2020 accounts then show the 2019 balance sheet as all zeroes, but there was no filing of amended accounts, and no explanation for the change, so this appears to be another error or a rewriting of history rather than a proper correction in accordance with usual accounting practice. ↩︎

    34. The 30 January 2017 balance sheet shows £2,250,066 cash in bank, £119,563 debtors, and almost all of that (£2,369,529) owed to creditors (none owed to HMRC). On the basis of these accounts, and what we know of the GCWealth scheme, we would speculate that the company made offshore payments it claimed to be tax-deductible. The accounts of other Gill companies, GCW Funding Limited, GCW Funding (2) Limited and GC Wealth RT Limited have similar features, with GC Wealth RT Limited also having a 2019 balance sheet identical to the 2018 balance sheet. ↩︎

    35. Although “RT” often stands for “remuneration trust” ↩︎

    36. One of the defendants in the negligence case brought against Gill was Bay Trust International Limited, which linked to Baxendale-Walker. There is another case involving Gill and two of Baxendale-Walker’s Minerva and Buckingham companies. And another case in which Gill applied to set aside a statutory demand; his lawyers were Morr & Co, who often act for Baxendale-Walker and his companies. ↩︎

    37. We put to Gill that he was connected to PBW. His response was that he “repeated his comments above”. It’s not clear which comments he refers to, so this may or may not be a denial. ↩︎

    38. There is no single legal definition of “tax avoidance”, but tax advisers and judges know it when they see it. ↩︎

    39. If you are sceptical of this claim, have a look through decided cases where the first paragraph of the judgment describes the arrangement in question as a “tax avoidance scheme”. In the last 25 years, the result has almost always been that the taxpayer loses. ↩︎

    40. That not’s quite true for SDLT, where a scheme that’s been around for ages, and HMRC are therefore aware of, can in some cases be “grandfathered” and not subject to DOTAS notification. ↩︎

    41. In other words, borrow the successful “double reasonableness test” from the GAAR ↩︎

    42. So, for example, if a person relies on an opinion from an adviser that DOTAS doesn’t apply then the defence should be available. If, however, the opinion was obtained on the basis of incorrect assumptions of fact, the adviser was improperly briefed, or a reasonable layperson would suspect the opinion was incorrect (e.g. because the barrister had previously issued opinions on DOTAS which courts had found to be incorrect), then the defence would not be available. ↩︎

  • Our take on the Labour manifesto

    Our take on the Labour manifesto

    The Labour Party has published its manifesto. Labour claims to raise £7.35bn from additional tax – but almost three-quarters of that is from increased tax compliance rather than actual new taxes. The most obvious criticism is a lack of ambition, and lack of any proposals to reform the most serious problems with our tax system.

    We set out the issues in more detail below.

    The overall tax effect of the manifesto

    We have previously said that the tax increases that Labour and the Conservatives were arguing about were so small as to be irrelevant. That is very much true for the Labour manifesto. The total new tax they’ve identified, most of which isn’t an actual tax increase, vanishes into insignificance compared with the almost trillion pounds collected by HMRC each year.

    This chart superimposes the size of Labour’s proposed new tax revenues over all the figures for UK tax receipts in 2023/24 (and, for ease, it’s in the top left, but none of the proposed Labour tax increases come from income tax):

    The Labour manifesto says this.

    “The Conservatives have raised the tax burden to a 70-year high. We will ensure taxes on working people are kept as low as possible. Labour will not increase taxes on working people, which is why we will not increase National Insurance, the basic, higher, or additional rates of Income Tax, or VAT”

    We are concerned about politicians boxing themselves into an impossible corner with this kind of promise. These three taxes make up more than two-thirds of all UK tax receipts; once you’ve promised not to increase them, what do you do if you find you need to fund additional expenditure?

    • Break your promise and increase tax anyway, saying circumstances have changed. This has historically not gone well for politicians.
    • Scrabble around making lots of increases to minor taxes to make up the sums you need. But that will also often come at a political cost: most of these taxes either directly hit households (e.g. council tax or stamp duty) or will be passed onto them (e.g. alcohol duties; insurance premium tax; fuel duties). There are a few others, but they don’t add up to much.
    • Create entirely new taxes that aim to raise large amounts of money without hitting typical households. This, however, is hard. The wealth tax proposed by the Wealth Tax Commission might fit the bill; but nobody, anywhere in the world, has ever implemented such a tax, and its actual consequences are unclear. The recent Spanish wealth tax, targeted at the very wealthy, raised only €632m in 2023. Perhaps for this reason, Labour appear to have ruled out a wealth tax altogether.
    • Do nothing, freeze tax thresholds and allowances, and let income growth/inflation push people into higher tax brackets – “fiscal drag”. It’s taxation by stealth, and it can raise very large sums – the current Government’s freeze of the personal allowance and higher rate threshold is forecast to raise £34bn of tax in 2028/29.

    We expect the answer in practice (whoever wins the election) will be the tried-and-tested last one. That is an unfortunate, but a consequence of having expediently ruled out the better, and more honest, options.

    No tax reform. No pro-growth tax policies.

    From a tax policy perspective, the most important thing about this manifesto is what’s not in it – tax reform. We made the same criticism of the Conservative Party manifesto, so if you’ve read that, you can skip right past this.

    There are serious problems with many of the UK’s most important taxes:

    • VAT is inefficient; the VAT threshold is too high, and that stops small businesses from growing. The exemptions and zero rates are too broad, causing uncertainty for business and disproportionately benefiting the wealthy. The flat rate scheme is being widely abused by criminals.
    • Corporation tax has become impossibly complicated. The move to “full expensing” was incomplete. The constant changes to the rate (three in one year) make it difficult to plan. The OECD global minimum tax means that the largest companies now have to undertake two completely different corporate tax calculations.
    • Income tax has been damaged by a series of gimmicks, bodges and compromises employed to avoid increasing the rate. There’s an “accidental” top marginal rate of 62% (if we include national insurance) for people earning between £100k and £125k (and, if they’re a graduate, 9% more than that). Someone with three children under 18 faces a top marginal rate of 57%. Anyone claiming free childcare and earning £100k potentially faces a marginal rate of over one million percent.
    • Employer national insurance creates a massive difference between the cost of employing someone and the cost of engaging an independent contractor. This means that the thin – and ultimately notional – line between employment and self-employment becomes hugely important. Complex rules are created to guard the line. HMRC’s efforts to police it waste their time and that of taxpayers. And there remains plenty of avoidance and evasion.
    • Stamp duty land tax reduces labour mobility, results in inefficient use of land, and plausibly holds back economic growth.
    • Council tax is hilariously broken, based on 1991 valuations, and with bands which mean that the Buckingham Palace residence pays less council tax than a semi in Blackpool.
    • Inheritance tax is deservedly unpopular. The rate is too high. The burden falls on the upper middle class. The very wealthy easily escape it.
    • Bank taxation is unnecessarily complex, with an entire tax that has no reason to exist, and could easily be shifted to another, better, tax.
    • Capital gains tax has a rate that’s so low it invites avoidance from people shifting income into capital.
    • Our environmental taxes are a muddled mess. There’s an economic consensus across the political spectrum in favour of a carbon tax. This is hard to do unilaterally, but the UK could play an important role advocating for a carbon tax in current OECD discussions.
    • There is now a widespread view, amongst individual taxpayers, business and the tax profession, that HMRC is seriously under-resourced. That is highly inconvenient for taxpayers (and sometimes much more serious than that). But it also means that some tax is not being paid: taxpayers are making mistakes, and HMRC is not helping them.

    We believe a pro-growth agenda has to include tax reform. It’s therefore a shame that there is little discussion of any of these issues in the Labour Party manifesto (or indeed any of the others).

    The only items in the Labour manifesto which might qualify as tax reform are a commitment to slow down the rate of constant change in business taxation. That’s welcome – but it barely scratches the surface of what’s needed.

    Costings

    Labour publishes these costings. The white space on the left side of the page makes clear how little Labour are planning to do to the tax system:

    and:

    Tackle avoidance and evasion – £5bn

    We will modernise HMRC and change the law to tackle tax avoidance. We will increase registration and reporting requirements, strengthen HMRC’s powers, invest in new technology and build capacity within HMRC. This, combined with a renewed focus on tax avoidance by large businesses and the wealthy, will begin to close the tax gap and ensure everyone pays their fair share.

    An important point of detail: it’s unlikely to be possible to raise £5bn by clamping down on tax avoidance, because HMRC figures identify only £1bn of tax avoidance:

    The focus on tax avoidance by “large businesses and the wealthy” may play well with focus groups, but doesn’t reflect the reality of where the “tax gap” actually is:

    To be fair, Labour have published a fairly detailed plan which justifies the £5bn figure, and it covers compliance and evasion as well as tax avoidance. It’s unfortunate that the manifesto mis-states what they actually say they’ll do.

    The other parties are also promising to raise large sums from increased tax compliance:

    The Conservatives included a plan to “clamp down on tax avoidance and evasion” as part of their National Service press release. The document doesn’t appear to be publicly available; we published it here.

    The origin of the £6bn figure common to Labour and the Conservatives appears to be the head of the National Audit Office, who said earlier this year that £6bn could be raised by cracking down on avoidance and evasion. But he didn’t say how, or how much it would cost.

    The Lib Dems just present the £7.2bn figure as 2028/29 funding in their manifesto costings document. They don’t give figures for earlier years. There is no published plan.

    In our view, targeted and carefully managed investment in HMRC compliance, customer service, investigation and enforcement functions could raise significant sums. We wrote about this in detail here. We are a little sceptical about whether Labour’s £5bn figure is realistic – naturally that scepticism applies to the other parties too (and more so, given their larger numbers).

    Business taxation

    The manifesto says:

    “The business tax regime matters for investors. It is not just the rates of tax that matter, but also certainty. Under the Conservatives there has been constant chopping and changing – corporation tax has changed 26 times – and multiple fiscal events have made drastic changes often at little notice. Labour will stop the chaos, and turn the page with a strategic approach that gives certainty and allows long-term planning. We are committed to one major fiscal event a year, giving families and businesses due warning of tax and spending policies. We will publish a roadmap for business taxation for the next parliament which will allow businesses to plan investments with confidence.”

    We expect business will welcome a slow-down in tax policy. We would, however, suggest that Labour go further: publish the roadmap with the first Budget and commit to make no changes to business taxation, other than simplification and targeted anti-avoidance measures.

    “Labour will cap corporation tax at the current level of 25 per cent, the lowest in the G7, for the entire parliament, and we will act if tax changes in other countries pose a risk to UK competitiveness.”

    It is correct that the 25% UK corporation tax rate is the lowest in the G7; it is, however, fairly average by international standards:

    There has also been a significant widening of the UK tax base over the last 30 years, and so UK corporation tax collects significantly more now (as a % of GDP) than it did in the 1970s when the rate was 52%:

    The effect of increasing the UK rate to from 19% to 25% in 2023/34, at a point when the base had become historically wide, was therefore to significantly increase the overall tax on companies. In our view this was likely the correct decision given economic circumstances, but we would be cautious about raising the rate further. We therefore believe Labour’s approach is sensible. Indeed it appears that no party is currently proposing to increase the rate.

    “We will retain a permanent full expensing system for capital investment and the annual investment allowance for small business. And we will give firms greater clarity on what qualifies for allowances to improve business investment decisions.

    Full expensing” was introduced by the Conservative Government in the 2023 Spring Budget. It gives a business up-front tax relief for all the cost of an investment rather than, as was historically the case, requiring the cost to be written-off for tax purposes over many years. That historic treatment created an unfortunate bias in the tax system against long-term investment, which is the opposite of what a sensible tax system should do. Full expensing was therefore a good pro-growth tax reform.

    The move towards full expensing followed a long campaign from the Adam Smith Institute and others. It’s a good policy, which should boost growth, and will cost less than first thought.

    Full expensing was unusual in that its effectiveness under a Conservative Government was highly dependent on the attitude of the Opposition: businesses would only take long-term business decisions on the basis of full expensing if they thought the rules would be there in the long-term. So Labour’s embrace of full expensing last year was important.

    However this is an area where Labour could consider going further. Something like a third of investments do not benefit from full expensing. That means the policy is less effective in supporting growth than it could be. It also creates uncertainty for businesses on where precisely the line should be drawn. The best way to increase clarity would be to dramatically extend full expensing to all investment; that would realistically have to form part of a major reform of the corporation tax base, including a curtailing of interest relief for debt financing. Such a move would face considerable technical and political challenges; but it is something we would hope a new Government would seriously consider.

    Ending the use of offshore trusts by non-doms – £0

    Labour will address unfairness in the tax system. We will abolish non-dom status once and for all, replacing it with a modern scheme for people genuinely in the country for a short period. We will end the use of offshore trusts to avoid inheritance tax so that everyone who makes their home here in the UK pays their taxes here.

    For hundreds of years, people living in the UK but born elsewhere have been “non-doms”, taxed on their UK income but only taxed on foreign income if they bring it into the UK. An even more important benefit: non-doms weren’t subject to UK inheritance tax on their non-UK property. This regime encouraged wealthy people to come to, and stay in, the UK – but has been perceived by many as unfair.

    The Conservative Party announced the end of the non-dom regime in the Spring Budget, along lines very similar to what we had proposed the previous month. They intend to replace the non-dom rules with a four year exemption on income/gains, and likely a ten year exemption from inheritance tax. But they proposed to permit existing non-doms to use trusts to escape inheritance tax forever.

    We believe this was a pragmatic compromise, aimed at preventing an exodus of the most wealthy non-doms. Many very wealthy people would not regard paying UK income tax and capital gains tax on their worldwide assets as a disaster. In some cases (e.g. Americans) the tax result is not so very different from their home tax result. For others, there is more tax but the difference is not hugely material. However UK inheritance tax, at 40%, has one of the highest rates in the world. Emotionally (rightly or wrongly) many non-doms regard it as an anathema, and would leave the UK rather than subject their estates to it if they die.

    There are really three questions here:

    • Is it simply wrong in principle for some people to be able to live most of their life in the UK, but (because of where they were born) for their estates to be mostly outside inheritance tax? Regardless of the cost/benefit?
    • Is it perfectly fine in principle for the UK to have a special inheritance tax rate for non-doms, regardless of the cost/benefit?
    • Or is this a question where we should reach our view based upon pragmatism – whether scrapping the favoured inheritance tax treatment results in more tax being paid, or less tax being paid?

    Most politicians move immediately to the third position. The problem with that, however, is that it’s very hard to say what the effect would be of removing non-dom inheritance tax trust privileges. There have been no such changes before that we can measure.

    Labour have previously suggested a £600m benefit from ending the trust “loophole”; however it’s interesting that this figure is now relegated to a footnote, and not included in Labour’s costings calculation:

    No reason is given for this, but we would speculate that it reflects a recognition of the unpredictable effect of this policy.

    Ultimately this is a matter of political choices and priorities, rather than assessing evidence, because we do not believe there is adequate evidence (and it’s not clear to us, even in principle, how evidence could be found).

    One important step that could be taken to reduce a non-dom exodus – and because it makes sense in its own right – would be to reform inheritance tax. Close down loopholes, expand the base, and reduce the rate to something more in line with other countries.

    Business rates

    The manifesto says:

    The current business rates system disincentivises investment, creates uncertainty and places an undue burden on our high streets. In England, Labour will replace the business rates system, so we can raise the same revenue but in a fairer way. This new system will level the playing field between the high street and online giants, better incentivise investment, tackle empty properties and support entrepreneurship.

    This characterisation of business rates is common; it is therefore unfortunate that it is incorrect. It is well established that, whilst business tenants pay business rates, the person who actually pays economically is the landlord (in the jargon, the “incidence” of the tax is on the landlord).

    It is unclear how Labour will achieve the stated objectives. A tax on land cannot easily (or perhaps at all) distinguish between different types of user of the land. Landlords should already pay business rates on empty properties (and some tricks some were using to avoid that were recently kiboshed).

    We would suggest the answer lies in something more radical: scrapping business rates and the two other unpopular and failed taxes on land: stamp duty and council tax. Replace them instead with a land value tax. That would be a major pro-growth tax reform which would have support from economists and think tanks across the political spectrum. Would Labour have the courage for such a step?

    Carried interest – £600m

    Private equity is the only industry where performance-related pay is treated as capital gains. Labour will close this loophole.

    A banker pays tax on their bonus at a marginal rate of 47%; but that comes out of a bonus pot that was all subject to 13.8% employer national insurance. That’s a total tax of about 54%. By contrast, when private equity executives receive a share of the returns of their fund – called “carried interest” – it is taxed as a capital gain, at 28%. That treatment wasn’t enacted by Parliament – it results from a spectacularly successful lobbying effort in 1987.

    Our view is that this treatment is both inequitable and wrong in law. We welcome Labour ending it.

    The question is how much that will raise. Private equity executives made gains on carried interest of £3.4bn in 2020/21, which if taxed as income would have potentially meant another £600m of tax.. The gains in 2021/22 were much higher – about £5bn, which if taxed as income would potentially yield almost £1bn.

    And there is significant additional carried interest earned by private equity executives who are non-doms, which isn’t even included in these figures – and those tend to be the most senior executives, who earn the largest amounts. Our discussions with private equity industry figures suggest that carried interest reforms plus the non-dom reforms could potentially yield up to £2bn.

    The important word in the previous paragraphs is “potentially”. There is no doubt that many private equity executives, particularly non-doms, would leave the UK rather than pay tax at 47%. Other countries in Europe and around the world would have more favourable regimes, and private equity executives are highly mobile, with many having only temporary ties to the UK.

    One answer would be for Labour to increase the rate of tax, but not equalise it. That, however, seems ruled out by the manifesto wording.

    It therefore seems likely that a significant number of private equity executives would respond to the additional tax by leaving the UK. Were this to happen, the economic effect of is debatable – it would not (or at least, not necessarily) reduce private equity investment into the UK, but change the location that investment is made from. There would be wider effects, e.g. on service industries and asset prices, which deserve consideration but are beyond our expertise.

    There are, therefore, a great deal of uncertainties, but Labour’s £600m figure seems to us to be reasonably prudent given that it is so much lower than the potential static yield.

    We would make two suggestions for Labour’s reform, which would create useful pro-growth incentives for the private equity industry:

    • Labour’s reform should be targeted at the controversial “buyout funds“, not venture capital or infrastructure investment funds.
    • Labour’s reform should only apply to traditional carried interest – where either the executives put in no money, or money is “round-tripped” and not actually at risk. It shouldn’t apply where private equity executives make a genuine investment into their funds. So if a private equity executive genuinely puts £1m into their fund, risks losing it, but the fund succeeds, then there remains a good argument that their return should be taxed as capital.

    We would add as an aside that there is speculation that Labour are secretly considering equalising the rate of capital gains tax and income tax. If Labour were going to equalise the rates, they would not need to change the tax treatment of carried interest.

    Windfall tax – £1.2bn

    To support investment in this plan, Labour will close the loopholes in the windfall tax on oil and gas companies. Companies have benefitted from enormous profits not because of their ingenuity or investment, but because of an energy shock which raised prices for British families. Labour will therefore extend the sunset clause in the Energy Profits Levy until the end of the next parliament. We will also increase the rate of the levy by three percentage points, as well as removing the unjustifiably generous investment allowances.

    We have written previously about the flaws in the Government’s windfall tax (which we don’t view as a windfall tax at all; just another profits tax). We suggested £5bn could be raised; Labour’s £1.2bn looks modest.

    Stamp duty – £40m

    Labour will support local authorities by funding additional planning officers, through increasing the rate of the stamp duty surcharge paid by non-UK residents

    Non-residents buying UK property have to pay a surcharge of an additional 2% stamp duty land tax. Labour are proposing a 1% increase, and say that will raise £40m in 2028/29. The charge was brought in during 2021 having been proposed by Theresa May’s government – it was probably prohibited by EU law prior to Brexit.

    HMRC publishes a document showing estimates of the impact of various tax changes – they show this change as raising £40m in 2026/27. If HMRC are correct, Labour’s figure will therefore be a slight under-estimate.

    We expect this is only partially about revenue-raising, and partially about (very) slightly weighting the housing system in favour of UK residents.

    We should reiterate that we regard stamp duty land tax as a bad tax that should be abolished. However the non-resident charge is not its worst feature: it is somewhat complex, but reasonably well designed and doesn’t cause too many difficulties in practice.

    Private schools – £1.5bn

    Labour will end the VAT exemption and business rates relief for private schools to invest in our state schools.

    This is another proposal where many politicians say their position is based on a pragmatic assessment of whether it will gain or lose revenue, but in reality they are (on both sides) arguing from an ideological position. That is inevitable in any political system, and we make no criticism of it, – but we will ignore that political debate and focus on the numbers.

    The easy question is: if Labour ends the private VAT exemption then by how much will private school fees rise? The answer is “a bit less than 15%”, because the net cost of VAT for most private schools will be around 15%, and some will be able to take cost-saving measures to absorb part of that 15% net cost. But evidence suggests that, as with most VAT changes on single products/services, most of the net 15% cost will be passed onto parents.

    The hard question that follows is: how many parents will therefore take their children out of private school? And what effect will that have on the net tax revenue yield, given that the State sector will have to educate those children?

    This is ultimately a question of education policy and economics; areas where we do not have expertise. We have, however, noted that some of the high estimates reported in the press have no good statistical basis.

    We wrote about the difficulties of coming up with an estimate here. The only serious attempt to come up with an estimate is this from the IFS. The analysis is, as the authors note, subject to numerous uncertainties, but it takes a rigorous approach.

    We therefore expect that the correct answer as to the net tax impact of the change will be in the region of the Institute for Fiscal Studies’ estimate of £1.3–£1.5 billion per year. Labour’s figure is at the top end of this.


    Disclosure: Our founder, Dan Neidle, is a member of the Labour Party, and sits on its most senior disciplinary body. His tax policy analysis is widely regarded as non-partisan, and he was highly critical of Labour Party tax proposals in the 2017 and 2019 elections.

    Footnotes

    1. I don’t regard the various wartime and post-war emergency taxes as a useful precedent, economically or politically ↩︎

    2. See page 68 of the Office for Budget Responsibility’s March 2024 economic and fiscal outlook. ↩︎

    3. See page 31 of the CBI report ↩︎

    4. It’s not merely that HMRC funding has failed to keep pace with inflation; its most experienced personnel have been moved onto other projects, particularly Brexit and the pandemic. See paragraph 1.8 onwards in this National Audit Office report. This was probably sensible, but is having long term consequences. ↩︎

    5. A considerable simplification – in reality the domicile concept is much more complex ↩︎

    6. The impressive research from Arun Advani and Andy Summers on the effect of the 2017 non-dom reforms shows what happened to “ordinary” non-doms who lost that status – very few of them left. However the 2017 reforms permitted the very wealthy to use trusts to escape essentially all the effects of the reforms. Hence we cannot use evidence from 2017 to predict how the very wealthy will behave today if the benefits of trusts are removed. ↩︎

    7. i.e. £3.4bn x (47% – 28%). ↩︎

    8. There’s also a report from the Adam Smith Institute. It contains some valid criticisms of the IFS approach, but in our view is then fatally undermined by using figures with no statistical validity. ↩︎

  • The Lib-Dem buyback tax won’t raise £1.4bn, and could raise nothing

    The Lib-Dem buyback tax won’t raise £1.4bn, and could raise nothing

    The Lib Dems are proposing a 4% tax on share buybacks that they say would raise £1.4bn/year. It’s based on a similar proposal in America. But circumstances in the US and UK are very different. This means that the rationale for the US tax isn’t relevant to the UK and, more importantly, that the Lib Dem proposal would raise much less than £1.4bn. It’s plausible it could raise almost nothing.

    UPDATED 9 June 2024 to reflect the latest Lib Dem proposal, which ups the main estimate to £2.2bn, but then knocks £800m off out of “caution”. There’s also a fair take on this from fullfact.org here.

    The US tax benefit of buybacks

    In 2022, the US imposed a 1% excise tax on share buybacks.

    Why?

    Primarily because two significant classes of investors in US shares receive a tax benefit from buybacks as opposed to dividends:

    • US retail investors directly hold about a third of the US equity market. Dividends they receive are taxed at up to 23.8% (plus State income taxes, where applicable). Capital growth from a buyback isn’t taxed immediately at all. Some investors will never sell and the gains will never be taxed; if they do sell, long term capital gains are taxed at 20% (plus any State capital gain taxes).
    • Foreign investors hold about 16% of the US equity market. The US imposes a withholding tax on dividends that ranges between 15% (for investors in countries with a favourable tax treaty with the US) and 30% (the worst case). But a buyback increases the value of an investor’s shares; any capital gain made on a subsequent sale by a foreign investor is not subject to US tax at all.

    We can therefore make a rough estimate that paying profit out as a buyback rather than a dividend means a reduction in overall US tax paid of somewhere between 4% and 14% of the amount of the buyback.

    It is therefore not that surprising that the 1% buyback tax did not noticeably reduce the volume of buybacks – the tax is significantly less than the tax benefit.

    How high would the buyback tax have to be to equalise the tax treatment? There is no simple answer, given the diversity of investors and their tax positions, but the simple calculations above suggest the answer is at least 4%.

    It is therefore probably not a coincidence that President Biden is now proposing to increase the tax to 4% (although we understand that this has little chance of becoming law in the current US political environment).

    The UK tax benefit of buybacks

    The differences between US and UK stock markets and tax rules mean that buybacks by listed companies have very little tax benefit in the UK.

    • UK individual investors who hold onto their shares have a big tax benefit from buybacks, as their eventual capital gain would be taxed at 20%, but dividends taxed at a top rate of 39.35%. However UK individual investors directly hold only about 4% of the UK equity market; another 7% is held through ISAs but, as ISAs aren’t taxable, these investors have no preference for buybacks vs dividends.
    • UK companies hold a small proportion of the equity market (1.4% in the 2020 figures). If they participate in a buyback then the position is the same as if they had received a dividend – it’s exempt. If they don’t, then buybacks provide them with a worse tax treatment: corporate capital gains are taxed at 25% but dividends are exempt.
    • Foreign investors hold almost 60% of UK listed shares, but the UK doesn’t tax them on either dividends or capital gains.

    We can therefore make a rough estimate that paying profit out as a buyback rather than a dividend means a reduction in overall UK tax paid of about 0.8% of the amount paid out in the buyback. This is pleasingly close to the existing 0.5% stamp duty charged on buybacks, leaving a surplus benefit of probably no more than 0.3%.

    It is therefore unsurprising that, whilst tax is often cited as a driver of US buybacks, it is not usually cited by market observers as the reason for UK buybacks.

    The consequences

    The lack of a material tax benefit from UK buybacks has two important consequences.

    First, it makes it hard to understand the rationale for a buyback tax. If the Lib Dems want to increase tax on companies, they could increase corporation tax (although I would be sceptical this is a good idea right now).

    Second, it means that the Lib Dems’ revenue projection is wrong.

    The Lib Dems say their 4% tax would raise £1.4bn annually. They haven’t published their methodology – they just say this:

    It’s reasonably clear all they’ve done is multiply 4% by the approximately £50bn volume of buybacks in 2022 and 2023, to come up with a static estimateo f £2.2bn. They then “take a cautious approach to account for potential changes in company behaviour”, and reduce this to their claimed £1.4bn.

    That is, however, not a realistic basis for estimating the revenues for a tax. You have to properly take into account the taxpayer response – the tax elasticity. If we impose a £10,000 tax on men with beards then we cannot calculate the revenue as (£10,000 x 15 million men with beards). There would be an obvious taxpayer response (shaving), and the actual revenue would be close to zero.

    In the case of buyback taxes there is an equally obvious taxpayer response – paying a dividend instead of buying back shares.

    The Lib Dems cite an IPPR paper from 2022 which proposed a 1% tax on buybacks. The IPPR said their proposal would raise £225m, using the same simple methodology now adopted by the Lib Dems, but with an important caveat:

    And the IPPR explicitly warned about the risk of a higher tax:

    The current US buyback tax at 1% is considerably lower than the overall tax 4% to 14% tax benefit from buybacks. Biden’s new proposal at 4% approaches the bottom-end estimate, but does not exceed it, and that is surely deliberate. So it would be rational to expect the 4% tax to somewhat reduce the volume of buybacks, but only to a degree.

    The Lib Dem tax is very different, because it is at least four times greater than the tax benefits of buybacks (particularly once we take account of the existing 0.5% stamp duty). There are other benefits of buybacks; they can be more flexible, and they send out price signals (inflating EPS but without a “real” economic effect). It is not at all obvious that these, rather ephemeral, benefits are worth 3% of the value of a buyback.

    The natural conclusion is that a 4% buyback tax will simply result in companies switching from buybacks to dividends. And because 95% of investors receive no tax benefit at all from buybacks, but would bear the cost of the 4% buyback tax, there would likely be significant shareholder pressure to drop buybacks entirely.

    The other justification provided for the tax is that it would increase investment. This doesn’t make any sense. If a company has decided to return cash to investors then a buyback tax may incentivise it to move to a dividend; it’s unclear why it would incentivise it to retain the cash. It also seems simplistic to regard cash retained by a company as investment, but cash returned to shareholders as simply disappearing.

    So the cautious estimate is not £1.4bn – it’s nothing.

    We agree with Stuart Adam from the Institute of Fiscal Studies:

    That is, however, not the end of the analysis, because there are second order effects:

    • Buybacks are currently subject to 0.5% stamp duty/stamp duty reserve tax. So an end to buybacks would mean a loss of c£250m of stamp duty revenue.
    • An end to buybacks means more dividends, so the c4% of UK individuals directly holding shares would pay more income tax. On the basis of our top-end estimate above, this amounts to somewhere less than 0.8% of buyback values i.e. £400m of additional tax revenue.
    • Then there are the costs to Government/HMRC of creating the tax, and the cost to business of complying with it.

    We don’t have enough data to properly estimate the net result of these effects. They would probably be small, but the direct revenues from the tax would also probably be small.

    There are many historical examples of people taxing shares without thinking through how people would respond. These usually ended badly – the Swedish financial transaction tax and US interest equalisation tax are the most notorious examples.

    The general rule remains that your motive for introducing a tax is irrelevant. The key questions are: what will happen in practice? What incentives are you creating? How will people respond?

    It’s all very tedious. It’s also necessary.


    Photo of Ed Davey by Dave Radcliffe, licensed under Attribution-NoDerivs (CC BY-ND 2.0)

    Footnotes

    1. “directly” meaning this is excluding holdings through ETFs, mutual funds and pensions, which have different tax treatment ↩︎

    2. i.e. because the minimum saving will be (34% x 3.8% + 16% x 15%) and the maximum saving will be (34% x 23.8% + 16% x 30%). This ignores State taxes and a large number of other complications, so should be regarded as no more than a very rough approximation ↩︎

    3. In principle one might say that there should be a different result, because the majority of investors in US equities obtain no tax benefit from buybacks, but now suffer the cost of the excise tax, and they could be expected to agitate against buybacks. A plausible answer is that retail investors have an outsize influence. ↩︎

    4. After writing the first draft of this piece, we found this analysis by the left-leaning Tax Policy Center, which uses different data and a slightly different approach but also concludes the answer is around 4%. ↩︎

    5. There is a separate question about unlisted/private companies engineering a return of capital rather than a dividend to obtain a tax advantage, i.e. because of the large differential between the 39.35% top rate of income tax on dividends and the 20% capital gains tax rate. The Lib Dems aren’t proposing to tax private companies but, even if they were, a buyback tax would not come close to reversing this benefit. The more effective and simpler answer would be a specific anti-avoidance rule. ↩︎

    6. Investors whose shares are bought back are mostly taxed on the buyback as income, as generally only the nominal value of the share is treated as a capital gain. Hence a rational UK individual investor will not take-up a buyback; the tax treatment is much worse than simply selling their shares in the market. ↩︎

    7. UK individual investors hold about 11% of the UK listed market, equating to about £250bn. However ISA investors hold about £400m of stocks/shares and have a 37% weighting towards the UK, implying they hold about £150bn of UK equities. Thus only 40% of UK individual investors’ holdings in UK listed equities are held directly. ↩︎

    8. There are exceptions to both rules, but for listed companies the exceptions generally won’t apply. ↩︎

    9. i.e. because 4% x 19.35% = 0.8%, but that’s a top-end estimate because many investors won’t pay the additional rate, and any investors actually participating in the buyback pay more tax as a result. ↩︎

    10. As an aside, whilst it’s a very good idea to benchmark tax policy proposals against other countries’ experiences, it’s dangerous to assume that a tax policy that’s successful in one country will also be successful in another. There are a myriad of tax, legal and societal reasons why that is often not the case. In this instance it’s the difference between the US and UK markets plus the difference in the tax treatment of foreign investors – both are sizeable differences, and together they make the buyback landscape in the US markedly different from the UK ↩︎

    11. There has been research into the impact of stamp duty on share trading, and the elasticity of share prices with respect to transaction costs. In principle similar research could look at the impact of existing stamp duty on buybacks (by reviewing data from when the rate changed from 1% to 0.5% in 1986. However I’m not aware of anyone doing this; possibly the volume of buybacks around 1986 was too small to make this feasible. ↩︎

    12. There are other problems with the estimate. The US buyback tax exempts certain types of mutual funds because they engage in buybacks to minimise their share price discount vs their NAV. Realistically a UK buyback tax would have to exempt investment trusts, and probably create other exemptions too. So the £2.2bn estimate is wrong even if we ignore elasticity/taxpayer response, but elasticity is by far the most important effect. ↩︎

    13. Not quite zero, because some people would make a mistake; some people would try and fail to avoid the tax (with complex boundaries between moustaches and beards, and difficult caselaw around false beards). And having a beard would become a signal of enormous wealth ↩︎

    14. It’s sometimes suggested that buybacks are used by executives to manipulate their own remuneration targets. This would be possible in theory if executive remuneration packages are not designed and implemented carefully. A detailed study looked at the FTSE 350 to see if there was evidence of buybacks inflating executive pay – it found that there was not. ↩︎

    15. Warren Buffet said “When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).” ↩︎

  • Matrix Freedom – the scam conspiracy theory that makes £500k a month from the vulnerable

    Matrix Freedom – the scam conspiracy theory that makes £500k a month from the vulnerable

    Iain Clifford Stamp and his business, “Matrix Freedom”, are selling a scheme which falsely claims to make their clients’ mortgages disappear. The scheme relies upon “freeman on the land” conspiracy theories about how the world and the legal system work. The High Court just threw out Stamp’s claims, and said those behind the schemes may have committed criminal offences. The police and the FCA should investigate before more consumers are defrauded, and more court time is wasted.

    The High Court judgment makes for alarming reading. We believe the increasing prevalence of pseudolaw scams like this represent a threat to vulnerable people in financial difficulties. The authorities should act.

    UPDATE 24 June 2024: Iain Stamp brought a defamation claim against openDemocracy for their excellent article on Stamp and Matrix Freedom. That has just been dismissed as “totally without merit”, with the case being transferred to a High Court judge, which made a general civil restraint order against Stamp.

    UPDATE January 2025: In response to this article, Stamp sent me a very long pseudo-legal document demanding that I respond to a number of nonsensical claims (including that “The UNITED KINGDOM is a UK limited company registered at 6 Sharon Court, London, N12 8NX”). I ignored it. Stamp sent a second similar document – I sent him a short response, asking him to stop sending me meaningless documents. Stamp didn’t reply, but sent me a third document on 6 January 2025, threatening to impose a $1.5m “lien” on me if I don’t agree to all manner of bizarre things. Finally on 20 January 2025 they served that fake “lien” on me. This is probably just playacting to impress his followers/victims, but if Stamp makes any attempt to collect on his fraudulent “lien” then he should expect serious consequences.

    UPDATE JULY 2025: the FCA is pursuing a prosecution against Stamp for undertaking unauthorised related activity. It obtained an restraint order in 2023 preventing Stamp from hiding his assets, and a disclosure order in 2024 requiring Stamp to disclose all his assets. Stamp ignored the orders. As a result, he was found in contempt of court and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment. Here’s Stamp’s pseudo-legal defence (which the court described as “nonsense”).

    UPDATE AUGUST 2025: Instead of complying with the contempt order, or indeed appealing Stamp, has raised complaints to the ECHR and the International Criminal Court (both of which complain about this report and name Dan Neidle).

    UPDATE FEBRUARY 2026: Stamp is now threatening to sue Dan Neidle in Wyoming for “suppressing his ministry“. Here’s our response.

    UPDATE MARCH 2026: Stamp is involved in litigation in New York which appears to relate to funds which he had an associate place in a New York bullion account on his behalf; the associate now claims sole ownership of the funds.

    Iain Clifford Stamp and Matrix Freedom

    Stamp runs a company, a website and a “private members association”, all called “Matrix Freedom”.

    Stamp himself has a background of business failure and losing investors’ money in dubious circumstances.

    Matrix Freedom uses their website, Facebook, TikTok, and traditional doorstep leaflets to make a series of spectacular “get rich quick” claims.

    The website includes a calculator that lets you see how much you can “claim”, based on their theories. It says that someone earning £50,000 could claim £80,000 “recoupment and compensation”.

    The internet is full of weird conspiracy theories about the nature of the financial and legal systems. This element of Matrix Freedom’s pitch is typical:

    But Matrix Freedom are unusual in that they aggressively monetise their conspiracy theories. The first step is a “facilitation fee”:

    And Matrix Freedom seems to operate like a normal business, complete with management meetings by Zoom (some of which were leaked here).

    In February 2023, OpenDemocracy published a detailed analysis by Dimitris Dimitriadis into Stamp’s history and activities. It’s well worth a read.

    The mortgage scam

    The materials on the website claim that you can “discharge your mortgage and get your payments back”. This is all set out in more detail in this webinar:

    Here’s the key slide explaining how it works:

    That list makes no legal sense at all, and neither do the “references” Stamp provides:

    None of these are UK Acts of Parliament; most relate to US Federal and state law.

    There is more detail, but no more sense, in the ebook Stamp makes available on his website:

    Most of this is taken directly from the “pseudolaw” Freeman on the Land and Sovereign Citizen conspiracy theories, which started in the US but are now increasingly common here. The footnote here has more background.

    But everything starts to make sense once we see this:

    In other words, Stamp and his associates charge people a £3k fee to give them template documents that (they claim) will make their mortgage magically disappear.

    How much money does Matrix Freedom make?

    A leaked Zoom management meeting shows that in its best month in 2022, Matrix Freedom made £500,000 from its clients:

    The High Court case

    Prior to 2022, it seems that Matrix Freedom’s main strategy was persuading clients to reverse previous direct debits made on their mortgages. On a leaked management video, one of Stamp’s colleagues says (while laughing) that some people actually managed to recover ten years’ of mortgage payments in this way, but the banks got a “little bit more careful”.

    In that same video, Stamp says that using the “public” courts was not going to be effective. But, nevertheless, in 2023 and 2024, he appears to have coordinated over 200 people to bring court claims against various mortgage lenders. Stamp was the lead claimant. The High Court handed down judgment on 9 May 2024.

    The claims were completely incoherent; in Stamp’s case he had borrowed £312,500, repaid the mortgage in 2016, and now claimed £265,000. He said he had been mis-sold because the mortgage had been securitised – but was unable to explain why securitisation (which doesn’t affect a borrower’s rights) amounts to mis-selling, or why it caused him any loss. He claimed that the securitisation hadn’t been registered with the Land Registry (which it couldn’t have been, because securitisation doesn’t affect the legal title to security).

    Stamp’s further legal justification for his claims was summarised by the court as follows:

    The other claims all took the same form (almost identically), with some of the mortgages still being in existence, and some being in default. None of the 200 claimants was represented by a solicitor, but all the filings shared “a near miraculous uniformity of common purpose, style and prose”.

    The defendant lenders applied for the claims to be struck out, and the court readily agreed:

    Stamp didn’t turn up to the hearing – he said he was “beyond the seas” and would rely on the documents already delivered to the court.

    There is a comprehensive summary of the judgment here, from Henderson Chambers.

    The High Court’s view of the behaviour

    The Court had previously ordered five of the claimants to explain why they had all filed identical claims with the courts, despite not identifying a legal representative. They did not comply.

    The Court asked the same question of the claimants present at the hearing. One admitted to buying this scheme from Stamp. Given the near-identical documents the claimants submitted, however, it’s a reasonable inference that many or most of the 200 bought the scheme.

    The conclusion was that whoever was behind these claims had likely committed a contempt of court, and it was “potentially criminal conduct”.

    Contempt of Court

30.
It is a contempt of Court for any person to do any act in the purported exercise of a right to conduct litigation where none exists or has been sought or conferred. It is central to the efficient administration of justice that the Court takes a firm line with any person who appears to offer services to litigants in the higher courts where that person does not have the disciplines and competence of those who are professionally qualified and members of an appropriate professional body.

31.
The present claims and the larger group of claims feature over two hundred claimants, apparently acting in person and sharing a near miraculous uniformity of common purpose, style and prose. In the absence of greater explanation than has so far been made available, they have the appearance of involving a person, or more likely persons, whose involvement may well amount to the conduct of litigation and a conduct that is likely to be a contempt of this Court. It is worth being clear; this is potentially criminal conduct.

32.
With such claims there must inevitably be doubts as to the competence of anyone having an unaccounted involvement with, or co-ordination, of them. Such doubts arise in relation to the present claims and the large group of claims of which they are representative.

    The court was deeply concerned at all this:

    37.
The totality of claims that are the subject of this judgment have not revealed the full extent of the source, and nature, of encouragement and co-ordination that lies behind them but there is every appearance of deceit, of abuse and contempt of Court, and it is a matter of time before a full picture of these comes to light. Anyone drawn into bringing claims like this should be cautious. Those that promote them are duly warned. Claims that are presented with these characteristics can expect the Court’s mercy and forbearance to be particularly limited. Claimants that are unable to explain the meaning of words that they appear to rely upon can expect to be frustrated and to lose money in the payment of fees that cannot be recovered and in costs ordered against them. Claimants that rely upon stock templates that are purchased by or given to them and that are nonsensical can expect to incur the Court’s displeasure. Those indifferent towards wasting the Court’s resources can anticipate having claims stayed or struck out and costs ordered against them. Claims listing elderly statutes and home-made legal labels and maxims can expect to be identified as being totally without merit. Those failing to comply with orders directing them in ways clearly aimed at providing assistance to the Court cannot expect to cast themselves in the light of being genuine and credible parties to justice. Those that pursue abusive claims can expect to be made the subject of orders that curtail their ability to adversely impact upon the proper and efficient administration of justice.

    … and concludes by saying that:

    We have never seen this before. There is a procedure for “civil restraint orders” to be obtained to prevent vexatious litigants filing repeated meritless claims, but here the court is saying that that the courts will ignore Stamp’s attempts to file claims, because they’re invalid on their face. Defendants won’t even need to file a defence.

    Stamp appears to have a number of other active claims, referred to obliquely in the judgment. Most of these seem to relate to a feud or falling-out with others providing similar “services” to Stamp. It is unclear whether the Court’s pragmatic attitude to Stamp’s claims against lenders will extend to his claims against private individuals.

    Stamp and tax

    The Matrix Freedom website makes predictably far-fetched claims about tax:

    “To learn how you can benefit from the fact that no Acts and Statutes have Royal Assent since 1973, meaning no tax Acts, including the council tax, applies, and all other Acts and Statutes from 1973 are void, attend the webinar.”

    Stamp also appears to offers various tax services under companies called Creditor Tax Rebates Ltd, CQV Tax Rebates Ltd, Creditor Tax Filings Ltd and Creditor Tax Assessments Ltd. We haven’t been able to find out any further details, but anyone who has any information should get in touch.

    He has another company probably called MTRXF Ltd, which claims to offer an “IRS tax filing service“. It is doubtful they have the US IRS authorisation required to do this; their directors aren’t registered with the IRS as tax preparers. We asked them why this was and received no response.

    Stamp also appears to have attempted to file some kind of claim of his own against HMRC. It wasn’t the usual tax appeal in a tribunal, but a high court claim for (we infer, given it’s under Part 7) over £100,000 which was dismissed.

    It seems from Stamp’s failed defamation claim that the HMRC claim was struck out as “wholly without merit“.

    Others appear to be actively using these kind of theories to attempt to defraud HMRC.

    Who will protect the public?

    These kinds of scams tend to be marketed to people who are vulnerable and in financial trouble. They’re precisely the kind of people who are supposed to be protected by the rules preventing non-lawyers from litigating. But, at the moment, nobody seems to be taking any action to stop Stamp and Matrix from ripping off their clients, wasting valuable court time, and wasting the time and money of the people and organisations they bring claims against.

    We don’t know whether Stamp and his colleagues genuinely believe the bizarre legal theories they are promoting, but we don’t think that matters. Here are some steps that could be taken:

    • The police could investigate what the High Court has already described as “having every appearance of deceit, of abuse and contempt of court”, and “potentially criminal conduct”.
    • The police could also investigate whether Stamp and his associates defrauded their own clients, given the High Court’s suggestion that the long list of “elderly statutes” may have been intended to deceive them. OpenDemocracy published other evidence of potential fraud last year. There are also numerous claims on this website of fraud by Matrix Freedom – we do not know whether these reports are reliable or not. And, in their own management meetings, Stamp admitted that it was their fault that their “solutions” had caused problems to their own clients.

    We are not aware of any active criminal proceedings.

    Matrix Freedom has posted documents on the internet suggesting that the FCA is already taking action. Matrix Freedom haven’t stopped marketing their schemes. But they have demanded £100m in gold or silver from the FCA and the judge, failing which Stamp says he will “employ the US Secretary of the Treasury and the IRS” to collect it.

    We’d like to see Stamp try to do that. But we’d prefer to see a criminal investigation into what looks like a conspiracy to defraud the public, mortgage lenders, and tax authorities.


    Many thanks to K and I for their research and other contributions to this article, and thanks to B for technical review of the videos.

    All videos/images (c) Iain Clifford Stamp/Matrix Freedom Limited, and reproduced in the public interest, and as fair dealing for the purposes of criticism.

    Footnotes

    1. Iain Clifford Stamp & Ors v Capital Home Loans Limited T/A CHL Mortgages & Ors [2024] EWHC 1092 (KB) ↩︎

    2. It unlawfully uses a PO Box for its registered office, has never filed accounts, is late filing its confirmation statement, and is about to be struck off. ↩︎

    3. Registration is required; it’s easy to do that with a disposable email address. This and all other links to Stamp’s business are marked “nofollow” so that our link does not increase their search engine prominence. ↩︎

    4. Not an actual legal term, but one that appears to be used exclusively by “sovereign citizens” and similar pseudolaw practitioners ↩︎

    5. There are also reports he used a company called SENJ Limited (Seychelles); however we can find no evidence that this company exists. Possibly it was dissolved at some point after the FCA started asking questions. ↩︎

    6. This appears to have led to a libel claim by Stamp against OpenDemocracy. ↩︎

    7. The second item on the list may be intended to refer to the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, which is mostly still in force, but of no relevance. ↩︎

    8. There is a magisterial analysis of all these theories in the Canadian judgment Meads v Meads. Yisroel Greenberg has written about UK adherents to these theories, from the perspective of a local government lawyer. The criminal barrister who tweets as @CrimeGirl has compiled a useful summary of UK caselaw. The Ministry of Justice recently sent an impressively complete FOIA response to someone asking about these theories. We recently covered a tax-flavoured variant of this conspiracy theory, which used the war in Gaza as an excuse for tax evasion. ↩︎

    9. The video was made available here. We would be cautious about believing many of the claims on this website, as the owner appears to have some kind of feud with Stamp. However, this video has every sign of being genuine (we showed it to an expert in “deep fake” video creation and he was confident that such techniques were not used). ↩︎

    10. See the 31 May 2022 “full council meeting” video on this website, around the 31 minute mark ↩︎

    11. Two of whom were wrongly identified; see the front page of the judgment ↩︎

    12. The court had already struck out some of the claims on its own, without an application from the defendant lenders; the 9 May judgment includes an appeal against that decision by the affected claimants. ↩︎

    13. A quick and simplified summary of securitisation: Banks can make only a limited amount of mortgage loans before running out of regulatory capital. So many banks will sell the beneficial interest in their loans to a “special purpose vehicle” which has raised funds issuing bonds on the capital markets. The risk of the loans not performing is now mostly borne by the bondholders, not the bank, meaning the bank has freed up regulatory capital and can make more loans. The bank remains the legal owner of the mortgage loans, and so has the relationship with the borrower. By definition, that means the arrangement doesn’t affect the borrower’s legal rights. ↩︎

    14. A term very redolent of the “Freeman on the Land” movement ↩︎

    15. As is typical of the genre, the claims are not even internally consistent – in the (impossible) event that all statutes since 1973 were void, we would have to pay tax under the pre-1973 statutes. This would not necessarily be a good outcome for their clients. There’s a not-entirely-serious comment below from Richard Thomas, the respected retired tax tribunal judge, on how this could play out. ↩︎

    16. That is a little unclear, as the company number on its website is in fact the company number for Creditor Tax Rebates Ltd ↩︎

    17. And despite the claims on the Matrix Freedom website that Matrix Freedom doesn’t have clients, Stamp freely uses that word in their own management meetings. ↩︎

    18. Why a contempt of court? Because of the High Court’s statement that the activities “could well amount” to the conduct of litigation. That’s a “reserved legal activity” under the Legal Services Act, and it’s a criminal offence to carry on a reserved legal activity if you are not a qualified/regulated legal professional; and in addition to that specific offence, it’s also a contempt of court. ↩︎

    19. See the 31 May 2022 “full council meeting” recording, at 37:00 ↩︎

    20. This document claims that the FCA applied for, and obtained, some form of court order against Stamp at Southwark Crown Court 7th June 2023 (No 34 2023). This document attempts to appoint a judge and an FCA lawyer as “trustees” of Stamp’s “estate” (with both terms used in ways that have little in common with their actual meaning). It is unclear whether all of this relates to the mortgage scam, or other activities of Stamp/Matrix Freedom – we asked the FCA and they said they couldn’t comment on individual cases. ↩︎

  • The Green Party – very shy about a big tax increase

    The Green Party – very shy about a big tax increase

    The Green Party says it will raise £50bn in tax from the “richest”. But their proposal will probably end up affecting half of all households. Whilst some of the very wealthiest will pay no additional tax at all, there will be people on fairly ordinary incomes facing marginal tax rates of 70%. The Greens should go back to the drawing board.

    This is twice in one day we saw a political party proposing a tax change that’s kiboshed by the tricks and gimmicks embedded in the income tax rules. It’s time we had real political focus on ending those tricks and gimmicks for good.

    Here’s Carla Denyer, co-leader of the Green Party, on Question Time yesterday:

    “Capital gains tax, the tax you pay on assets, so that’s pretty much the wealthy that have those, you pay less tax than the income you get from work. We think that’s unfair, so we would equalise those and we would also remove the cap on national insurance that means that the richest pay less. Those three changes together would raise over £50 billion by the end of the next Parliament.”

    The casual viewer may have come away with the impression that the Greens will be raising £50bn by taxing the wealthy.

    That’s mostly true for the Greens’ proposal to raise capital gains tax. It would indeed affect mostly the wealthiest. Complete equalisation with income tax could perhaps raise £8bn.

    However it’s not an accurate description of where most of the £50bn is coming from.

    The Green proposal

    What does “removing the cap on national insurance” mean?

    Here are the current Class 1 rates:

    £967 is the “upper earnings limit”. There used to be no national insurance past that point; it’s now 2%. “Uncapping” means removing the limit so that the 8% rate continues to apply past £967 a week.

    We should, however, discard the pretence there’s something special about national insurance. It’s just income tax by another name, with an antiquated weekly calculation, a complicated history and a funny national accounting treatment. A realistic approach looks at the overall combined rate of income tax and national insurance.

    In the current, 2024/25 tax year, this looks like this for an employee:

    • No tax on incomes below the £12,570 personal allowance.
    • £12,570 to £50,270 – a combined income tax and employee national insurance rate of 28%
    • £50,271 to £125,140 – a combined rate of 42%
    • Above £125,140 – a combined rate of 47%.

    The Greens are therefore proposing that the third of these should rise to 48%, and the fourth to 53%.

    However things aren’t that simple. The personal allowance starts to be withdrawn (“tapered”) when your income hits £100,000, and is gone by £125,140. This means that the marginal rate in the £100,000 to £125,140 range is much higher than the headline rate.

    This chart shows the effect, as things stand today (blue) and under the Green proposal yellow):

    There’s an interactive version of the chart here that lets you select different scenarios and touch/mouse over the chart to get exact figures.

    This is not the only factor that means the actual marginal rate is higher than the headline rate. There are a series of poorly thought-through tricks and gimmicks that have this effect, most significantly child benefit withdrawal and student loan repayments.

    Here’s the marginal rates under the Green proposal for a graduate with three kids under 18:

    So a graduate earning £60,000 with three kids pays a 72% marginal rate, and everyone earning £100k-£125k pays a 77% marginal rate. I don’t think this would be sensible or sustainable. There are many people (think: hospital consultants) who would prefer to reduce their hours than earn just 23p in the pound.

    Uncapping national insurance was a perfectly rational policy in the 90s, but it’s not viable today unless the various tricks and gimmicks in the system are fixed or removed.

    It’s remarkable that this was the second proposal yesterday which was undone by a failure to understand the complexity in the tax system. That says something about the need for reform.

    Who would pay this?

    The Green proposal will affect quite a lot of people.

    £50,270 is not that far above the average London salary. And, by 2027/28, one in five taxpayers, and one in four teachers will be affected; I expect a majority of households will have someone who earns that figure at some point in their life. To say this is a tax on the “richest” is not particularly accurate.

    But some very wealthy people won’t be affected much, or even at all. The big problem with increasing national insurance is that it only affects wages. The retired don’t pay it. Investors don’t pay it. Landlords don’t pay it. It’s a funny choice of tax rise for a progressive political party. It’s a bit odd, because only three years ago the Greens were proposing abolishing national insurance and rolling it into income tax. Perhaps Ms Denyer got the policy wrong. Or the more cynical version: they chose to raise national insurance because they think people don’t understand it.

    One of Jeremy Hunt’s best decisions was starting to phase out employee national insurance. No sensible political party should be looking to reverse this, and particularly not one of the Left.

    Some suggestions

    I have three suggestions for the Greens:

    • The tax rise should apply to income tax, not national insurance, so it impacts landlords/investors as well as working people
    • Realistically you have to scrap the child benefit and personal allowance clawback at the same time, or you end up with indefensibly high marginal rates. Student loans also need thought.
    • Be clear about what this proposal is, and who it applies to, instead of suggesting it’s a tax on the “richest”.

    It’s great that there’s a political party offering people the choice of significantly higher taxes and significantly higher spending. However this needs careful consideration to ensure the result is fair and workable. And it also needs the Greens to be clear and honest about what they’re proposing, and who it affects – and I don’t think Ms Denyer’s description of this policy was.


    Video (c) British Broadcasting Corporation and reproduced here as fair dealing for the purposes of criticism and review.

    Footnotes

    1. I initially thought “three” was a mistake, but possibly she says “three” because she forgot to mention the Green Party’s wealth tax proposal. ↩︎

    2. However that would give us one of the highest rates in the developed world; a more modest increase would seem sensible and/or one that was combined with a return to an indexation allowance (which prevents inflationary gains being taxed). ↩︎

    3. The self-employed pay slightly less ↩︎

    4. Uncapping the upper earnings limit was a key element of Labour’s “shadow budget” for the 1992 general election. The “shadow budget” in general, and this proposal in particular, are often blamed for Labour’s loss, although whether that is correct is contested. ↩︎

    5. Ignoring Scotland for the moment, and also ignoring weird marginal rate effects ↩︎

  • Less Tax for Landlords – what happens when tax avoiders are caught?

    Less Tax for Landlords – what happens when tax avoiders are caught?

    Less Tax for Landlords and The Bailey Group sold a landlord tax avoidance scheme involving an LLP “hybrid partnership”. We reported back in October that the scheme was technically hopeless; HMRC has written to the clients and invited them to settle. Everyone thought the game was up.

    How did Less Tax for Landlords respond to being caught? They denied there was anything wrong with their scheme, paid £100,000 to a KC known for writing tax avoidance scheme opinions, obtained an opinion which appears to be worthless, and advised their clients to disregard HMRC’s offer to make a disclosure by 31 January 2024. We expect that, as a result, their clients will incur significant penalties.

    At this point the big question is whether Less Tax for Landlords are recklessly incompetent, or conducting a deliberate fraud on HMRC and their clients. Tax advisers and others will form their own view after viewing the evidence we set out below.

    It’s often said that the answer to rogue tax advisers is regulation. Less Tax for Landlords’ accounting arm is regulated, by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales. But the ICAEW shows no sign of taking any action.

    Regulation isn’t working. Rogue tax advisers are taking advantage of HMRC and their own clients. The question is: what can be done?

    The LT4L scheme

    On 4 October 2023 we published a detailed report into a tax scheme marketed by Less Tax for Landlords, the trading name of the One Consultancy Group (OCG). The idea was:

    • Landlords would declare a trust over their properties in favour of a limited liability partnership (LLP)
    • The landlord and their spouse would be members of the LLP; there would also be a newly incorporated company as member, owned by the landlord/spouse
    • The LLP diverts most of its profit to the company.

    LT4L made some very impressive claims about the structure:

    • There was no need to tell the mortgage lender.
    • After two years, the structure is entirely exempt from inheritance tax thanks to business relief.
    • The diversion of LLP profits to the company means rental income is taxed at the corporate rate of 19-25%.
    • The trust means the landlords’ obligation to make mortgage payments “shifts to the LLP”, meaning the company as LLP member obtains full tax relief for mortgage interest. The “section 24” restriction on landlords claiming tax relief is avoided.
    • No CGT or SDLT on establishment, without needing to qualify for any special reliefs.
    • The properties are “rebased” for capital gains tax. In other words, when they’re sold, only the capital gain after incorporation of the LLP is taxed. Pre-incorporation gains disappear.
    • Instead of taking profits out of the LLP, you can take capital out instead, and you won’t be taxed.
    • There’s no need to disclose the structure to HMRC.
    • If the structure triggers unexpected tax, then their clients are protected by an unusual insurance arrangement – LT4L claim they have a “written note” from their insurers stating they are happy to cover all interest, penalties and extra tax payable if HMRC do not agree with the way the structure was set up.

    How the LT4L scheme fails

    We couldn’t believe the scheme when we first saw it. Every aspect fails:

    • Declaring a trust over the rental properties without the mortgage lender’s consent (or even telling them) will in most cases default the mortgage. The structure was described to us by an experienced broker as “almost unmortgageable”.
    • Rental property businesses almost never qualify for inheritance tax business relief. The LLP structure doesn’t change that.
    • The mortgage obligation doesn’t “shift to the LLP”. It remains with the landlords – who now lose their 20% credit.
    • The “mixed partnership” rules mean you can’t get a tax benefit by allocating profits to a corporate partner in an LLP.
    • The allocation of profits to the corporate partner means there will be up-front capital gains tax. There’s no CGT rebasing.
    • SDLT will be due at the point that income profits are allocated to the corporate member. LT4L’s unusual structuring potentially results in a higher SDLT liability than would result from a simple incorporation.
    • The structure can incur additional SDLT every time the profit allocation changes. LT4L’s clients could have unknowingly racked up years of SDLT liabilities.
    • The structure is disclosable under DOTAS, the rules requiring tax avoidance schemes to be disclosed to HMRC. That is obvious, given that the structure was mass-marketed and its main benefit is to avoid tax.
    • Members are taxed on profits as they are made; when and how they are taken out is irrelevant. This is a basic principle of LLP taxation.
    • HMRC do not in fact agree with how the structure was set up, but there is no automatic payout from LT4L’s insurers. That’s because there never was a special “written note”; they just have the usual professional indemnity insurance. To get any benefit from that, an LT4L client has to lose an argument with HMRC, sue LT4L (with the insurers arguing LT4L’s case, not the client’s), and win. This is not easy, even if (as we believe) LT4L’s advice is plain wrong.

    We went into the issues in detail in our report of 4 October 2023. That same day, HMRC issued a “Spotlight” saying that the scheme didn’t work, and then wrote to taxpayers and agents inviting them to make a disclosure by 31 January 2024.

    Worse than just failure

    Many tax avoidance schemes fail, indeed these days almost all of them do. The unique thing about Less Tax for Landlords is that nobody has been able to explain why they thought their structure worked. It’s not a case where they have an argument, and that argument is wrong. It’s that they don’t appear to have had an argument at all.

    We can illustrate this if we focus for the moment on the claim that the structure is exempt from inheritance tax after two years.

    Here are six answers that Less Tax for Landlords provided to clients and advisers asking questions. People familiar with inheritance tax and the tax concept of “trading” will see immediately they are nonsense (The Chartered Institute of Taxation have published a clear summary of the actual position). But we believe even a non-specialist will see that the explanations given are contradictory:

    1. Tick boxes and have a business plan

    This was the original confident claim:

    “[the business] is outside of your estate for inheritance tax, as long as you tick various boxes”

    Why?

    “because the HMRC recognizes that there is a trading relationship between you all, and that you’ve got a written business plan and that you’re managing it and that your sole purpose is not to avoid tax but to maximize your wealth to tax efficiently as possible, the whole thing becomes inheritance tax free.”

    A trading relationship between the participants, a business plan, not having a tax avoidance purpose – all these things are irrelevant to whether inheritance tax applies. There are no “boxes” to tick.

    2. The LLP turns into a trading business

    If you don’t like that, here’s a completely different explanation:

    “The LLP structure that we set up is not investing in property. It does not own the property. The property is owned by the individuals. The LLP has taken advantage of that ownership and it is available… after two years, that LLP turns into a trading business according to HMRC, not according to us, according to HMRC. And at that point, after two years, the equity of those properties inside that LLP are then outside of the estate for inheritance tax after two years. “

    Pure nonsense. The LLP does have beneficial ownership of the property. The LLP does not “turn into a trading business”. HMRC has certainly not said this, or anything like this.

    Here’s another version of the same claim from a document LT4L sent to a client, with a badly drawn rectangle supposedly showing that something, somewhere, somehow is trading:

    3. The LLP turns rental income into trading income

    Less Tax for Landlords often used this slide:

    And sounded very confident:

    In reality, an LLP doesn’t transform its income into trading income.

    4. Gobbledegook about the equity

    Some advisers asking LT4L to explain their structure received this explanation:

    “The LLP holds the equity and not the properties – so it cannot be classed as investment. The owner of the properties does not qualify for BR on the properties, but on the equity.”

    We have no idea what this means.

    5. More trading activity is introduced

    When we were researching our report, we asked LT4L how they justified their inheritance tax claims. This was their response:

    “We do not work with all landlords, at least not in relation to a Mixed Partnership structure, and for those we do work with, we look to help them commercialise their operation and introduce more trading activity into their business model.”

    You can’t “introduce more trading activity” into a rental property business and qualify for business relief. So this approach would fail; however we have been unable to find any LT4L clients who were helped to “introduce more trading activity”. This statement may just have been a lie.

    6. Aggressive evasion

    Over the years, many tax advisers asked Less Tax for Landlords how their scheme magically qualified for business relief. That often went like this:

    Or this:

    That confidence has now disappeared, and Mr Gimple’s correspondence with us makes clear he never understood the technical tax basis for the structure. He tells us he relied on Vajahat Sharif who ran the associated law firm (which includes STEP qualified practitioners), and Chris Bailey, who ran the accounting and tax advisory side of the business.

    Mr Sharif has told us that he and his staff don’t in fact have any tax expertise, and he never advised on any element of the hybrid partnership structure. We believe Mr Sharif when he says he has no tax expertise, because he promotes himself on LinkedIn as “Head of Terrorism, National Security, Political & Complex Crimes at Tuckers Solicitors”. It is impressive that he can combine this with being “Group Head of Legal” and head of compliance for OCG Group (which owns/runs Less Tax for Landlords). We’d assume it’s two different people with the same name, but it isn’t.

    Mr Sharif says he had no involvement in the LT4L tax avoidance structure. A letter was recently sent to LT4L’s clients from Sharif and the other directors concerning the structure; Mr Sharif says he didn’t authorise that letter, but hasn’t taken any steps to correct it.

    Mr Bailey is a qualified accountant, but from the videos and documentation we have seen, it is apparent that he either has no tax expertise or is lying (we do not know which it is). Bailey was disciplined by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants in 2020 for failing to provide audit files when requested. He provided a series of excuses for this: he first said he needed more time, then claimed the clients were audit-exempt, then claimed the files were offsite, and finally blamed a software issue. He was found guilty of misconduct. The ACCA accepted that the failure to disclose was not deliberate; it is not clear how they came to this conclusion.

    We believe Mr Gimple, and don’t think he was dishonest. However, he had no technical tax qualifications or experience, was selling a scheme he didn’t understand, and aggressively responded to criticism from people who were qualified (without, it seems, ever wondering what precisely was going on). This strikes us as reckless.

    The justifications for the other key elements of the structure were equally nonsensical, with no reasonable basis ever provided for thinking capital gains were rebased, or that the diversion of income to the corporate member would escape the mixed partnership rules. Over the years, many advisers queried the structure – nobody received a coherent explanation.

    And the other people who never received an explanation were LT4L’s clients. As far as we are aware, not a single LT4L ever received a technical explanation of why business relief applied, or indeed a technical explanation of any other aspects of the structure.

    It is, in short, astonishing.

    Why?

    The LT4L structure has been the subject of widespread comment by tax professionals. We are not aware of a single adviser, anywhere in the UK, who believes the LT4L structure had any prospect of success.

    At this point there are three possibilities.

    • First, Less Tax for Landlords have alighted on a structure so brilliant that nobody else is able to understand it. They are right and we are all wrong.
    • Second, LT4L were incompetent and negligent to an astonishing degree.
    • Third, key personnel at LT4L either knew the structure didn’t work, or were wilfully blind to it not working, but sold it anyway. In other words: they defrauded both HMRC and their own clients.

    We are going to discard the first possibility.

    To assess the likelihood of the second and third possibilities, let’s look at how LT4L responded to the Spotlight.

    LT4L’s response

    Here’s what LT4L have been up to, since October, in their own words:

    As you are aware, we actively contacted HMRC the day after Spotlight 63 was published and the Spotlight (DOTAS) team are aware that we are working with Kings Counsel and are waiting for us to follow up with them once the Counsel's Opinion is available.

Speaking of which, we did manage to get an unscheduled couple of hours with KC on Wednesday afternoon to look at progress.

The fact that KC is conducting such a detailed analysis of all of the relevant laws factoring in the points that have been raised by HMRC and others is frustrating from the perspective of delivery timescales but essential for helping to determine the specific facts.

KC has indicated the Opinion will be covering 100’s of pages and is still a few weeks away and we hope you understand that, until Counsel's Opinion is secured, we are unable to rely upon the advice and so cannot comment or provide information on this in this update.

    Less Tax for Landlords didn’t admit wrongdoing and continued to represent their clients. It’s an impossible conflict of interest.

    LT4L then admitted that the chosen counsel is Robert Venables KC.

    We hope that your Christmas and New Year break was as enjoyable as possible.

This email contains information about the Leading Kings Counsel we are working with, as well as our current intentions regarding communicating with HMRC on behalf of those clients who have received a nudge letter ahead of the 31st January.

Several of you have expressed a degree of frustration at the fact we have chosen to keep the identity of the KC we have been working with since the 6th October confidential. To date his identity has been strictly between the Group Directors and HMRC. We have explained the reason to people who have asked directly. In short it is around enabling the research and the dialogue to be kept tight and away from any additional distractions.

The KC has offered to provide OCG Accountants with a letter for us to send to our clients covering his brief assessment of the current situation and his advice, and this is now imminent, and, as such, with his permission, we are sharing his details with you. We would prefer this to remain confidential within our client community.

Since Spotlight 63 was produced by HMRC on the 4th October 2023, Leading Tax Counsel, Robert Venables K.C., has been extensively advising, first, Less Tax for Landlords Limited and then, in addition, OCG Accountants.

    This is an illuminating choice. Venables’ reputation is for providing opinions on avoidance schemes.Jolyon Maugham once wrote an insightful and influential blog about the “boys who won’t say no” – the handful of tax KCs who frequently issue technically dubious opinions on avoidance schemes. Venables is generally considered to be one of those KCs. He’s not the man you go to if HMRC are unreasonably challenging your entirely commercial structure (not least because he has no credibility with HMRC).

    We understand from a source that LT4L paid £100,000 for the Venables advice.

    LT4L wrote to their clients last month summarising Venables’ opinion. We are publishing a copy of the LT4L letter; it is stated to be confidential, but we believe there is a public interest in publishing it, given it reveals highly unethical behaviour by LT4L. We also believe public scrutiny of LT4L’s actions is in their clients’ interests.

    The first and most important thing Venables says is that clients can’t rely on his advice. If Venables gets it wrong, LT4L’s clients are stuffed:

    This is standard practice for KCs writing avoidance opinions. The people who actually need to rely on the KC’s advice, can’t. This is why “the boys” happily issue opinions that other advisers wouldn’t touch – it can never come back to them.

    The other key reason is that “the boys” will often make assumptions of fact which are unrealistic, and mean they are advising on a structure which is not quite the same as the actual structure. Like this:

    This is not how the structure was sold to LT4L’s clients. The whole point was to allocate large amounts of income to the corporate member to obtain a tax benefit. LT4L presentations show almost all the rental income being allocated to the company, leaving the individual LLP members only enough to use up their 20% income tax bracket:

    Other advisors, who are merely bad, think there is a 15% limit to the profit that can be allocated to the corporate member. LT4L think there is no limit:

    So Venables is assuming away the actual structure, either because he has been mis-instructed, or because that’s the only way he can come to the “right” conclusion. Everything that follows is therefore worthless.

    Mixed partnership rules

    These are the rules which undo attempts to allocate income to a corporate member of an LLP/partnership which go beyond a fair return on services or capital provided. Less Tax for Landlords made a series of nonsense claims about these rules. What does Venables have to say?

     

    HMRC have claimed that income which was in fact allocated to the corporate member is deemed to be taxable income of the individuals which should have been declared as such.

    HMRC have mentioned the “mixed partnership” rules and the “income stream” rules.

    Robert has advised us that he has seen nothing in HMRC’s arguments which justifies the view that taxable income has been under-declared and does not see how their claim can be established on either basis.

    There is zero content here.

    LT4L were previously very confident the rules didn’t apply as long as your “main reason” for the structure wasn’t tax avoidance and they are “used for business purposes”:

    As we explained in our original report, this is not at all what the rules say. The mixed partnership rules and transfer of income streams rules clearly apply. Bailey appears to have no understanding of the legislation.

    But Venables is silent on LT4L’s original justification, and provides no basis for thinking the structure works. It is possible, again, that he is misunderstanding/misdescribing the structure.

    We have heard from a source that LT4L are in fact submitting client tax returns for 2022/23 on the basis there is no allocation of profits to the company. If that is correct it is very disturbing, because it suggests they know their structure is indefensible, and are conceding most/all of the benefit of the structure for future periods, but concealing this from their clients.

    Any reallocation of profits can also trigger SDLT charges – more on that below.

    Inheritance tax

    The prospect of an inheritance tax exemption after two years was the big benefit of the LT4L structure. But on this, Venables provides no advice at all. We are aware of former LT4L clients where HMRC is asserting seven figure inheritance tax liabilities, but all LT4L have to say is:

    HMRC have also raised the question of inheritance tax.

    To the clients where this is a current issue, separate steps are currently ‘in progress’ with HMRC and unless you have made some gift of your rights over the LLP, Robert sees this as being currently academic. He notes that in any event your self-assessment return has nothing to do with inheritance tax.

    Clients who paid thousands of pounds for advice from LT4L which claimed to enable an inheritance tax exemption, should be pretty unhappy that the issue is now described as “academic”. It’s a striking change from their breezy confidence of a few months ago.

    Stamp duty land tax

    Here’s what LT4L are saying about Venables’ advice:

    HMRC have not claimed in their letters to us or to our clients, in the “factsheet” or in Spotlight 63 that any stamp duty land tax should have been paid on the transfers of the properties to the LLP.

    Robert had advised us that no stamp duty land tax should have been due on such transfers, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances. We shall be contacting separately our clients whose circumstances may be exceptional.

    It’s another bait and switch. The problem isn’t SDLT when the properties go into the structure; it’s SDLT when the profit-sharing ratios change. Every change potentially triggers a tax charge, and the changes are often large.

    HMRC didn’t mention this point in Spotlight 63, but we understand they are currently investigating it.

    Capital gains tax

    Here’s LT4L/Venables:

    HMRC appear to accept that there was no capital gains tax payable when the properties were transferred to the LLP.

    Robert has advised us that in general that must be correct, although he adds that there may be a small number of our clients who may require more specific contact relating to their specific circumstances.

    Once more, a failure to engage with the actual problem: LT4L promised that the structure would “rebase” assets so that, when you sell a property, you’re only taxed on gains since it went into the LLP:

    They explained this through gobbledegook:

    There is no rebasing when property is moved into an LLP.

    One of Bailey’s many errors was to believe LLPs were treated as corporates for capital gains tax purposes:

    This is an amazing mistake for any accountant to make (but one Bailey makes consistently). We’re aware of former LT4L clients with high six figure liabilities as a result of LT4L’s incompetence.

    It’s fairly obvious why LT4L don’t want Venables discussing these issues.

    Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes

    The “disclosure of tax avoidance scheme” (DOTAS) rules require promoters of tax avoidance schemes to notify HMRC. HMRC then provides a scheme reference number which the promoter has to give its clients to put on their tax return. This is the kiss of death if you’re trying to market a scheme, so promoters generally find bogus legal rationales for not disclosing.

    The LT4L scheme plainly was disclosable, because its “main benefit” was obtaining a tax advantage, and the scheme was mass-marketed and highly standardised.

    LT4L didn’t disclose, because they thought their LLP scheme (created wholly for tax reasons) was comparable to the kind of LLP commonly used by accounting and law firms (it isn’t) and “a business structure is not a tax avoidance scheme” (which just ignores the way the rules work).

    Spotlight 63 is very clear that HMRC believe DOTAS applies. The LT4L/Venables advice doesn’t mention DOTAS. We would speculate that’s either because LT4L didn’t ask the question, or because they asked the question but didn’t like the answer.

    Where does this leave LT4L’s clients?

    In a terrible position. They are being advised to do nothing…

    “HMRC have suggested that you should amend your self-assessment return for 2021/22.

    Robert does not see how it could be to your advantage to do so. He can see that it would very probably be to your disadvantage and to the advantage of HMRC

    HMRC have suggested that you should make a “declaration” to them and have threatened an enquiry into your self-assessment return for 2021/22 if you do not do so by January 31st 2024. They have not specified what the “declaration” should concern.

    Robert does not see how it could be to your advantage to make such a declaration, even if you knew what it was you were supposed to declare. He sees the threat of HMRC making an enquiry into your self-assessment return if you do not do so by January 31st 2024 as a hollow
    one.”

    … but being given no explanation that would let them form a reasonable belief this is a correct course of action.

    The likely outcome will be penalties. Robert Venables KC has this to say about penalties:

    HMRC have suggested that unspecified penalties might be due from you.

    Robert does not see how that can presently be the case.

    Again, there is zero content here. Penalties are very likely due for taking all the unsupportable positions we refer to above, and then for failing to correct returns when HMRC has given taxpayers an opportunity to do so.

    Why won’t LT4L publish the full opinion?

    Often people don’t publish opinions they receive from KCs because that would cause the opinion to lose legal privilege. HMRC could then obtain a copy of the opinion, the instructions and other supporting documentation.

    But this ship has likely sailed. By publishing the summary, LT4L probably waived privilege in the opinion itself.

    Another possibility is that the full opinion is embarrassing, particularly if LT4L actually put Chris Bailey’s amazingly wrong technical claims to Venables.

    Another is that the opinion would reveal how Venables is being instructed to not actually advise on the key questions.

    A taxpayer cannot reasonably proceed on the basis of an empty summary of advice which reveals none of the reasoning, and may indeed be on an entirely incorrect basis. LT4L clients should be demanding the full instructions and opinion. LT4L will probably refuse.

    However LT4L will likely be unable to refuse a formal request for the Venables papers from HMRC. Similarly we expect they will be unable to resist disclosing the documents in the (very likely) event they are sued for ngeligence by former clients.

    So was it fraud?

    We don’t know.

    This may have been a case of people acting in good faith, but just getting the tax position extremely wrong. That is quite hard to credit given the number of apparently qualified people working for LT4L, the number of unrelated errors they have made, the number of people who pointed out their errors over the years, and the length of time they sold the structure. Nevertheless, it remains a possibility.

    In our judgment the more likely scenario is “wilful blindness” – that Chris Bailey, the qualified chartered accountant who appears to be behind the scheme, had no real expertise in tax, somehow bluffed his colleagues into thinking he did, and pressed on despite all the criticisms made by other advisers. If that’s what happened, then it could amount to fraud against HMRC and LT4L’s clients – that depends on whether a jury would consider Bailey’s actions to be “dishonest”. We discussed how courts approach this question here. In this scenario, those around Bailey were not dishonest, just reckless/negligent.

    The people who run LT4L are in greater legal jeopardy now. They have a detailed analysis of their structure which demonstrates it to be hopeless, and they know HMRC agrees. But, instead of admitting error and acting in the best interest of their clients, they are deep in denial, if not cover-up, and continuing to collect £450 per month in fees from around 450 LLPs – i.e. c£2.5m/year. This behaviour may amount to dishonesty even if the earlier behaviour did not.

    There is an additional question around LT4L’s repeated claims that they had special insurance which provided complete protection for their clients, with coverage of “£2m per case”:

    These claims are almost certainly false, and if LT4L knew the claims were false then that could amount to fraud by false representation. We asked LT4L to explain these statements; they declined.

    What should LT4L clients do?

    LT4L clients should urgently obtain independent tax advice to regularise their tax affairs, plus independent legal advice to preserve their ability to sue LT4L if (as is likely) they have suffered loss.

    We can’t recommend individual advisers due to the risk of a conflict of interest, but there are now a number of reputable legal and tax advisers who are familiar with the LT4L scheme and able to act.

    However we fear that most LT4L clients will have no way of knowing they are being badly misled.

    Who can protect LT4L’s clients?

    Right now there is nobody protecting LT4L’s clients from what we believe to be incompetent advice that will cause them significant financial harm.

    Who could act?

    • Chris Bailey is regulated by the ICAEW. We reported him to their professional conduct department, and urged swift action to protect LT4L’s clients. It looks like no swift action is being taken. The ICAEW is in danger of completely undermining the concept of self-regulation.
    • HMRC are enabling LT4L’s behaviour by continuing to treat them as a normal adviser, and allowing or even encouraging them to coordinate their clients’ responses. HMRC should write directly to the clients, warning them that LT4L promoted an undisclosed tax avoidance scheme, and suggesting the clients obtain independent advice.
    • HMRC should commence a criminal investigation into Chris Bailey and Less Tax for Landlords.

    The question is whether the ICAEW and/or HMRC will step up.

    Tax Policy Associates is committed to accuracy and we will promptly correct any errors of fact or law in this article. We will not, however, retract our legal opinions in the face of abuse, legal threats and vague non-specific denials.


    Thanks to M and L for a helpful discussion on fraud and dishonesty, P for a detailed analysis of the tax evasion caselaw, and K for advice on privilege and collateral waiver. Thanks to S for his insightful review of our original draft. And thanks again to the many people who helped with our original investigation into Less Tax for Landlords.

    Footnotes

    1. The Bailey Group was acquired by SKS in September 2020. We understand from SKS that Chris Bailey continued to run the practice until November 2022, and after that point other SKS personnel discovered the nature of the scheme Bailey had been selling. SKS tells us they obtained counsel’s advice and started trying to remedy the position for their clients before the publication of Spotlight 63. So SKS appear to be acting properly and in good faith (although that won’t remove the Bailey Group’s liability for its historic actions). ↩︎

    2. We’ve heard anecdotally that other firms sold similar schemes, but we haven’t seen any evidence to support this. ↩︎

    3. The relief used to be called “business property relief”, and many advisers still refer to it as BPR. This is, however, incorrect – it’s a mistake we made in our original LT4L report, but we will be using the correct nomenclature going forwards. ↩︎

    4. The rate is 19% for profits under £50,000, with a “catch-up rate” of 26.5% on profits up to £250,000, so that the overall effective rate smoothly transitions into the full rate of 25%. ↩︎

    5. This was no small step. HMRC don’t issue a Spotlight for every piece of tax planning which merely doesn’t work; HMRC only Spotlight what they see as particularly egregious and hopeless tax avoidance schemes ↩︎

    6. In this respect Less Tax for Landlords are significantly worse than Property118, whose schemes are poor quality tax avoidance, and who clearly aren’t qualified to advise on tax structures – but we have no reason to suggest they are engaged in intentional fraud. ↩︎

    7. Update 1 March 2024: for some reason the link is down, so we’re linking to an archived version ↩︎

    8. You can find the full versions of some of these videos on YouTube; most are freely available on the LT4L website once you’ve registered (but that means we can’t link to them). All the videos are © Less Tax for Landlords, and republished by us for the purposes of fair dealing/criticism and in the public interest. ↩︎

    9. This is from a June 2021 webinar, hosted by Benham & Reeves; they asked us to remove their logo from the video, and we agreed to that. Many people in the landlord real estate world cosseted and promoted Less Tax for Landlords; Benham & Reeves are a long way from being the worst offender. ↩︎

    10. The way they phase the business relief test as referring simply to “trading” is not quite right. A business will usually qualify for business relief unless it consists wholly or mainly of of one or more of dealing in securities or shares, land or buildings, or making or holding of investments”. So what LT4L really need to show is that the insertion of the LLP means that the business no longer consists wholly or mainly of the business of making or holding of investments in land. That is in practice not something they will be able to do. ↩︎

    11. Only in “exceptional” cases will a property rental business qualify for business relief. Taxpayers have failed to qualify for business relief even for an actively managed business of letting holiday cottages; in the words of the recent Grace Joyce Graham judgment, it is only “the exceptional letting business which falls on the non-investment side of the line”. In the Graham case, the deceased “lavished” personal care on guests, including making them home-made food, providing them with fresh crab and fish, arranging linen and towels, making cream teas, and organising weddings and other events. The Tribunal thought this was an “exceptional” case but that, even then, it only “just” qualified for business relief. ↩︎

    12. Mr Sharif has indeed acted on major terrorism cases, although it’s perplexing that Tuckers’ website lists Mr Sharif as a “senior caseworker”. ↩︎

    13. It is important to note that Mr Gimple cannot be blamed for the actions of Less Tax for Landlords after Spotlight 63 was published, given he retired from the business in 2020. He now runs a firm called “Chancery Law and Tax” which claims to be “one of the UK’s leading providers of Legal Services” but employs no solicitors, barristers or qualified tax advisers. ↩︎

    14. i.e. because it’s probably in their clients’ interests to say that they were mis-sold a scheme which had no technical basis – they may then be able to avoid penalties, or even argue that the scheme should be disregarded. Less Tax for Landlords are obviously not going to run that argument. They’ve a clear incentive to claim that HMRC are wrong and their scheme works, and so keep the clients on their books (paying an annual retainer of around £1,800, which for over 500+ clients is a significant sum) and reduce the risk of negligence claims, or even time them out. ↩︎

    15. The contents of these opinions are generally not publicly available. One exception is the Hyrax case – see in particular paragraph 80 of the judgment. Venables provided an opinion the structure wasn’t disclosable to HMRC under the DOTAS rules. The tribunal had no difficulty coming to the opposite conclusion. ↩︎

    16. The 15% figure used by Property118 and others is, we believe, meant to suggest that the allocation to the corporate member reflects an arm’s length return on services provided, and is therefore disregarded under section 850C(15) ITTOIA 2005. But where the services are personally provided by an individual member of the LLP then s850C(17) disapplies subsection 15. You can’t, in fact, allocate even 1% to the corporate member in such circumstances. ↩︎

    17. There is a question whether it is appropriate for a barrister to advise on the basis of assumptions that are unrealistic, particularly when the barrister knows his advice will be shown to unrepresented individuals. It’s possible of course that Venables did not know the original purpose of the structure; but then, what did he think it was for? ↩︎

    18. Bailey also ignores the fact that incorporation relief requires shares to be issued, which an LLP patently can’t do. ↩︎

    19. Under the doctrine of “collateral waiver”, sometimes described as the “cherry-picking rule”, a summary of the content of advice will generally waive privilege in all of the advice and instructions. See the PCP Capital Partners case. ↩︎

    20. In reality almost all professional indemnity insurance includes an “aggregation clause” which means that the coverage from one error, or series of errors, would be £2m across all their clients. That’s a huge difference. ↩︎

  • Douglas Barrowman made more than £100m selling disastrous tax avoidance schemes. New evidence shows the schemes defrauded both HMRC and his own clients.

    Douglas Barrowman made more than £100m selling disastrous tax avoidance schemes. New evidence shows the schemes defrauded both HMRC and his own clients.

    Douglas Barrowman describes himself as an “entrepreneur”. The reality is that his businesses made a fortune mis-selling tax avoidance schemes on an industrial scale to people on modest incomes. The schemes all failed, leaving their clients with huge tax bills – many went bankrupt; at least two killed themselves. The clients were then directed to a new company – Vanquish – with a new scheme that supposedly could make those tax bills disappear. That scheme was legally hopeless and relied upon false documents – we believe those involved should be prosecuted for tax fraud. And, whilst Barrowman has denied any connection to Vanquish, the evidence suggests he is lying.

    The Times first reported on Vanquish in 2019. BBC File on Four carried a further, more detailed report in 2020. We’ve used these reports as a starting point, and obtained significant amounts of additional documentation and correspondence from AML’s former clients. That new evidence, plus the expertise of the tax specialists we work with, enables us to reach new conclusions.

    We believe that the evidence shows that the AML and Vanquish schemes were fraudulent, that the Vanquish schemes relied upon a false document signed by key Barrowman personnel, and that Barrowman’s denial of any connection to Vanquish was a lie. Whether the criminal offences of fraud or tax evasion were actually committed are questions of fact, which ultimately a jury would have to decide, but we believe there is sufficient evidence for a prosecution.

    To understand the nature of that evidence, we have to go back through some of the history. This report is therefore inevitably somewhat lengthy.

    Loan schemes – the history

    There’s an obvious way to avoid tax on your income: replace it with a loan. Income is taxable; a loan isn’t. If you turn £80,000 of salary into a loan you’ll save £33,600 (40% income tax, 2% employee’s NIC).

    But the equally obvious problem is: you’ll have to repay the loan. This problem was solved in the 1980s with the invention of the offshore employee benefit trust (EBT). The idea was that if (for example) you normally earned £90,000, then £10,000 of that would be paid normally, but your employer would pay the other £80,000 to the EBT. The EBT would lend you £70,000 of it, saving you £23,600 each year, and retaining £10,000 as a fee. The claim was that the nature of the trust meant that the trustee wouldn’t, and perhaps even couldn’t, demand repayment of the loan. So the promise (rarely put in writing) was that the “loan” was a very funny kind of loan which would never be repaid, and would remain in existence forever.

    In our view these schemes never worked – the uncommercial nature of the loan meant that it wasn’t a loan at all – it was simply remuneration, taxable in the usual way. HMRC was, however, slow to challenge the schemes, and they became widely adopted by large corporates. Eventually, in 2000, HMRC started a challenge against Dextra, a scheme used by John Caudwell, the founder of Phones4U. Caudwell and colleagues had avoided tax on about £17m of income, but the significance of the case was much wider than that. So it was unfortunate that HMRC lost – the failure of the court to step back and look at the reality of what was going on looks very wrong in retrospect.

    The Government’s response was to change the law (but only somewhat). That was insufficient – Dextra was seen as a green light by promoters of the scheme, who just slightly adapted their schemes to (they claimed) get around the new laws. The Revenue lost more cases, the law changed a bit more and the promoters responded by tweaking their schemes again. This “arms race” between Revenue and promoters continued for years, so in the last twenty years we have had eighteen different versions of the “employee benefit contributions” tax rules. 

    In 2004, the Government warned that future game-playing would result in retrospective legislation. Retrospective legislation duly followed in 2006, but only a subset of schemes were targeted. From that point, it became standard practice for law firms issuing opinions on tax matters to add a caveat that retrospective legislation was a possibility. However we are not aware of any promoters of loan schemes ever warning about retrospection risk (or indeed of any risk).

    HMRC lost another case – Sempra – in 2008. Again, it wasn’t appealed. To be fair to HMRC, at this point the courts seemed to be refusing to look at the “loans” realistically, which was peculiar given that in other contexts tax avoidance schemes were being merrily struck down where elements were artificial.

    These failures and half-measures just emboldened the promoters.

    In 2010, the Government finally stopped fiddling with the details of the legislation, and introduced a broad anti-avoidance rule specifically designed to stop all the variants of the loan schemes – the “disguised remuneration” rules. As tax barrister Patrick Cannon says, it was clear from that point (at least to advisers) that anyone engaging in a disguised remuneration scheme would be acting contrary to the intention of Parliament, and that rarely ends well.

    Large corporates and banks generally received sensible advice from specialists like Mr Cannon, and ended their loan schemes. But individual self employed contractors, typically working through their own services company or another intermediary, and earning relatively modest incomes, didn’t have the benefit of any of this advice. That created a huge opportunity for unscrupulous promoters, who could market schemes to individual contractors which supposedly got round the disguised remuneration rules, take highly aggressive positions, collect large fees, but suffer little or no downside if (as was always likely) the schemes failed to work.

    Barrowman’s business, AML (UK) Tax Limited, had started up in 2009 – it was not in the least bit deterred by the new legislation.

    Barrowman’s AML Tax business

    Here’s their pitch – on the face of it’s exactly the EBT loan scheme we summarised above:

    There’s more detail in AML Tax’s brochures (full PDF copy here).

    Words that are missing: “loan”, “offshore”, “avoidance”, “risk”, “retrospective”.

    And the following promises were made:

    The marketing of these schemes appears to be false and deceptive in a number of respects:

    • Were the schemes really endorsed by a leading tax QC? We’ll probably never know. But even if they were, the opinions almost certainly provided no actual comfort to clients – we explained why here.
    • Was the scheme really “audited by a leading international accountancy firm”? Or was the only audit the standard audit of AML’s own accounts?
    • Where is the warning that the scheme creates a loan which is legally required to be repaid? We have reviewed the AML loan documentation, and it enables the lender to demand repayment, with no protection for the borrower – and that has recently had terrible consequences for some of AML’s clients. However the clients were, so far as we are aware, never warned of this. The assurances that the loan would never have to be repaid were critical to the scheme (because otherwise who would accept it?) but false.
    • Where is the warning that the Government had already threatened retrospective legislation to reverse remuneration tax avoidance, and had actually done so on one recent occasion? This was known to all competent advisers. But, as far as we are aware, AML never mentioned it to their clients – and the fact retrospective legislation was even technically possible came as a shock to most of them when (as we’ll come to shortly) the Government used exactly that route.
    • The “disclosed to HMRC” line is particularly troubling. There is usually only one way a structure gets disclosed to HMRC – under the “disclosure of tax avoidance schemes” (DOTAS) rules. Early iterations of the AML structure were disclosed to HMRC, later iterations weren’t. We even have an email from Arthur Lancaster (an AML director) using the lack of DOTAS disclosure as a selling point. So why did this brochure claim the opposite?
    • Contractors were assured in emails that the trustees who’d be making their loan were “independent”. In fact, all the trustees we’re aware of were companies in Barrowman’s group. We’ve more about the trustees later.
    • And who, really, was running this scheme? Were there appropriately qualified people advising on the tax and drafting the documents? We don’t know who provided the tax advice, but metadata in the loan documentation indicates who drafted it – John Hardman: a former solicitor, struck off for dishonesty, who acts as Barrowman’s legal adviser. There were various different lenders over the years; all the documents we’ve reviewed which have author metadata show Hardman, or his firm (“HC Legal Consulting“) as the author.
    • Contractors were also assured that AML “employed its own in-house barrister”. As far as we are aware, AML never employed any barristers; the only legally qualified individual we’re aware of was John Hardman.
    • There was no warning at all about the risks that the scheme was running. As the Chartered Institute of Taxation (CIOT) put it, loan schemes, whilst not illegal, were contrived avoidance schemes which were always likely to be robustly challenged by HMRC.
    • Nor was there any warning that if HMRC successfully challenged the schemes, or if there was a retrospective change of law, contractors could be solely responsible for paying the tax. The contractors we’ve spoken to had no idea this was the case – they assumed that AML would be responsible.
    • The failure to outline the risk, and who would be responsible if it crystallised, was in our view critical to the contractors agreeing to the scheme – we believe that, if it had been outlined, few if any would have signed up to it. And we believe the people marketing the AML scheme knew that.

    The 2019 loan charge

    HMRC could have aggressively challenged all of the contractor loan schemes using the disguised remuneration legislation, and made clear public statements (aimed at contractors, not advisers) that the schemes didn’t work. They didn’t do either of these things.

    It’s unclear why HMRC did not react more aggressively. It may have been chastened by the judgments against it. Possibly HMRC did not appreciate quite how many people were now using the schemes. But, regardless of the reason, by the mid-2010s there were around 67,000 users – the true number may be higher. Many were under HMRC enquiry (i.e. a formal tax investigation); many were not. When HMRC did open an enquiry, promoters often took control of correspondence and sent back obstructive replies. This, combined with the huge scale, made conventional HMRC challenges difficult and perhaps impossible.

    One option would have been to change the law going forwards to put beyond all doubt that the schemes didn’t work. But it was highly likely the promoters would ignore any new rule in exactly the same way as they’d ignored the old rules. It meant HMRC would have to continue with the very difficult large-scale enquiry process. And there would be a big revenue loss from all the existing schemes that were not already under enquiry – well over £3bn.

    The situation was out of control.

    So HMRC and HM Treasury did something quite different: a return to the old tactic of retrospective legislation, but this time with much more impact. They created a one-off tax in 2019 for all loans made since 1999. People would have three years to repay the loans. If they were normal loans (like a standard season ticket loan) people would repay them and there would be no tax. But if the loans were really disguised salary then the loans would remain, and would be taxed.

    Now imagine you took part in these schemes.  You’ve been borrowing £70,000 a year for each of the last ten years. Perhaps HMRC has never opened an enquiry; perhaps they have but the promoter never told you; perhaps the promoter told you, but seemed confident HMRC would go away.

    Now you’re facing a tax hit – the “loan charge”. £70,000 x 10 x 45% = £315,000 of tax.  How are you going to pay that?  HMRC will give you time to pay the tax – but you can’t afford it. Repaying the loan would eliminate the tax, but that requires an even-more-impossible £700,000 (plus interest). This retrospection was highly controversial and was described by the CIOT as a “blunt instrument“.

    This might feel just if (in our example) the £315k just took you back to where you would have been if you hadn’t bought into the scheme. But it’s worse than that, because AML extracted their 16% fee, and you won’t be getting that back. You end up in a much worse position than if you’d never bought into the scheme at all. And of course, who earning £70k/year can afford a lump sum £315k payment?

    This caused, and continues to cause, terrible financial and personal consequences for AML’s former clients. HMRC were warned about the hardship the loan charge would cause some people back in 2016, and the risk to mental health and even suicide was mentioned; but momentum had built up, and it was clear that the loan charge was coming regardless of opposition. To be fair to HMRC, by that point there were no good options – the mistakes of the past could not be fixed.

    What would have happened if, instead of the loan charge, HMRC had properly pursued the schemes in the early 2010s, before they spiralled out of control? Many scheme users would have been put in equally dire financial straits. Escaping tax on all of your income inevitably creates a very large liability if the tax scheme fails, which most people will not be able to afford to pay. But earlier HMRC action could have reduced the numbers involved, and the number of years’ tax at stake.

    This report won’t go into the rights and wrongs of the loan charge, and HMRC’s actions (and lack of action). Many AML clients/victims are understandably furious with HMRC. It is, however, our belief that primary responsibility rests with AML, and the others promoting and profiting from the schemes. At least two Barrowman/AML clients have killed themselves: moral responsibility for that is on AML and Barrowman. It is their involvement that is the focus of this report.

    AML’s first response to the loan charge

    The loan charge was announced in April 2016. At that point it was clear to all that the loan schemes were dead, and the only effect of advancing additional loans was to increase the contractors’ liability.

    But additional loans would also mean additional fees for Barrowman’s group. So the loans continued.

    Astonishingly, we have evidence that Barrowman’s companies continued with the loan schemes until as late as December 2018, two-and-a-half years after the loan charge had been announced. We cannot understand how anyone would have regarded this as appropriate. In our view it approaches, and may have been, fraud.

    This is a serious allegation to make, so we feel it is right we present the evidence. This is a letter from Smartpay Limited, signed by the Deputy Chairman of Knox (Barrowman’s business), showing they continued to make loans right up to December 2018:

    The letter was sent as part of AML’s other post-loan charge plan – to create another scheme that it claimed would rescue its clients from the loan charge. That was Vanquish.

    The Vanquish scheme

    AML and the other related Barrowman companies ceased trading around the time the loan charge came in. They sent their former clients an email like this:

    Vanquish also had a website.

    When asked what precisely their “option” involved, Vanquish were reluctant to spell out the details. They described it as a “preferred loan repayment opportunity” which would mean that the contractor would “not be subject to the new Loan Charge legislation”. Payment should be made to a mysterious new Malta entity, Options 365:

    People kept pressing, and eventually they were able to extract some details from Vanquish. The “preferred repayment opportunity” turned out to involve taking another small loan to pay back the original large loan. That doesn’t make much sense, so people who agreed to proceed were given a more detailed explanation – here from “Jack”:

    Thanks to File on Four we have the benefit of a recorded telephone call with one of Jack’s colleagues, “Jamie”. Putting all of this together, the Vanquish structure looks like this:

    • The EBT will split your loan into a 5% and a 95% bit.
    • You’ll then repay the 5%, bringing its balance to zero.
    • The 5% is then invested into a third-party investment company.
    • The third-party investment company takes on the remaining 95% loan.
    • The 95% loan would not be written off because that would trigger a tax charge.
    • But the 95% loan is no longer your problem – you won’t have to repay it, and you won’t have to pay the April 2019 loan charge.

    So on our example numbers above: you owe £700,000. The loan is split into £35,000 and £665,000 sections. You repay £35,000 and the £665,000 disappears, with no loan charge. 

    But this isn’t what actually happened. Here are the documents Vanquish’s clients were given (PDF version here):

    All these documents do is:

    • Supposedly grant a new loan of the 5%, from the same lender (“to consolidate” the previous loan, which is nonsense). Contrary to the description by Jamie, it’s not a split of the original loan at all – it is (at least on its face) a new loan. But it’s a very curious loan, because no money is advanced by the “lender” to the contractor under this document. It’s not really a loan at all.
    • Create a “statement of no liability” – a letter saying that the original loan has been “repaid and provided for”. We don’t know what “repaid and provided for” is supposed to mean, but the original loan (£700,000 on our figures) certainly wasn’t repaid by the client.
    • What the documents don’t say, but what happens, is that the new 5% “loan” is repaid soon after it’s granted. The contractor never received the 5% from the lender, but they make a “repayment” of that 5% anyway. The “statement of no liability” then is issued. So the “loan repayment” is more realistically a fee, in return for which the contractor gets the “statement of no liability” to show to HMRC that the loan doesn’t exist.

    How could this work? Jack’s email mentions paragraph 2 of the loan charge rules.  This says that, when an old loan is replaced by a new replacement loan, then the April 2019 loan charge applies to the replacement loan. It seems Vanquish think that if the original loan was £700,000, but the replacement loan is for £35,000 then that £35,000 is all that’s taxed under the April 2019 loan charge rules (and if the £35,000 is repaid then there is no loan charge at all). That would be a wonderful result for the client. It is, however, indefensible as a matter of tax law:

    • For a start, as we say above, the “new loan” isn’t really a loan at all – realistically it’s just a fee for entering into a tax avoidance scheme to avoid the loan charge.
    • But if paragraph 2 does treat the new “loan” as a loan then the effect is that, for the purposes of paragraph 1, the replacement loan is deemed to be the original loan.  That means that the replacement loan is brought into the April 2019 loan charge.  But the amount taxed isn’t the £35,000 amount of the replacement loan – it’s the original £700,000 lent. In other words, replacing a loan for £700k with a loan for £35k doesn’t change the fact that the amount initially lent was £700k, and so doesn’t change the tax charge. The scheme fails.
    • However the scheme does worse than fail. There’s a specific tax charge if someone “releases or writes off” a loan under the normal disguised remuneration rules (and perhaps under the normal rules for beneficial loans and general earnings charge as well).  Jamie seems to think there isn’t a problem because the £665,000 now owed by the investment company is never released. The final structure doesn’t appear to have actually worked like that, as we can’t find evidence there was ever an investment company, but even if there was one behind the scenes, Jamie’s claim is false. The question is whether the £665,000 you owed was released – and clearly it was. You previously owed £665,000, and now you don’t. That’s a release, no matter how you describe it or dress it up. So the scheme doesn’t just fail to eliminate the loan charge, it triggers an additional 95% liability on the release.
    • It then gets worse still. There is a targeted anti-avoidance rule (“TAAR”) in paragraph 4 that says that a payment (e.g. the repayment of the 5% loan) is to be ignored if there is any connection (direct or indirect) between the payment and a tax avoidance arrangement. Vanquish is, needless to say, a tax avoidance arrangement. So even though the new 5% loan might actually be repaid, it is still outstanding for the purposes of the loan charge and tax would still be due. That’s an additional 5% liability. The repayment of the 5% achieves nothing except giving money to Vanquish. We don’t understand how anyone could think the TAAR wouldn’t apply.
    • There is also a General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) which HMRC can apply to defeat schemes. The question then is whether entering into an artificial arrangement to defeat an anti-avoidance rule is a reasonable thing to do, when it involves artificially splitting a loan into two and somehow transferring 95% of the borrower’s liability to a random company solely for a tax avoidance purpose. Or, in the actually implemented version of the structure, whether pretending to “consolidate” a loan and then magicking the 95% away behind the scenes is a reasonable thing to do. Neither sounds reasonable to us. Contrived disguised remuneration schemes have been considered by the GAAR Advisory Panel many times, and failed each time. There is no reason to expect a different result here. The loan charge tax would be due and, in addition, the individual could be landed with a GAAR penalty of 60% on top.
    • All of this means that a client buying the Vanquish scheme would incur multiple tax charges, including (but not limited to) the original loan scheme charge, a disguised remuneration charge on the new loan, and a charge on the release of the old loan. The liability could more than double.
    • It was clear that HMRC would contest the scheme – only days earlier it had published a “Spotlight” (a public notification highlighting common tax avoidance schemes) saying that these kind of attempts to avoid the loan charge wouldn’t work.

    In our opinion any reasonable adviser, even a non-specialist, would have known that the Vanquish structure would be challenged by HMRC, and that the structure would fail. This goes beyond normal negligence. Proceeding in the teeth of the HMRC Spotlight looks like madness.

    But actually it made absolute sense for Vanquish, because (on our numbers) it made £35,000 in fees and took no risk. Vanquish then ceased trading soon after the loan charge kicked in. And, of course, HMRC did contest the structure, using some of the arguments above.

    Clients buying the Vanquish scheme were asked to sign a letter authorising the transaction to proceed. But the letters weren’t with Vanquish – they were with the mysterious Maltese company, Options 365 Limited (which File on Four found was held by Barrowman’s Knox Group.).

    The false documents

    The whole point of the Vanquish scheme was to make the loans disappear, and so eliminate the loan charge. That required something contractors could give to HMRC as evidence that the loan had been repaid. This was the “statement of no liability” (the last document in the above gallery and also this PDF).

    The key paragraph is this:

    This statement is a lie: the loans had not been repaid. This is a false document.

    As we note above, the new 5% loan created by the Vanquish structure is not really a loan at all. This is what the Vanquish loan says is happening:

    But this isn’t true – in no sense does the Borrower receive a loan advance from the lender. The purpose of the arrangement is to create something they can claim is a “replacement loan” which has been repaid (hopeless as that argument is technically), and then extract fees from the contractor dressed up as a repayment of the loan. This is another false document.

    What kind of lawyer would draft such a document? We can look at the metadata:

    It’s John Hardman again, the former solicitor, struck off for dishonesty, who acts as Barrowman’s legal adviser.

    Intentionally providing a false document to HMRC is very serious. HMRC commenced a criminal investigation against other loan scheme promoters for submitting false documentation to HMRC.

    We have reviewed substantively identical “statements of no liability” and “loans” sent by six companies linked to Barrowman which acted as trustee lenders under contractor loan schemes:

    These individuals include some of the most senior people in Barrowman’s organisation.

    These documents are sent on the headed notepaper of the separate companies. However, one client received documentation from Smartpay, Knox House and Principal Contracts on the same day, and the metadata suggests all three companies created documents using the same computer:

    As is typical of Barrowman, he is not a director or shareholder of any of the companies involved, and the Companies House entries don’t list him as the “person with significant control” (PSC).

    The links between Barrowman and AML

    The schemes were originally sold by AML Tax (UK) Limited, a UK company. Its director at the time in question was Arthur Lancaster – a senior employee of Barrowman.

    The other directors of AML Tax were Timothy Eve and Paul Ruocco. Eve is Deputy Chairman of Knox, Barrowman’s business. Ruocco is closely connected to Barrowman.

    UK companies have to register their PSC at Companies House. AML’s registered PSC is Braaid Limited, a BVI company. The rules don’t permit a BVI company to be a PSC – the entry should show the actual individual who has significant control or influence over AML – AML’s directors therefore broke the law.

    Despite this attempt at obfuscation, Barrowman has, to our knowledge, never denied his ownership of AML Tax – his defence is that “the schemes were lawful“. We don’t agree with that – after 2010 we believe they did not work and were not compliant with tax law. The way in which they were marketed and sold to unsophisticated individuals was disgraceful, and possibly fraudulent. Two courts have found that AML’s failure to disclose to HMRC under the “disclosure of tax avoidance schemes” (DOTAS) rules was unlawful. Another court found that AML’s failure to comply with HMRC’s information notices was unlawful. The failure to disclose Barrowman’s ownership of AML was also unlawful. This is a pattern of law-breaking.

    The links between Barrowman and other scheme companies

    Barrowman also controls other companies that sold schemes for AML, or sold essentially identical schemes to AML.

    Dentists were sold schemes by AML Healthcare Contracts Ltd, later renamed to Denmedical (UK) Ltd. Barrowman himself was originally listed as the “person with significant control” of Denmedical; this was then changed to Anthony Page. Page worked for Knox/Barrowman until he was sacked in disputed circumstances.

    Many contractors were introduced to the scheme by “Principal Contractors” – registered in the Isle of Man as a “business name” of Principal Contracts Limited, one of Barrowman’s companies.

    Here’s a financial projection prepared by “Principal Contractors” for a potential client:

    And here’s the metadata for that document:

    Once clients signed up, the actual loans ended up being made by a variety of offshore company trustee entities, all connected to Barrowman. Many of the loans also show Hardman, or his firm (“HC Legal Consulting“) as the author.

    Some of the early loans were made by AML Management Limited. Later loans were less easily traceable to Barrowman.

    One example was SP Management Limited, a Maltese company owned by Soldado (PTC) Limited (which we have previously seen holding a property in Belgravia acquired by Barrowman and his wife). The metadata in the SP Management Limited documents shows John Hardman as the author – the former solicitor, struck off for dishonesty, who acts as Barrowman’s legal adviser. Another example is an Isle of Man company also called SP Management Limited, with Knox House Trust Limited as its agent.

    As noted above, letters supposedly written by Smartpay Limited, PCL and Knox House Trust have metadata suggesting they were all prepared on the same computer.

    Smartpay Limited made the outrageous December 2018 loan. Its letters to clients use Knox House as its address, and are signed by its director, Timothy Eve. Eve is Deputy Chairman of Knox, Barrowman’s business.

    So we can confidently link Barrowman to AML and the other related companies selling the same scheme (as well as firms supposedly providing tax/accounting advice). It’s plausible that a large proportion of his fortune came from AML’s tax avoidance schemes.

    The links between Barrowman and Vanquish

    Whilst Barrowman doesn’t deny that AML is his company, he does deny a link to Vanquish Options Limited, possibly because he realises how very questionable, and potentially criminal, its actions were.

    • His lawyers told The Times in 2019 that he denied having “any involvement or interest in Vanquish Options“.
    • Barrowman’s lawyers told File on Four that neither he nor Knox have at any time owned or controlled Vanquish.
    • At the time Vanquish was selling its schemes, its personnel told clients that there was no link to AML or Knox House (which was important, because by that point most of the clients were very unhappy with AML). Here’s one contractor asking “Jamie” of Vanquish directly if the two companies share a director, or if Vanquish is a subsidiary of AML. The answer is a clear “no”:

    Our starting point is that there is no reason to believe any denial by Barrowman that he is linked to a particular company, because it is now a matter of public record that he and his wife have admitted lying about their ownership of another company controlled by Barrowman, PPE Medpro. A lawyer who relayed one of their lies has issued a public apology.

    And multiple lines of evidence evidence suggests that in reality Vanquish was part of Barrowman’s Knox Group:

    • Vanquish, AML and other Knox companies used the same email server. Electronically signed Vanquish documents show that Vanquish sent the document from IP 89.107.1.218, which geo-locates to Douglas, in the Isle of Man, where Knox is based. Vanquish’s email headers show that its emails originate from the same IP address. Jamie denied being associated with AML, but his own emails come from the same server. And AML emails also originated from that IP:
    • Vanquish, AML and Knox companies all used computers on the same network. Email headers show that emails from Vanquish (including Jamie’s) were all sent by computers on the “aml.local” subnet. We see the same subnet in emails sent by AML and other Knox companies:
    • Vanquish shared a director with AML and its other directors are closely linked to Barrowman. Arthur Lancaster is a director of AML Tax; he is also a director of Vanquish Options Limited. “Jamie” in the audio clip above was straight-out lying. Lancaster was also Vanquish Options’ listed PSC at the time (he was also the PSC for PPE Medpro, but appears to have been (unlawfully) “fronting” that company for Barrowman.
    • Vanquish’s documents were written by AML/Knox personnel. Metadata in the PDF documents Vanquish sent to clients reveal that the authors included John Hardman (the struck off solicitor who acts as Barrowman’s legal adviser), HC Legal Consulting (Hardman’s firm), Sandra Robertson (at the time a director of Barrowman’s Knox Group) and Nerys Roberts/Rowlands (head of marketing for the Knox Group, covering all entities owned by the Knox Group).. These documents on their face were prepared only by Vanquish.
    • AML Tax specifically recommended Vanquish Options to its clients (so far as we are aware, all of its clients). Barrowman’s other tax scheme companies did too. If Barrowman really had no interest in Vanquish, why would they do this?
    • Knox businesses were involved in the structure. A bona fide structure to repay the original loans would not have required any involvement from the original Knox lenders of the contractor loans. However, in this case, the lenders were deeply involved, supposedly making the new 5% “loans” (which were not really loans at all). The lenders were all Knox businesses – Smartpay, PCL and Knox House Trust.
    • AML admitted the link on one occasion. We have reviewed an email exchange between AML’s Isle of Man entity and a client. The client asked if AML was associated with Vanquish Options. AML replied that AML (UK) Tax “appointed” Vanquish Options “to assist with the loan charge once AML ceased trading”.
    • The link is made even clearer by Companies House filings. Vanquish was established in 2008 as “Aston Ventures Consultants Limited”. “Aston Ventures” was Barrowman’s first successful business endeavour, a private equity fund of sorts. The register of debentures (i.e. lenders), and later its registered office, was at the offices of John Hardman’s law firm at the time (before he was struck off). The company soon became dormant, before being revived in 2018 when its name was changed to Vanquish Options Limited. During the time Vanquish Options was most active, its registered office remained Hardman’s law firm – it only changed in March 2019.
    • There is a Maltese connection which also traces back to Knox. As File on Four reported, some of the Vanquish documentation creates a contract with Option 365 Limited, a Maltese company owned by Knox Limited, Barrowman’s company. Clients were also told to make their payments to Option 365. Barrowman’s lawyers told File on Four that the Option 365 shares were held for third parties (who they wouldn’t disclose). We note again that there are good reasons to be sceptical about such denials.

    On the basis of this evidence, we believe that Barrowman’s denial of involvement in Vanquish was another lie.

    How much money did Barrowman make from the schemes?

    There are a large number of uncertainties here, but we can make a reasonably reliable lower-bound estimate based on the following figures and assumptions:

    • Most of the schemes ran for about nine years.
    • This case suggests AML’s fee was 16-18% of gross income (and that is consistent with what we hear from former AML clients).
    • Average contractor salary was around £75,000 (that’s consistent with HMRC’s figures and the data we’ve reviewed).
    • About 67,000 contractors used loan schemes.
    • We’ll assume that at any given time only half of the 67,000 were using a scheme (on the basis that four or five years seems typical in the cases we’ve reviewed).

    On this basis, the total fee revenue for all loan scheme promoters was approximately £3.6bn.

    We can test this estimate independently by looking at HMRC’s stated recoveries from the loan charge. HMRC say they settled 21,900 cases of either individuals or employers, and the total tax brought into charge as a result of that was about £3.9 billion. That implies total loans of approximately £9.8bn. Scale this up to the total 67,000 users and we have total loans of £29.8bn. 16% of that is £4.8bn. This will be an over-estimate because around 25% of the original £3.9bn is likely to include interest; the figure also includes companies. On the other hand, the marginal rate will be lower in many cases. But overall this confirms that our £3.6bn estimate is in the correct ballpark.

    How much of the approximately total £3.6bn did AML and the other Barrowman companies receive?

    AML was one of many promoters selling these schemes, but had a large presence in the market – informed sources have told us at least 10% and perhaps much more. In March 2022, the Loan Charge & Taxpayer APPG issued a call for evidence to loan charge users – the responses from scheme users disclosed 1,006 contractor loans, of which 295 (29%) were from Barrowman’s companies. That figure should, however, be used with caution, because these were voluntary responses to a questionnaire and not a random sample, and there could be reasons why the responses over-represent or under-represent Barrowman.

    We will therefore prudently use the 10% figure, suggesting fee revenue for Barrowman’s companies of £360m, but plausibly the true figure was much higher (over £1bn if the 29% figure is correct).

    (20 January 2024 update – we’ve seen an email from a Knox Group company dated 2015 which boasts they have 7,500 contractors on their books. If that was a true statement at the time that implies Barrowman’s companies had at least 12% of the market by 2019, and likely more)

    This certainly won’t all have been profit for Barrowman – he had all the fixed costs that come from running a medium-sized business, and was also paying commission to independent financial advisers (IFAs) and accountants who referred clients to AML.

    There are many uncertainties, but we believe it is safe to say that Barrowman made comfortably north of £100m from the original contractor loan schemes, and potentially much more.

    We currently have no reliable way of estimating the income/profit from the Vanquish scheme. Only about one in twenty of the AML contractors who’ve contacted us used the Vanquish scheme, but that could easily be unrepresentative of contractors generally (in either direction).

    Evidence for a prosecution

    We believe this report demonstrates there is sufficient evidence for a criminal investigation and, if that supports it, a prosecution of some of the individuals responsible for the AML and Vanquish schemes.

    There are several key questions: did AML and the other companies defraud their clients? Did they defraud HMRC? Which individuals and companies should be prosecuted?

    1. Did AML and the other companies defraud their clients?

    Here’s how the Crown Prosecution Service summarises the offence of fraud by false representation:

    This report identifies numerous instances where individuals working for AML, Vanquish and other Barrowman entities made false representations to clients to gain or retain their business, in circumstances where we believe they must have known those representations were false:

    • The implication that the original AML scheme had been “audited by a leading international accountancy firm”. We expect that was not true.
    • The assurances that the original AML scheme loans wouldn’t have to be repaid. These were untrue.
    • The assurances that the schemes were legally robust, when everyone in the sector knew that the Government had already threatened retrospective legislation to reverse remuneration tax avoidance, and had actually done so on one recent occasion.
    • The claim in marketing brochures that the scheme had been “disclosed to HMRC”, when at the same time AML were assuring people in private emails that the scheme had not been disclosed under DOTAS.
    • The claim that the schemes were “HMRC compliant”, which was understood by clients to mean that HMRC would not object to it – AML surely knew that HMRC would absolutely object to the scheme.
    • The claim in emails to contractors that the trustees who’d be making their loan were “independent”, when in fact all the trustees we’re aware of were companies in Barrowman’s group.
    • The claim that AML “employed its own in-house barrister”. We believe this was untrue.
    • The fact at least one of the AML companies continued making loans even after the loan charge had been enacted, when the only consequence of those loans was (inevitably) a large tax liability for the contractors (plus, of course, fees for Barrowman’s companies).
    • The claim that Vanquish was not linked to AML, including a specific claim by “Jamie” that AML and Vanquish had no directors in common. These claims were false; the companies had a key director in common; they used the same staff; they were on the same computer network and used the same email server.
    • The description of the Vanquish scheme as a “preferred repayment opportunity” when it reality it was a very aggressive tax avoidance scheme.
    • The claim, that the Vanquish scheme would work, when it had no technical prospect of working, and even a non tax-specialist would have realised that upon reading the whole of the legislation. That isn’t speculation – a (presumably) non-specialist on a web-forum took less than an hour to spot this point. A specialist – and Barrowman’s team hold themselves out as tax specialists – would also have appreciated that HMRC were easily able to counter it in any one of several different ways, with the potential for multiple tax charges plus penalties.
    • Furthermore, Vanquish were proposing a scheme to avoid the loan charge just days after HMRC had said schemes of that type wouldn’t work, and that HMRC would challenge them.
    • Vanquish mentioned none of these issues to clients; their clear representation was that the scheme worked. This was enough to persuade some people, who couldn’t believe that an adviser would sell a scheme that didn’t work.

    In addition:

    • AML and then Vanquish stood to gain significant fees by selling the schemes, but would have no liability if the schemes failed.
    • The scheme Vanquish actually implemented was not the scheme it told clients it would implement.
    • Both the original contractor loans and the Vanquish loans were drafted by a former solicitor previously struck off for dishonesty.
    • Vanquish did not stick around to defend its position; it stopped trading right at the point when its structure would become visible to HMRC.

    Were the AML/Vanquish individuals involved “dishonest”?

    That means asking whether their conduct was dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people (regardless of whether the individuals in question believed at the time they were being dishonest). The leading textbook of criminal law and practice, Archbold, says:

    “In most cases the jury will need no further direction than the short two-limb test in Barton “(a) what was the defendant’s actual state of knowledge or belief as to the facts and (b) was his conduct dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people?”

    In our view it is plausible, even likely, that Barrowman’s team knew full well that what they were doing (particularly Vanquish) would not result in the advertised outcomes, would leave their customers exposed and yet create a profit for themselves. We expect most ordinary decent people would say that was dishonest; but ultimately that is something a jury would have to decide.

    Given the terrible consequences of the schemes for AML’s clients, the clear public interest, we’d have hoped the CPS would have considered a prosecution. We don’t believe they did. We hope they reconsider in light of the evidence in this report.

    There is no statute of limitation on criminal fraud.

    2. Did Vanquish defraud HMRC?

    There’s a good summary of the law on “cheating the revenue” (the technical term for “tax evasion”) from barrister Patrick Cannon:

    There are also statutory offences, for example s106A Taxes Management Act 1970:

    106AOffence of fraudulent evasion of income tax
(1)A person commits an offence if that person is knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of income tax by that or any other person.
(2)A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding [F212 months] [F2the general limit in a magistrates’ court] or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both, or
(b)on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years or a fine, or both.

    We can identify the following false statements made, or facilitated by Barrowman’s companies:

    • The scheme involved producing false documents, procured by Vanquish and signed by the directors of AML Management Limited, Smartpay Limited, Knox House Trustees Limited, Principal Contracts Limited, SP Management Limited (Isle of Man) and SP Management Limited (Malta). There were loans that said on their face that money was being lent, when it was not. There were statements that loans had been repaid, when they had not been (in either the usual meaning of the word “repaid” or its technical tax meaning in this context). These documents were produced for the purpose of leading HMRC to believe (incorrectly) that the loan charge would not apply.
    • Vanquish told clients to submit false tax returns, declaring no disguised remuneration loans, and including a note in the “white space” on the tax return reading “I did receive loans that were caught by the loan charge, but these were all repaid by 5 April 2019”. The loans were not repaid, so this statement would again be false.
    • Whilst we have not been able to verify this, there is one report that Vanquish told a client that, after the Vanquish structure had been executed, the trustee would report a zero loan balance to HMRC (and not disclose that the Vanquish structure had been used). Any such report would be false.
    • The stated technical basis for the Vanquish scheme, on the strength of which clients filed their tax returns, was false, and anyone reading the legislation (even a non-specialist) would have realised it was false.
    • Vanquish told its clients not to mention the arrangement to HMRC: “We do not want to weaken the position of the individual by giving out any information that could end up with HMRC”. That is not how normal tax advisers behave. Advisers have been prosecuted for failing to disclose material facts to HMRC.

    Were these false statements made with the intention of defrauding HMRC? That again comes down to whether the individuals in question were being dishonest, by the standards of an ordinary decent person. On the evidence available to us, we expect an ordinary decent person would regard the making of these statements as dishonest, but ultimately that is a question for a jury to decide.

    In our view, the evidence is strong enough, and clear enough, that a prosecution is in the public interest.

    There is no statute of limitation for tax fraud. However, Vanquish will soon be wound up, complicating any investigation – HMRC and other interested parties may wish to act to prevent this.

    (It possible that AML and the other loan scheme companies were responsible for false statements during the period when they were active, prior to Vanquish (particularly during the post-2016 period when it was very obvious that the loan schemes were doomed). However, our detailed analysis of scheme documentation for this report was limited to Vanquish.)

    3. Who should be prosecuted?

    A criminal investigation would be able to identify all the people involved in the false statements and potential frauds identified above, but from our research we can identify the following individuals:

    • False documents were signed by the six lenders who participated in the Vanquish arrangements. The signatories were the directors of those companies: Timothy Eve, Anthony Page, Voirrey Coole, Lisa Rowe and Timothy Blackburn. Eve and Rowe were, we understand, responsible for the day-to-day management of the tax business. The others may or may not have been familiar with every aspect of the Vanquish structure, but as directors we expect they knew that new loans were not really being made, and the old loans were not really being repaid. Yet they signed documents saying they were.
    • Metadata indicates that false documents were drafted by John Hardman.
    • Metadata indicates that Sandra Robertson and Nerys Roberts/Rowlands were involved in the marketing of the Vanquish scheme. We do not know how much they knew about the details.
    • The directors of Vanquish were Arthur Lancaster (who we understand takes a key role in the design of the Knox Group’s tax products), Timothy Eve and Paul Ruocco. We do not know what role Ruocco had in the business.
    • Douglas Barrowman ultimately controls all of the entities named above. We do not know how involved he was personally in the actions of the entities and their personnel, but given the very large amount of money these businesses made for him, and the involvement of some of his most senior personnel, it is in our view unlikely that he was a mere passive investor.
    • False representations were made by more junior Vanquish personnel; it is possible that their understanding of the arrangements was such that they did not realise what they were saying was false, and they were just following a script, but the denial by “Jamie” of a connection between Vanquish and AML appears to have been intentional deceit (and it doesn’t seem from the recording as if “Jamie” was following a script).

    In addition, Barrowman’s companies may themselves be liable for the corporate criminal offence of facilitating tax evasion.

    The potential for civil claims

    Our findings raise the possibility that a civil claim could be made against various entities in Barrowman’s group, for example based on deceit, unlawful means conspiracy or negligent misstatement. There is also the potential to bring deceit/conspiracy claims against Barrowman himself, and the directors of his companies, on the basis that they were the real controlling minds behind the statements, or were party to a plan that others made.

    Any such claim would not be straightforward, particularly given the passage of time and the difficulty of establishing what precisely was relied upon – nevertheless the evidence we’ve assembled, particularly in relation to Vanquish, suggests this is worth serious consideration.

    As a practical matter, the initial challenge would be organising a group claim, and arranging funding and/or insurance – given the amounts that contractors have lost as a result of Barrowman’s schemes, they will rightly be reluctant to put their own money at risk. We hope that there are law firms willing and able to take this forward.

    Why prosecute?

    In our view, Barrowman is morally responsible for the damage caused by the AML and Vanquish schemes to thousands of people, including two suicides. Whether he’s legally responsible, and whether he knew about, was complicit in, or directed, the numerous false statements made by his associates, is something that should be considered by a jury.

    If, on the other hand, the behaviour of Barrowman and his companies – the false representations, the impossible legal positions, the false documents, the obfuscation and lies – does not result in prosecutions, then Barrowman and other bad actors will know they can act with impunity, and make illicit fortunes without any accountability.

    Barrowman’s response

    We gave Douglas Barrowman the opportunity to respond to the serious, specific and evidenced allegations we make in this report. His lawyers, Grosvenor Law, initially responded with an entirely non-specific denial – “your outright and unqualified allegations of dishonesty, wrongdoing and misconduct are denied by our clients in their entirety.”

    The only point of substance in their response was a claim that the AML and Vanquish arrangements were properly notified to HMRC. We believe that is untrue – it’s reasonably clear from the evidence we cite above that neither the original AML nor the Vanquish structures were properly notified to HMRC. So we’ve asked Grosvenor Law why they are relaying this false claim. They have so far refused to answer.

    His lawyers also claimed to be acting for Barrowman and the “Knox Group”. Given Barrowman’s previous attempts to conceal the identity of his the members of his group, we asked specifically which companies Grosvenor Law were acting for. They have, again, refused to answer. It highly unusual, and may be improper, for a law firm to refuse to identify its clients.

    The full email chain is available as a PDF here.

    The BBC asked Grosvenor Law specifically if Barrowman now accepted that his previous denial of links to Vanquish was misleading. The lawyers responded with another generic denial:

     

    STATEMENT BY THE KNOX GROUP
    The Knox Group denies any and all allegations of dishonesty, misconduct and wrongdoing. HMRC has had disclosures of all relevant documents and information relating to the loan charge arrangements for a lengthy period and the parties have been engaged in an ongoing and extensive process of dialogue and disclosure with the HMRC for several years in relation to such schemes.

    HMRC has had all relevant materials for several years during which time it has never even suggested, let alone alleged, that there has been any form of dishonesty or wrongdoing by the Knox Group.

    For the BBC to allege otherwise is speculative and not justified.

    The Knox Group deeply and sincerely regrets that any contractor or their families suffered any distress or anguish arising from tax charges levied by HMRC when it retrospectively and retroactively amended the relevant legal framework. This retrospective change in the law was a matter of industry-wide criticism at the time from bodies such as the Chartered Institute of Taxation and the Institute of Chartered Accountants.

    This is a weak response, which fails to engage with the substance of our evidence and our accusations, and which notably fails to even defend Barrowman’s past denials of his link to Vanquish.

    The claim that HMRC has not alleged wrongdoing is false. We do not know if HMRC has ever suggested dishonesty, but we also do not know if it has had access to the same information as us.

    This is also a misrepresentation of the CIOT, which has said the loan schemes were contrived avoidance schemes which were always likely to be robustly challenged by HMRC. Advisers expected challenges, and the Government had expressly warned of retrospective legislation – the question is why Barrowman’s businesses hid this from their clients.

    Grosvenor have since added:

    By way of context, HMRC estimate that there are 50,000 tax payers in the UK who have used a loan scheme. My instructions are that a large number of companies and professional advisors promoted these (legally compliant) schemes at the time: the Knox Group accounted for a small percentage of this number overall.

    The fact other promoters were pushing similar schemes is irrelevant; we are specifically identifying evidence of fraud by the Knox Group.


    Many thanks to M, the remuneration tax guru who provided most of the technical content for this article on the schemes and the loan charge, and wrote the first draft. Thanks also to K and N for tax law input, to L and Michael Gomulka of 25 Bedford Row for the criminal mens rea and dishonesty content, to H for the “cheating the revenue” analysis, and to Y for general insight. Thanks to F and B for their invaluable review and research, and P for advice on metadata and email IP address tracing. Thanks to the advisers working with former Vanquish and AML clients who provided their expertise and experience (particularly T). Thanks to Ray McCann (former senior HMRC inspector and past President of the Chartered Institute of Taxation) for reviewing a late draft, and to YK for a critical review and her invaluable suggestions on how to best structure this report. Thanks to PS for a final read-through. And thanks, as ever, to J.

    Thanks to The Times and File on Four for their journalism that originally exposed the Vanquish scheme.

    Thanks to Simon Goodley at the Guardian, and Ben Chu and team at Newsnight.

    Most of all, thanks to all of the the clients/victims of AML and Vanquish who spent time corresponding with us, and digging out old documents and emails – we can’t name them, but the evidence highlighted in this report would never have been found without them.

    Footnotes

    1. We nevertheless cover only a very small part of the history – a big omission is IR35. Anyone interested in the full background should start with the Morse Review ↩︎

    2. We’ll ignore the personal allowance to make the calculation easier ↩︎

    3. One of the key originators of the scheme was Paul Baxendale-Walker – a barrister and solicitor who moonlit as a porn star, and eventually ended up struck off, bankrupt, and convicted of fraud. It’s very strange that someone so peculiar was responsible for so much damage to the tax system, to many peoples’ lives, and led to the downfall of a football team. There’s a good summary of much of this in the Wikipedia article on Baxendale-Walker, but be warned that the article is out of date and parts of it appear to have been written by him. ↩︎

    4. Interestingly, in 2022 John Caudwell said he was “extremely proud” of paying tax in the UK and “absolutely wouldn’t” use loopholes to save money again. ↩︎

    5. See paragraph 18 of the case here ↩︎

    6. The old Special Commissioners, who heard first instance tax appeals until the modern tax tribunal system was adopted in 2009 ↩︎

    7. HMRC did appeal on the question of whether the company was entitled to a deduction for its payment to the EBT, but didn’t appeal on the question of whether the individuals should be taxed on the loan amounts. ↩︎

    8. See e.g. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/14/schedule/23 and https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/4/part/20/chapter/1/crossheading/employee-benefit-contributions. ↩︎

    9. i.e. mundane vanilla transactions, not tax-motivated transaction, as by that time major law firms would rarely if ever advise on tax avoidance arrangements ↩︎

    10. As late as 2014, the First Tier Tax Tribunal (FTT) and (on appeal) Upper Tier Tribunal (UTT) found for the taxpayer in Murray Group Holdings (the Rangers case) on the basis that the repayment of the loans was not a “remote contingency”. This showed a remarkable failure by the tribunals to understand what was going on – these structures only make commercial sense if the loans aren’t repaid. The “loans” are, in reality, not loans at all. ↩︎

    11. Although other AML entities appear to have started to run schemes as early as 2006 ↩︎

    12. Barrowman had numerous companies selling what was always basically the same scheme. This video is badged “Principal Contractors”. A lawyer looking at their emails and website immediately sees something odd: no company name is ever stated, just “Principal Contractors”. We can find no evidence that company ever existed. However “Principal Contractors” is registered in the Isle of Man as a “business name” of Principal Contracts Limited, one of Barrowman’s companies. We can also tie Barrowman directly to documents sent out by Principal Contractors. ↩︎

    13. The point being to identify avoidance structures early to “inform legislation to close loopholes” (see e.g. paragraph 2.2. here ↩︎

    14. AML has twice been found by a court to have unlawfully failed to disclose under DOTAS; those schemes were slightly different, but we believe all were disclosable. We’ve reviewed a email explaining AML’s basis for not disclosing under DOTAS in 2015, and in our view it’s clear AML was acting unlawfully. ↩︎

    15. In theory the structure could have been disclosed on some informal basis, but that would be contrary to HMRC’s usual practice. Another possibility is that elements of the scheme were individually disclosed in response to preliminary HMRC enquiries. But we would very much doubt the whole scheme was confirmed, outside DOTAS. ↩︎

    16. Metadata is the hidden information contained in computer document files. For example, if you open a PDF document in Adobe Acrobat, then click “File” and “Properties”, you will see the author of the document (or at least the person whose details were entered into the application that generated the original document) and the details of the application that generated the PDF ↩︎

    17. Metadata needs to be viewed with caution. It can be changed, although here that would mean multiple former AML clients sent us documents with identically forged metadata, before they even knew we were looking at metadata (or, in many cases, before they knew that metadata existed). That is therefore very unlikely. More importantly, metadata does not tell you who wrote a document. The default setting is that the “author” is taken from the user of the machine on which the PDF was created, but this default can be changed. Someone else could be using that person’s computer. If we had one loan document with Hardman in the author metadata then that could easily be an accident, but multiple documents created over years for different lender entities, sent to us by unrelated people, is much less easy to dismiss. ↩︎

    18. There was a Spotlight published in 2015, updated/replaced in 2016, but by then it was too late. Contractors would readily believe promoters who responded by claiming that their scheme was totally different from the Spotlight scheme, and the lack of HMRC challenge proved this. The industry probably could have been strangled at birth: it wasn’t. ↩︎

    19. The schemes were not disclosed on tax returns but there were fairly obvious tell-tale signs: the sudden 90% drop in reported income, and the use of AML affiliates as the accountants submitting the tax return; query how fair it is to expect HMRC to have spotted this at the time. ↩︎

    20. As indeed happened – see Smartpay below ↩︎

    21. Which is why we believe no reasonably prudent adviser would ever advise someone on a relatively modest income to use a scheme of this type, even if it had good prospects of success ↩︎

    22. Our source for this is the Loan Charge Action Group, who have identified that two of the reported cases of suicide were of former AML clients ↩︎

    23. We are redacting the details to protect our source. ↩︎

    24. This and many other links in this report are to the “Internet Archive“, which enables us to view websites as at particular dates in the past, even if they no longer exist. Note that many corporate networks block the Internet Archive (because it could otherwise let users circumvent restrictions on which websites they can view), so you may need to view these links on a mobile or home computer. ↩︎

    25. See this forum post – there are many others like it ↩︎

    26. We would not normally include publish bank account details, but the same information has been visible in forum postings for four years; furthermore there is a chance this information will be helpful to other researchers. ↩︎

    27. See this forum post ↩︎

    28. We have not been able to positively identify Jack or any of the other individuals appearing in the Vanquish emails we have reviewed. This is surprising given that most people working in marketing, tax, accounting and business development are on LinkedIn. One possibility is that these were assumed names. We are not publishing the full names, because of the potential for innocent people to be wrongly identified (if the names are false) and the potential for junior employees to be unfairly blamed (if the names are real). ↩︎

    29. See the File on Four transcript – paragraph 16 ↩︎

    30. When we first received Vanquish documents from a contractor we assumed that he had mislaid the document moving the loan to the third-party investment company. However when we received more sets of documents, we were still missing any document referring to the investment company. We spoke to advisers representing former Vanquish clients, and they’d had the same experience. We’ve also reviewed HMRC correspondence sent to former Vanquish clients, and it is apparent HMRC have also never seen any documents relating to a third party-investment company. A review of forum postings suggest that by early 2019 the scheme had changed. It is therefore our conclusion, as well as that of the advisers we spoke to, that Vanquish never implemented the “Jamie” structure.Could the structure still have been implemented behind the scenes, with the lender entering into some kind of agreement with the third-party investment company? We think not, or at least not in a legally coherent manner. As a legal matter it’s not possible for the borrower’s side of a loan to be transferred (“novated”) to a company without the borrower signing a legal agreement (there is a nice explanation of novation from law firm Watson Farley Williams here). ↩︎

    31. Because the charge is based on the amount that is “outstanding” on 5 April 2019.  The term “outstanding” is defined in paragraph 3 as the “initial principal amount lent” (with some adjustments, including for amounts have really been repaid).  This is not defined further but has nothing to do with the amount of the replacement loan and so would not change the amount taxed in April 2019. ↩︎

    32. This was a failure common to a number of loan charge avoidance schemes. The leading practitioners’ textbook, Pett on Disguised Remuneration and the Loan Charge says that none of the loan charge avoidance schemes addressed this point, and follows this with a statement that criminal charges had been brought against a number of individuals in connection with the such schemes – see para 15.6. ↩︎

    33. As a matter of English law and UK tax law you can assign the lender’s side of a loan, but you cannot assign the borrower’s liability. Anything that looks like the borrower is moving their liability to someone else is actually a release of the old debt and the creation of a new debt – often called a “novation“. The courts have always been clear on this. ↩︎

    34. In practice HMRC doesn’t appear to take these points, but we believe technically multiple charges do apply (there are others in addition to those mentioned in this paragraph). ↩︎

    35. There is an ancillary question as to whether Vanquish itself has properly accounted for corporation tax on its profits. It was introducing clients to a variety of offshore companies who were charging large fees; however from Vanquish’s accounts it appears as though Vanquish received no compensation for this. That is not the result one would expect. ↩︎

    36. see page 17 of the transcript ↩︎

    37. The document says “repaid and provided for”. This is curious terminology. If a loan is “provided for” that usually means that the lender thinks it won’t be repaid, and so has written it off in its accounts, even though it remains in existence as a legal matter. “Repaid and provided for” is a non-sequitur. Possibly the authors thought this gave them sufficient cover to avoid any suggestion of fraud. It does not. The document says the loan was repaid, and it wasn’t. The other potential argument the authors might raise is that the loan was repaid, just not by the contractor. That may have happened (one can imagine a circular movements of funds behind the scenes, not involving the contractor at all), but it is not what most ordinary people would understand by the word “repaid”. And that ordinary meaning of “repaid” is expressly adopted by the loan charge legislation, which says a repayment must be a “payment in money” by the contractor. We don’t believe the authors of the letter can credibly claim that “repaid” was intended to have a meaning which both defies common sense and the legislation that the letter was created to thwart. ↩︎

    38. It is of course not necessary for a borrower to actually receive cash themselves – for example in a typical mortgage, a person is borrowing to finance the purchase of a house, but the loan goes straight to the seller (via the solicitor) and the money is never received by the borrower. There is however no doubt that in that case the borrower is receiving the benefit of the loan advance, both in practical terms and legal terms – the way the money moves is a point of detail. By contrast, in Vanquish there is no loan advance in any sense. ↩︎

    39. We trace the links below, in “How responsible is Barrowman”? ↩︎

    40. i.e. a Mac using the same os/version of Preview. This looks like a one-off: the other documents we have were either exported from Word or are scans. ↩︎

    41. Lancaster’s efforts to stymie an HMRC enquiry into the company were recently described by a tax tribunal as “seriously misleading”, “evasive” and “lacking in candor”. There is more about Lancaster here. ↩︎

    42. The Panama Papers list Braaid as the road where Barrowman’s house is located. ↩︎

    43. On 9 September 2016 the PSC was listed as “Knox Limited Ref Willowbarn Trust”; this was then changed to Braaid Limited on the same day. A mistake? Or an accidental reveal of the real ownership structure? ↩︎

    44. Companies have to identify their actual human owners – they’re only permitted to identify companies as their PSCs/beneficial owners if those companies report their owners (preventing multiple duplicated filings). There are certain other cases where a PSC/beneficial owner can be a company which are not relevant here – there is helpful guidance in paragraph 2.2 here. So, for example, if I own UK company A which owns UK company B, then company B will declare that company A is the PSC, and company A will declare that I am the PSC. But if I own BVI company A which owns UK company B, then company B will declare that I am the PSC. ↩︎

    45. We assume this was Barrowman’s assistant, or someone using Barrowman’s computer; it seems most unlikely that Barrowman prepared the financial projection himself. We’ve redacted some of the metadata, and the details from the PDF itself, to protect our source. ↩︎

    46. It’s very unusual for groups to set up multiple companies with the same name in different jurisdictions – ordinarily one wants to avoid even similar names given the potential for confusion. We cannot think of a legitimate reason to do this – but Barrowman’s group often does. We do not know why. ↩︎

    47. Oddly there is also a UK company called Smartpay Limited; its PSC is said to be Paul Ruocco. Most groups don’t register identically named companies in different jurisdictions, but Barrowman seems to make a habit of it, with one particularly well-known example. It is unclear what legitimate purpose this could have. ↩︎

    48. Knox Group plc is Barrowman’s main holding company; it owns Knox Family Office, holds/manages Barrowman’s own assets. Knox at one point had a business of running family offices for third parties, but it is unclear if that exists today other than on paper ↩︎

    49. This is part of the same recorded phone call covered in the File on Four broadcast, although they didn’t include this question/answer ↩︎

    50. All emails include “headers” which contain information about the sender, the recipient, and the route that the email took through the sender and recipient’s network, and through the public internet. This data is usually hidden, but it’s easy to reveal and analyse it – there is a good explanation and analysis tool here. ↩︎

    51. i.e. 89.107.1.218 was specified in the Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for the Vanquish domain. SPF is a protocol designed to prevent email impersonation. The receiving server checks that emails claiming to come from a domain originate from the SPF IP address. So 89.107.1.218 isn’t just a random node on the internet; it’s the email server from which the Vanquish email was sent, and which Vanquish officially designated as their email server. ↩︎

    52. As do emails from Carnegie Knox, Grosvenor Tax (not to be confused with the unrelated Grosvenor Tax Services) and Principal Contractors Ltd. ↩︎

    53. There was, again, also a Maltese company with the same name. ↩︎

    54. The Roberts document contains no information identifying a particular contractor, and so we have made it available here, and you can view the metadata yourself. We have established Roberts’ role from two independent sources, but there is no confirmation of this in any public material. There is clear evidence Roberts ran the “AML 250” network which managed referrals by advisers to AML – see Chartered One – “the Quarterly Bulletin of the Liverpool Society of Chartered Accountants”, edition 10 from Autumn 2014 contains an interview with Roberts. That’s not available online, but there is a Google cache available here, which we have archived here. Roberts’ marketing role also included Barrowman’s PTS Tax/c business, which claimed to help AML clients with their HMRC enquiries. We can demonstrate that Roberts worked for PTS thanks to metadata in PTS documents ↩︎

    55. This figure comes from the 21,900 loan charges HMRC has settled, plus the 45,000 that HMRC estimate have not settled – see these select committee minutes. The number will be higher than this, given that the loans were not disclosed on tax returns, and HMRC can only discover them if the taxpayer comes forward, the trustee/lender discloses the taxpayers’ identity (which they should, but may not), or HMRC’s own analysis of tax returns reveals that a taxpayer likely took a loan. However we have no idea how much higher the true number is. The Loan Charge Action Group believes the figure could be as high as 100,000 ↩︎

    56. i.e. 9 x 16% x £75,000 x 50% x 67,000. ↩︎

    57. £3.9bn/40%, because the £3.9bn represents tax on the marginal rate, usually 40%, on the loan amount ↩︎

    58. See the post here, responding to a question posed 55 minutes earlier. See also this post. ↩︎

    59. Vanquish claimed their scheme was “supported by tax counsel”. We’d be very surprised if the scheme they actually implemented was supported by tax counsel; if it was, that raises very serious questions for the tax counsel involved. And we would be amazed if an opinion didn’t include warnings about the TAAR, GAAR and further retrospective legislation. Saying “we have a KC opinion” is no defence – the question is, what does the opinion say, how was it obtained, and what precisely does it cover? There is more about KC opinions here. ↩︎

    60. You might say clients could sue AML/Vanquish for negligence. In principle that’s right; in practice these claims have very rarely succeeded, not least because promoter companies tend not to stick around to face the music. We are not aware of any successful claims against AML, Vanquish, or any of Barrowman’s companies. ↩︎

    61. The subjective element of the test for dishonesty (see Ghosh (1982)) was removed by Ivey [2017] for civil cases, and that decision was confirmed to apply to criminal cases in Barton [2020]. The fact that a defendant might plead he or she was acting in line with what others in the sector were doing, and therefore did not believe it to be dishonest is no longer relevant if the jury finds they knew what they were doing and it was objectively dishonest. ↩︎

    62. Noting our caution above about reaching conclusions from metadata ↩︎

  • How libel firm Carter-Ruck recklessly enabled a $4bn fraud

    How libel firm Carter-Ruck recklessly enabled a $4bn fraud

    In 2016 and 2017, libel firm Carter-Ruck acted for a business called OneCoin, and threatened defamation proceedings against people who alleged OneCoin was a Ponzi scheme and a fraud. In fact OneCoin was a giant Ponzi fraud – second only to Madoff. Plenty of people realised this at the time. So why were Carter-Ruck helping OneCoin keep the fraud going?

    Ed Siddons and Matthew Valencia reported on Carter-Ruck and OneCoin for The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. We’ve now conducted a detailed review of Carter-Ruck’s actions, and what they should have known at the time. We conclude that Carter-Ruck recklessly acted for a client it should have known was a fraud, and recklessly made accusations Carter-Ruck should have known were false. It’s likely that Carter-Ruck’s actions caused more people to lose more money to the fraud – and this was foreseeable at the time.

    UPDATE: 6 August 2025. Following this report, we referred Carter-Ruck to the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA). The SRA announced today that they would be prosecuting the solicitor responsible, Claire Gill, before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal.

    OneCoin

    OneCoin was founded in 2014. It presented itself as a cryptocurrency, akin to BitCoin, which was “mined” by computers, held on a blockchain, and traded on an exchange. OneChain was aggressively marketed online and offline.

    Everything was a lie – OneCoin was one of the biggest scams in history. There was no “mining”. There was no blockchain. The “exchange” presented fake prices, designed to make investors think the price of OneCoin was rising when, in reality, there was no price at all. OneCoin was a fraud from the start – a Ponzi scheme, where new investors’ money was used to pay old investors. It also had pyramid scheme features – existing investors were incentivised to sell packages to new investors, who’d pay up to €118,000 for worthless “training courses” accompanied by “tokens” that could be exchanged for OneCoins

    OneCoin failed spectacularly in 2017, and its executives are all now either in jail or in hiding. Around $4bn was stolen from millions of investors, across 125 countries. Its founder, Ruja Ignatova, is one of the FBI’s ten most wanted fugitives.

    Carter-Ruck and its decision to act for OneCoin

    Carter-Ruck is possibly the UK’s most well-known libel-specialist law firm. At some point in 2016 it decided to act for OneCoin and Ruja Ignatova. How did it make that decision?

    I was a partner in a large law firm for many years. Before a partner could act for a new client, a team went through procedures to check the bona fides of that client and their business. This included searches of the internet and other open source materials, as well as searches of private databases. Partly this was about protecting the firm’s reputation. But also it was about the serious consequences for a law firm which facilitated criminal activity or received money that was the proceeds of crime. I am not giving away any secrets by saying this, because these are procedures followed by all UK law firms.

    What would reasonable due diligence have found in mid-2016, if we limit ourselves to material available on the public internet?

    First, OneCoin’s own publicly available promotional material should have alerted any reasonable person to the likelihood that this was a fraud:

    • A widely circulated projection prepared by OneCoin in 2016 claimed to show that in its “base case”, the value of each OneCoin would increase 200 times in two years. That should raise an immediate red flag.
    • In 2015, OneCoin claimed it had been audited by a firm called Semper Fortis. At that point OneCoin had a market capitalisation of around $2bn. Semper Fortis was a small and unknown firm with no obvious credentials. As at January 2016, its website consisted of one page saying “under construction”. The comparison with Madoff’s obscure auditor is obvious (although there aren’t many other similarities; the warning signs Madoff was running a Ponzi were much more subtle than those for OneCoin, and Madoff likely started off running a real investment fund).
    • At a lavish event at Wembley Arena in June 2016, Ms Ignatova had said that OneCoin would double the number of coins in circulation, but the price of each coin would not change. That is not plausible.

    Second, one glance at OneCoin’s price showed that it did not behave like any cryptocurrency, or indeed any asset with a market price:

    No real asset goes up over time so inexorably (noting of course that the bar chart has no scale and so the steps are not actually as regular as the chart suggests).

    For comparison, here is the Bitcoin price on each of those dates:

    Third, The reported history of Ms Ignatova and OneCoin revealed additional signs of fraud:

    • Ms Ignatova and her father had been accused of fraud in 2012 in connection with an acquisition of a foundry in Waltenhofen, Germany, which they asset-stripped and then bankrupted.
    • In February 2016, the Daily Mirror had reported on a cult-like recruitment rally where OneCoin representatives presented a pyramid scheme-style fee structure, with some unbelievable claims about the price:
    • In March 2016, the Swedish and Norwegian police had started investigating OneCoin. The Norwegian Direct Selling Association warned that OneCoin was a Ponzi scheme and a fraud.
    • That same month, the Finnish Broadcasting Company reported (in English) that local police had interviewed OneCoin staff, and – more seriously – that the business was turning over €3bn, with cash paid by OneCoin “investors” going through a chain of companies that ended up with Ms Ignatova’s mother.
    • There were numerous articles and postings online by cryptocurrency experts (like this, this, this, this, this and this) making a compelling case that OneCoin was not a cryptocurrency, but rather was a Ponzi fraud. In fact I’ve been unable to find a single article at the time by anyone with cryptocurrency expertise expressing a different opinion. This itself was evidence of fraud: cryptocurrency was a small world, and everyone knew which developers were developing which blockchain. Nobody knew anyone who’d developed a blockchain for OneCoin.

    Should Carter-Ruck have agreed to act for OneCoin in mid-2016 given all these warning signs?

    Coin Telegraph

    Coin Telegraph is a website publishing news on the cryptocurrency industry. An indication of its prominence is that its Twitter account has 1.9 million followers.

    In May 2015 it published an article: “One Coin, Much Scam: OneCoin Exposed as Global MLM Ponzi Scheme“.

    On 8 July 2016, Coin Telegraph received a letter from Carter-Ruck (PDF version here):

    There are some very questionable elements to this letter.

    1. False labelling

    The letter is labelled “private and confidential” and “not for publication”. Nothing in the letter constituted confidential information. The claim it was “confidential” was false. In my view, these false claims are included to mislead non-legally qualified recipients, in an attempt to prevent libel threats from being published.

    The Solicitors Regulation Authority said last year that this kind of false “labelling” of letters is unacceptable. This was not a change in practice: solicitors have never been permitted to mislead third parties.

    2. Claims without merit

    The letter threatened legal action if Coin Telegraph did not comply within seven days; it was a pre-action letter. It should, therefore, have complied with the pre-action protocol for defamation. This requires that a claimant should explain why a defamatory statement is incorrect. But, whilst the letter asserts that the allegation OneCoin was a Ponzi scheme was “false and seriously defamatory”, indeed so egregious as to amount to a malicious falsehood, at no point does the letter explain why the statement is incorrect.

    It makes an attempt to do so which betrays a complete lack of understanding by Carter-Ruck:

    "A further crucial difference between the OneLife Network and a pyramid or Ponzi scheme is the way money is handled. As money is earned by members, it is not paid to fulfill overdue financial commitments. 'New money does not satisfy 'old' debts, but rather, the OneLife Network's bonus and commissions plan allows members to profit at every level and at any time."

    If new investors’ money is being used to pay out bonuses and commissions to existing investors then that absolutely is a Ponzi scheme. Carter-Ruck just admitted the very thing they were trying to deny.

    The charitable interpretation is that Carter-Ruck had no idea what pyramids or Ponzis were, and didn’t understand the accusation being made. “Money earned being paid to fulfil overdue financial commitments” is not a correct definition of either a Ponzi scheme or a pyramid scheme.

    The denial that OneCoin was a Ponzi scheme was, therefore, completely without merit, and refuted by the facts set out in Carter-Ruck’s own letter. They had, it seems, failed to speak to anyone with knowledge of financial fraud. This was reckless, incompetent, or both.

    3. False claim about Greenwood and Allan

    Second, Carter-Ruck’s letter makes a factual claim which five minutes’ research would have revealed was false and misleading.

    The Coin Telegraph article says this:

    Also working for OneCoin in various capacities are Sebastian Greenwood and Nigel Allan, both of whom have been involved in scam operations in the past.

Greenwood previously worked with defunct pyramid scheme Unaico, whose activities were the subject of a warning from Pakistan’s Securities and Exchanges Commission. The notice cited “illegal multi-level marketing” practices and advised consumers “to refrain from investing/ dealing in these so-called lucrative business schemes, launched by the Company.”

Allan, the ex-president of OneCoin, has meanwhile previously been implicated in similar pyramid schemes to OneCoin, namely Crypto888 and Brilliant Carbon. Correspondence originally from January 2015 would appear to suggest that Ignatova and Allan had a falling out, with Ignatova describing “betrayal of trust” and Allan as “illoyal” (presumably with the intended meaning of ‘disloyal’).

    Carter-Ruck doesn’t deny the dubious history of the two individuals, but denies (or, at least, appears to deny) any connection between them and OneCoin:

    This is a very peculiar paragraph. Coin Telegraph didn’t say they were “directors”. It said they were “working in various capacities” and that Allan was the “ex-president” of OneCoin. A Google search in 2016 would have immediately revealed that these statements were true:

    This was, therefore, a false and misleading statement by Carter-Ruck, and one which even cursory investigation would have shown to be misleading. The claim that Coin Telegraph’s accusation was false and defamatory was completely without merit.

    Either Carter-Ruck knew the statement was false, and made it anyway, or (more likely) was given the statement by their client and made no attempt whatsoever to check it.

    Either way, the statement should not have been made.

    4. Abuse of data privacy law

    The letter seeks to use the Data Protection Act as a weapon to silence Coin Telegraph:

    Breaches of the Data Protection Act 1999

The Article contains personal data of which Or Ignatova |s the dala subject for Ihe
purposes of Ihe Data Protection Act 1208, specifically personal dala relating to her
academic qualifications and her professional kfe. As such, CoinTetegraph and its slaff,
in 30 far as they have compiled, and are stewing and processing those dale, are dota
controllers under $.1 of Ihe Act, and as such sre subdpect to the statutory duly mmposed
by 3.4(4) of the Act.

{n heir capacity as data controllers, they have failed lo comply with this duty in respect
of Dr Ignateva’s personal data. (n particular, her personal data have not been
processed fairly or lawfully in accordance with the First Data Protection Principle, none
of the comiitions for processing set out in Schedule 2 te the Aci has been mel, and the
Fourth Data Protection Principle, which requires thet your record of her personal deta

OCH: 2D 3

Car

be accurate, has nol been complied with. In the latter connecton, we specifically have
In mind your insinuston thet Or Ignatova does not possess the academic qualifcations
and professsanal axperience that she claims to have.

In Ihe premises, we hereby put you on notice on our client's behalf under 3.10 of the
Dala Protection Act 1998:

(a) that the processing of our client's personal dala by publishing as part of the
Article on the Coin Telegraph wabsile is causing her subsiantal, unwarranted
damage and disiess, and that any further processing of her data by continuing
(o publish it on your website is likely to conlinua to cause her substantial,
unwarranted damage and distress; and

(b) that you should cease processing thease data within 48 hours of the time of
receipt of this letter by amail. We conseder this to ba a reasonable period
under the circumstances. We expact you to cease this processing by
removing the Article as a whole from the intarnel (sae further below).

tf this 5 10 notice is not complied with voluntarily, we reserve our client's ight to apply
to the court under a 10(4) to compe! your compliance.

    Introducing a data privacy angle into what is really a defamation claim is a classic SLAPP tactic, designed to overload the defendant and obtain information on their sources. A similar tactic, also involving Carter-Ruck, was recently criticised by the High Court in the Amersi v Leslie case.

    Carter Ruck’s use of it here is particularly egregious, because it fails to recognise the journalism exemption. It is not appropriate for a law firm to advance an argument to an unrepresented person when it knows that a defence is potentially available.

    Jen McAdam

    Jen McAdam lived in Scotland and had worked as an IT B2B sales consultant. She’d invested her life savings in OneCoin, and encouraged her family to invest. By 2017 she had become convinced that OneCoin was a Ponzi scheme, in part based upon accusations made by Bjørn Bjercke, a Norwegian cryptocurrency expert.

    Ms McAdam discussed the accusations with Mr Bjercke in this webinar in April 2017:

    Mr Bjercke made two key allegations:

    First, that he and others had undertaken extensive testing, and found that when OneCoins were sold from one account to another, the transactions were not visible on OneCoin’s supposed blockchain. Mr Bjercke went into some detail as to what he had found. Given that the whole point of a blockchain is to be a robust and unalterable record of transactions, the obvious conclusion was that the blockchain was being faked.

    Second, that he (and other blockchain specialists he knew) had been approached by recruiters for OneCoin at the end of September 2016 to build a new blockchain for OneCoin. That contradicted OneCoin’s claim that it had switched over to a new blockchain on 1 October 2016.

    Mr Bjercke and Ms McAdam featured again in this Youtube video, and then another webinar. The videos were posted by an account called “Crypto Xpose”, but Ms McAdam linked to the videos on her Facebook page.

    This is what happened next:

    It was exactly three weeks after the webinar that the email arrived. The attachment was a letter from lawyers representing OneCoin and Ignatova, its co-founder. “Our clients’ current instructions”, it stated, “are to initiate proceedings against you for defamation.” The only way to avoid a court case, the letter said, was to refrain from publishing similar allegations and to retract the webinar video (which had actually been uploaded by someone else). She had seven days to act.

    Why was Carter-Ruck still acting for OneCoin in April 2017?

    By this point there were considerably more signs that OneCoin was a fraud:

    • Ms Ignatova had appeared on a promotional video in July 2016 claiming that anyone buying a €118,000 training course would receive 1,311,111 tokens, worth around $5m, which would turn into even more (around $14m) after OneCoin launched their “new blockchain”. These are, again, not credible claims.
    • As Ms Ignatova had promised at the London event (reported by The Mirror), the supply of OneCoins doubled on 1 October 2016, but the price per-coin didn’t change. This should not be possible.
    • On 26 September 2016, the FCA published a warning that consumers should be wary about OneCoin, and that the City of London Police was investigating it:
    aan SENDA ANTHONY About us Firms Markets Consumers J news| Publications
Beware trading virtual currencies with OneCoin a .
inv

News stories | Published: 26/09/2016 | Last updated: 26/09/2016 Print this page Share this page

Beware trading virtual
We believe consumers should be wary of dealing with OneCoin, which claims to offer the currencies with OneCoin

chance to make money through the trading and ‘mining’ of virtual currencies,

Related links

‘OneCoin markets itself as ‘a digital currency, based on cryptography’. It clams to have a finite amount of currency Unauthorised firms to avoid
nits which means itis unaffected by factors such as inflation, and that it is not bound by a central bank.
Protect yourself from

unauthansed firms
Why we are concerned

The City of Londan Police are currently investigating OneCom. If you believe that you have been a victim of fraud Report an unauthonsed firm
in this regard, or have had dealings with OneCoin, then please contact Action Fraud “ or telephone them on 0300

123 2040.

External links

This firm 1s not authorised by us and we do not believe it is undertaking any activities that require our

authorisation. However, we are concerned about the potential risks this firm poses to UK consumers. ‘Action Fraud *

‘As OneCoin is not authorised, consumers who deal with it will have no protection from the Financial Ombudsman
Service or the Financial Services Compensation Scheme.
    • In December 2016, the Italian Anti-Trust Authority suspended all promotion of OneCoin on the basis that it was a Ponzi/pyramid scheme, the Hungarian Central Bank warned that OneCoin was similar to a pyramid scheme, and the Austrian Financial Markets Authority issued a specific warning about OneCoin.
    • Also in December, a Bulgarian newspaper reported that Ms Ignatova had transferred her legal ownership of the business to a 25 year old with a past history of selling his identity. This followed a previous article about Ms Ignatova’s pattern of suspicious transactions.
    • In January 2017, OneCoin suspended clients’ withdrawals of money, but continued to accept new funds.
    • In March 2017, the Croatian Central Bank issued a warning about OneCoin, referring to the warnings issued by other European authorities and regulators.
    • Semper Fortis, the firm which had “audited” OneCoin in 2015 didn’t publish an audit for 2016 or 2017. As at April 2017 its website still consisted of one page saying “under construction”.
    • Bob Summerwill, one of the founders of Ethereum, had described OneCoin as a “scam”, and explained why.
    • The OneCoin Wikipedia page by this point stated OneCoin was a Ponzi scheme, and linked to multiple sources questioning OneCoin’s bona fides.
    • British Muslims were a particular target for OneCoin sales (together with other minority groups). In November 2016, a paper was published by Wifaqul Ulama, a body representing Islamic scholars in Britain – it concluded that OneCoin involves fraud and deception, and therefore it was impermissible for Muslims to invest in the product. The value of the paper for non-Muslims is its careful and detailed analysis of the history and workings of OneCoin, and its extensive footnotes and links. The paper presents the clearest and most complete picture I can find of OneCoin as at late 2016 (although many of the links are now dead).

    I found the materials listed above, and those in the pre-2016 section, after about two hours of basic internet research, using only Google, looking only at pre-April 2017 materials, and using only simple search terms. I expect an experienced KYC professional would have done a better job, faster. A KYC professional would also have had access to newspaper archives, credit reports, corporate ownership databases and other private resources.

    But we don’t need to speculate on what Carter-Ruck’s due diligence could have uncovered in 2017, because we can see the actual actions of two other firms.

    First, thanks to a US civil judgment – we can see the findings of Bank of New York’s compliance team in December 2016. BNY had processed large transfers for a OneCoin affiliate, and so their compliance team was tasked with researching OneCoin. Using only standard internet searches, they concluded that OneCoin was operating a pyramid/Ponzi scheme (see page 7 of the judgment).

    Second, thanks to testimony in a US criminal trial, we can see how Apex Fund Services, a UK investment fund administrator, reacted when they saw OneCoin’s name. Apex was administering a fund for a lawyer, Mark Scott. Paul Spendiff, a managing director at Apex, was concerned about the identity of Scott’s proposed investors. He spent the weekend of 30 June 2016 looking through the Apex team’s historic emails – and found one where Scott had accidentally included a previous email instructing him how to proceed, sent to him from an address at onecoin.eu. Paul Spendiff started Googling OneCoin and, when he saw the Mirror story and various online investigations into OneCoin, he reacted by calling an emergency meeting with his risk and compliance teams, and filing a “suspicious activity report” with his anti-money laundering regulator.

    Note that Spendiff and BNY made their conclusions in 2016. It was on 1 January 2017 that OneCoin blocked its “investors” from withdrawing their money – a significant additional warning sign.

    Why did Carter-Ruck reach a different conclusion to Spendiff and BNY’s compliance team?

    Carter-Ruck’s decision to act as a PR firm

    We know that Carter-Ruck was aware of at least some of what was going on, because they issued a statement responding to the decision of the Italian Competition Authority. This is from The Mirror, 17 February 2017:

    OneCoin hit by £2.2m penalty

A £2.2million fine has been slapped _had been branded a pyramid scheme
onthe supposed cryptocurrency —_by the authorities in Italy and fined
OneCoin. €2.5million.
I've previously told how this lot were “OneCoin and OneLife are aware of
drumming up investors at recruitment —_ the statement issued by the Italian

rallies where you were encouraged to Competition and Markets Authority,
rope in family and friends, being which suggests conclusions based
promised 10% of whatever they on a misunderstanding of the
putin. business, compounded by

In May, the Financial misleading and incorrect facts,
Conduct Authority issued a its lawyers Carter-Ruck replied.
warning about OneCoin, and “"We are considering all our
City of London Police are legal options with a view to

investigating. appealing the reported ruling
It was founded by Ruja inthe administrative court.”
Ignatova, from Sofia in It added: "We are
Bulgaria, and has been committed to transparency
recruiting in other as a responsible and leading
countries, with sister global cryptocurrency.”

operation OneLife. Leading? OneCoin is not
| asked the operation to FOUNDER even in the top 100 of global
Ruja Ignatova
comment on reports that it cryptocurrencies.

    And this is what the Italian Competition Authority had said (rough Google translation):

    sd AL TORITA GARANTE £
LUA COMLORREN SA [Sf
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PS10550 - Pyramid sales: Antitrust suspends One Life's promotion of the OneCoin cryptocurrency = Press

PRESS RELEASE

PYRAMID SALES:

ANTITRUST SUSPENDS ONE LIFE'S
PROMOTION OF THE

ONECOIN CRYPTOCURRENCY

The Antitrust, after having extended the procedure relating to the
by the One Life company. Easy Life Srl instead announced that it had

promotion of the program for the purchase and dissemination of the
connected to it.

persons in their capacity as registrants of the promotiona

promotion of the OneCoin cryptocurrency to the

companies One Life Network Ltd. and Easy Life Srl, ordered the precautionary suspension of the aforementioned activity

interrupted the practice.

In fact, from the information acquired, the two professionals in question would also appear to be involved in the

OneCoin cryptocurrency and the training packages

On this point, the Authority had in fact initiated proceedings against One Network Services Ltd. and three natural

sites onecoinsuedtirol.it, onecoinitaliaofficial it,

onecoinitalia.com. (see press release of 30 December 2016) and ordered the suspension of activities linked to the promotion of the aforementioned cryptocurrency against
them. In fact, the largest part of the income achievable from the activity promoted by professionals would derive not so much from the purchase of the OneCoin virtual
currency but rather from the payment of the fees that consumers are required to pay when joining the system, which they time, to reach the revenue goal, they seem to be

required to recruit other consumers. These methods appear to be attributable to the typical dynamics of pyramid sales.

In gathering the elements that led to the subjective extension of the proceedings, the AGCM made use of the invaluable collaboration of the Special Antitrust Unit of the

Financial Police.

Rome, 27 February 2017

    A law firm is not a PR agency, and needs to be careful when it acts like one. There’s nothing that stops a PR agency from simply repeating the claims of its client, regardless of their apparent truth. Indeed there is nothing that stops a PR agency from misleading the public. But lawyers remain bound by ethical standards and the SRA Principles – they have a duty not to mislead, and acting as an uncritical mouthpiece for claims made by their client is not acceptable.

    Did Carter-Ruck really have a legitimate basis for saying that the Italian authorities had misunderstood the business and had their facts wrong? What did Carter-Ruck think they had misunderstood?

    Carter-Ruck’s letter to Jen McAdam

    Here is the full text of the letter, which Ms McAdam has kindly permitted us to publish for the first time (PDF version here):

    There are, again, a number of curious elements to the letter:

    • We once more see the false “confidential” labelling, which I believe was intended to intimidate Ms McAdam into not publishing the letter. It succeeded in this.
    • The curious reference to Mr Bjercke “holding himself out as having links to Bitcoin, a competitor cryptocurrency”; perhaps the author thought that Bitcoin was a company or organisation?
    • The letter denies Ms McAdam’s accusations that OneCoin is a scam, illegal pyramid scheme or a Ponzi scheme. However it does not say these statements are defamatory. That is very surprising.
    • The letter also fails to engage with, or even mention, Mr Bjercke’s evidence that the OneCoin blockchain was faked.
    • Mr Bjercke had claimed that OneCoin had attempted to hire him to build a blockchain; he concluded that their “new blockchain” did not exist. Carter-Ruck completely misunderstand or misdescribe his claim:
    by suggesting he has some inside knowledge about OneCoin's
systems. However, he has no knowledge about or access to OneCoin's systems: he
spoke to an agency about an IT job with OneCoin and submitted his CV but he was
never recruited.
    • Instead, the letter focuses on Mr Bjercke’s conclusion that OneCoin was a criminal network, without referring to his reasons for that conclusion.
    • The letter threatened legal action if Ms McAdam did not comply within seven days; it was a pre-action letter. However it failed to comply with the pre-action protocol for defamation. In particular, it objected to the “criminal network” accusation but did not “give a sufficient explanation to enable [Ms McAdam] to appreciate why the words are inaccurate or unsupportable”. That explanation could have consisted with quoting Mr Bjercke’s reasons for concluding that OneCoin was a criminal network, and explained why those reasons were wrong. But instead there was nothing. The letter makes no reference to the evidence cited by Mr Bjercke.

    So this was a highly ineffective letter on its face; pursuing ancillary points of detail, missing the main “sting” of the accusations against OneCoin, and breaching the pre-action protocol. Carter-Ruck would have known this.

    My view, and that of libel experts I’ve spoken to, is that the letter was not sent as a precursor to legal action. And indeed, when Ms McAdam (impressively) refused to back down, there was no legal action.

    So why was it sent? To intimidate an unrepresented person of limited means, and to bluff them into a retraction. It failed.

    There was a parallel attempt in Norway to bring a claim against Mr Bjercke, which went as far as an application to the Norwegian equivalent of a county court. The county court rejected the claim on grounds of complexity, and OneCoin never took the matter further.

    The Norwegian lawyer acting for OneCoin, Per Danielsen, was struck off last year (following 67 complaints) for acting recklessly against third parties and his own clients, unlawfully using client funds, and breaches of money-laundering rules. Mr Danielsen’s appeal against that decision was rejected earlier this year. During those proceedings, his decision to act for OneCoin was specifically criticised for his lack of due diligence in identifying the potential money-laundering issues.

    Mr Bjercke believes that Per Danielsen was instructed by Carter-Ruck. I don’t know if that’s correct, or if there’s a wider relationship between Carter-Ruck and Mr Danielsen, but he is featured on Carter-Ruck’s website, despite having been struck off.

    Carter-Ruck write to the FCA

    The warning notice that the FCA had placed on its website on 26 September 2016 had been highly effective, warning both potential investors and regulatory/enforcement authorities around the world.

    Carter-Ruck wrote to the FCA in late July 2017, demanding that it take down the warning notice. By that time, OneCoin was very near its catastrophic end:

    Again the question should be asked why Carter-Ruck continued to act.

    The FCA responded to Carter-Ruck’s letter by taking down its warning notice.

    According to the BBC, the initial FCA explanation was that “it had been on our website for a sufficient amount of time to make investors aware of our concerns”. The subsequent explanation was that the decision to take it down had been made in conjunction with the City of London Police, and that – because the FCA does not regulate crypto-assets – it couldn’t take it further.

    The FCA is now leaning further into that last explanation, telling TBIJ this was because OneCoin’s activities “did not require regulation”. I don’t understand that explanation; it certainly doesn’t prevent the FCA publishing other warnings about Ponzi and pyramid schemes, or initial coin offerings.

    It seems a reasonable inference from the timing, and the changing explanations, that the FCA notice was in fact removed as a result of Carter-Ruck’s letter. Carter-Ruck themselves appear happy to take credit for the removal.

    Jen McAdam was able to stand up to Carter-Ruck – why wasn’t the FCA?

    The end

    On 12 October 2017, Ignatova was charged with fraud and money laundering in New York; two weeks later, she vanished.

    Things then deteriorated quickly:

    This was not a Madoff-style situation where a business starts off legitimate and (for one reason or other) ends up as a fraud. This was a criminal operation right from the start, and emails revealed by US prosecutors make clear that the fraud was not an accident, but Ms Ignatova’s intention.

    Why did Carter-Ruck act for OneCoin?

    Why did Carter-Ruck feel it was appropriate, or even legal, to act for OneCoin given that:

    • OneCoin claimed to be a cryptocurrency like Bitcoin but all the evidence suggested it was not.
    • Its advertising promised returns which were impossible.
    • There was no evidence of any blockchain (and the supposed blockchain entries on its website had been convincingly shown by Bjork Bjercke and others to be fake).
    • The supposed “audit” of a $2bn business by an obscure firm (whose website had disappeared) was redolent of Madoff.
    • All of this had led Apex and Bank of New York to conclude in 2016, solely on the basis of public internet searches, that OneCoin was a fraud.
    • Events since then made it even more obvious, particularly OneCoin’s blocking of investor withdrawals in January 2017, and the various regulatory and criminal investigations/enforcements across the world.

    There are two important reasons why this is different from the usual scenario where a law firm is acting for (or defending) an individual or business accused of behaving unethically or illegally.

    First, this was a case where the accusations were that the entire business of OneCoin was a fraud. If the allegations were true, then Carter-Ruck would be receiving the proceeds of crime.

    Second, Carter-Ruck would not be conducting a criminal defence of OneCoin – it would be assisting its business by silencing its critics.

    Here are some possible hypothetical scenarios for how Carter-Ruck came to act:

    • Carter-Ruck might have told OneCoin it was happy to act in principle, but was concerned about the multiple accusations from regulators, journalists, and others that OneCoin was a Ponzi scheme. Carter-Ruck therefore asked OneCoin to provide sufficient documentation to provide Carter-Ruck with assurance that it was a legitimate investment. OneCoin provided documentation that, at least at the time, provided a reasonable answer to the accusations that had been made, and on that basis Carter-Ruck thought it was appropriate to act.
    • Carter-Ruck might have asked OneCoin if the accusations against it were true. OneCoin said they weren’t, and denied it was a Ponzi scheme (without any justification or evidence). Carter-Ruck accepted that assertion and proceeded to act.
    • Carter-Ruck might have decided that it was in the business of advising controversial clients, and it was not for it to make any judgment about whether the accusations against OneCoin were correct.
    • Carter-Ruck might have conducted no due diligence, or inadequate due diligence, and was not aware of the widely reported allegations against OneCoin.

    The first of these scenarios could – in principle – have been a perfectly proper way for a law firm to act. No law firm can be expected to undertake a full-scale investigation of a potential client, but there should be a serious assessment undertaken, proportionate to the level of risk. In this case, the high level of risk and the seriousness of the accusations suggest that Carter-Ruck should have applied its procedures robustly. It is conceptually possible that this is what happened but, given the surrounding facts and circumstances, I find it very difficult to see how the conclusion of robust procedures could have resulted in a decision to act for OneCoin.

    In my view, the other three scenarios above would represent ethically unacceptable behaviour, and possibly unlawful behaviour. In these scenarios, Carter-Ruck acted recklessly and, as a result, abetted a fraudster.

    Of course the reality may have involved a completely different scenario from the four above, but the same question arises in each case: why, given everything that was known about OneCoin, did Carter-Ruck think it was appropriate to act? Did Carter-Ruck miss what BNY and Apex spotted? Or did Carter-Ruck not care?

    Carter-Ruck’s decision to threaten defamation proceedings

    The decision to act is one thing. The decision to threaten defamation proceedings against Coin Telegraph and Ms McAdam is another.

    At this point, Carter-Ruck went beyond merely acting for a potentially criminal business. It was sending an aggressive communication to unrepresented individuals. If OneCoin was a fraud, its motivation in instructing Carter-Ruck to send these letters would be to protect its fraud from scrutiny, and enable it to continue to defraud investors. This should have been regarded by any law firm as a very high risk situation.

    A meritless factual claim

    What steps, if any should Carter-Ruck have taken to establish that the accusations were false?

    One view is that Carter-Ruck had no duty to take any steps. If a client instructs it to make a factual assertion in correspondence to the other side, it may do so, and perhaps is even required to do so. In many ordinary cases this may be a respectable position to take; I don’t think it’s defensible in this case.

    I’d suggest that the extent to which a firm is required to check factual points depends upon the likelihood that, by making those points, it will be misleading a court or a third party (such as Ms McAdam or Coin Telegraph). In this case there was, at the time, a high risk that the factual claim by OneCoin (“we are not a Ponzi scheme”) was false, and therefore a high risk that Carter-Ruck would be misleading Coin Telegraph and Ms McAdam (and, indirectly, the wider public). A solicitor’s duty to uphold the rule of law, act with integrity, and maintain the public trust meant that Carter-Ruck should have considered the matter extremely carefully before writing as it did.

    The evidence of those letters, and the content of those letters, suggests that Carter-Ruck did not consider the matter carefully. It seems reasonably likely they did not conduct even basic background research into cryptocurrency, OneCoin, or the accusations. If that’s right, then Carter-Ruck’s decision to send the letters was even more reckless than its original decision to act.

    Everyone has a right to a criminal defence, and a criminal lawyer is perfectly entitled to run a factual defence that the lawyer may privately regard as far-fetched (provided the lawyer does not positively know the defence is false). That does not apply to civil litigation. SRA guidance is clear that lawyers may not run meritless claims. This applies to meritless factual claims in the same way as meritless legal claims.

    The FCA letter

    More serious issues arise from Carter-Ruck’s decision, three months after their letter to Ms McAdam, to write to the FCA to request that it take down its warning notice. I say “more serious” for two reasons:

    First, by this time it should have been clear to a reasonable observer that OneCoin was fraudulent – countries were starting to arrest OneCoin employees, and India had an arrest warrant out for Ms Ignatova herself.

    Second, the letter to the FCA had more impact. Ms McAdam and The Coin Telegraph did not take down their postings; but the FCA did take down its warning notice. That plausibly facilitated the continued fleecing of “investors” by OneCoin until the whole enterprise exploded three months later. This was a very foreseeable outcome, and presumably OneCoin’s intended outcome. Carter-Ruck’s recklessness had consequences.

    Carter-Ruck’s response

    I asked Carter-Ruck why they acted for a client which public sources, at the time, indicated was likely involved in criminal activity. They refused to comment, citing legal privilege:

    Adri |@carter-tuck.com
RE: Request for comment - OneCoin
5 December 2023 at 10:52

: Dan Neidle gg @taxpolicy.org.uk

Dear Mr Neidle
‘Thank you for your email of 4 December

We are not able to comment on client matters, including in relation to our instructions concerning the correspondence to which you
refer. You wil no doubt be aware that we were cle of a number of fims instructed to act on behalf of One Coin and Ruja lgnalova. We
acted properly at all times in accordance with our professional and regulatory obligations. Given that we had no involvement in setting
Up the relevant scheme, the actions we took were based on information available af the time of our retainer 6 years ago including
information from cur cents, legal opinions from law firms in this jurisdiction and elsewhere and where appropriate we acted in
consultafion with other law fms and Counsel. 4s to the FCA Notice, you will no doubt have seen that the FCA is reported fo have
stated recently that it removed its waming notice because One Coin did not require regulation.

Yours sincerely
Carter-Ruck

    Carter-Ruck say they acted based on information available at the time. If that included the information set out above then Carter-Ruck’s decision to act is hard to defend. If it didn’t, then Carter-Ruck’s client due diligence procedures were inadequate.

    Their other points are unconvincing:

    • Nobody has accused Carter-Ruck of setting up the scheme. I’m not sure why they think this is relevant.
    • The fact other firms may have acted is problematic for those firms, and hardly a defence for Carter-Ruck. However, as far as I’m aware, Carter-Ruck was the only UK firm which sent letters to unrepresented individuals threatening libel proceedings for accusing OneCoin of being a fraud.
    • The content of the “legal opinions in this jurisdiction and elsewhere” is a mystery. I doubt very much they were opinions that considered the allegations of fraud (legal opinions cover the law, not factual matters). More likely they were opinions that OneCoin’s pretended business of offering training courses and a cryptocurrency did not fall foul of securities rules and/or prohibitions on pyramid schemes. If so, this is again not relevant – Carter-Ruck should have been on notice of OneCoin’s actual business of defrauding its investors.
    • The reason why the FCA agreed to remove its warning notice is important but once more not relevant: the impetus for the removal was Carter-Ruck’s letter to the FCA, and Carter-Ruck should not have sent that letter.

    Finally, the usual prohibition on commenting on client matters does not apply here. OneCoin was a fraud, right from the start. Even if Carter-Ruck had done nothing wrong, and had no way of knowing that they were furthering that fraud, that wouldn’t change the fact that they were furthering the fraud. Legal privilege and confidentiality do not apply in such circumstances. Unlike other recent cases, this isn’t just one transaction which is alleged to be fraudulent; it’s a business where the entire executive team is now either in jail or has disappeared. The man who instructed Carter-Ruck, Frank Schneider, is himself on the run.

    I put this point to Carter-Ruck. They did not reply. A copy of my email requesting comment is here.

    Lawyers understandably don’t disapply privilege and confidentiality whenever an accusation of fraud is made, but this is the rare case where there is no doubt that OneCoin’s business was entirely fraudulent. Carter-Ruck’s refusal to comment is therefore in my view self-serving.

    The consequences for Carter-Ruck

    I cannot recall a case where a law firm acted for a client whose business was entirely fraudulent, where that was widely understood at the time , and where the effect of the law firm’s involvement was to assist the fraud. It seems inconceivable Carter-Ruck knew that OneCoin was fraudulent, but all the signs were there. Carter-Ruck’s actions throughout were reckless, and that had serious consequences.

    Carter-Ruck appears to have breached the SRA Principles on multiple occasions. In particular:

    • The original decision to act, given the available evidence that OneCoin was fraudulent (evidence that warned off BNY and Apex).
    • The decision to continue to act, as evidence piled up that OneCoin was a fraud.
    • The lack of thought and research that went into the letter to Coin Telegraph showed a high level of recklessness. The fact that Carter-Ruck didn’t know what a Ponzi was, and so didn’t see that their own facts showed OneCoin to be a Ponzi. The denial that OneCoin was connected to Messrs Greenwood and Allan (which one Google search would have revealed was false and misleading). The inclusion of a false “confidentiality” heading in the letter.
    • The decision to write to Jen McAdam, an unrepresented individual of limited means, with a false “confidentiality” heading that served to intimidate, when their letter breached the pre-action protocol and failed to engage with the actual evidence presented by Mr Bjerke that OneCoin was fraudulent. Did Carter-Ruck at that point have any legitimate basis for contesting Mr Bjercke’s allegations?
    • Carter-Ruck’s decision to act as a PR firm and claim that actions of the Italian Competition Authority was based on a misunderstanding and incorrect facts. It wasn’t – it was based on an entirely correct understanding. What led Carter-Ruck to think otherwise? Or did they just issue their statement without any consideration of whether it was correct?
    • The decision to write to the FCA at a time when the evidence OneCoin was a fraud was overwhelming. What was the content of that letter?
    • All of this showed a lack of integrity. It also breached the specific rule that a solicitor “can only make assertions or put forward statements, representations or submissions to the court or others which are properly arguable”. The statements in Carter-Ruck’s letters were not properly arguable.

    There are also uncomfortable questions for two other firms, Locke Lord and Hogan Lovells It is important to note that these two firms were not making accusations of defamation against people criticising OneCoin – Carter-Ruck should be held to a higher standard.

    I’ll be asking the SRA to consider these issues.

    I’ll also ask the SRA to provide guidance to solicitors on the general question of the extent to which lawyers are required to verify factual matters before asserting them in civil litigation, or correspondence relating to potential civil litigation.

    It appears from a number of recent cases that some defamation lawyers believe that they have no responsibility to verify factual claims by their clients, even when the claims are far-fetched. There’s a strong case for reforming defamation law, but on its own that won’t solve the problem. Lawyers would continue to make meritless legal and factual claims, with a reckless disregard as to whether they are true. There is a strong public interest in changing this behaviour; a high profile SRA intervention is the only way I can see this happening.


    I wouldn’t have been motivated to look into OneCoin without Ed Siddons and Matthew Valencia‘s article for The Bureau of Investigative Journalism – many thanks to them. And thanks to Andrew Penman, former Daily Mirror columnist, probably the first journalist in the UK to write about OneCoin, who drew my attention to Carter-Ruck’s PR activity.

    I’m very grateful to Jen McAdam and Bjørn Bjercke, who generously spent time talking me through their experiences.

    As ever, I am completely reliant on the expertise and goodwill of legal experts across the profession. Thanks to Y and T for defamation law advice, P for criminal law input, A for data privacy advice, and G for an invaluable discussion on law firm client due diligence. Professor Richard Moorhead kindly reviewed an early draft from a legal ethics standpoint.

    For anyone interested in reading more about OneCoin, I strongly recommend The Missing Cryptoqueen by Jamie Bartlett, and Devil’s Coin by Jen McAdam. There’s plenty more to be said – those books came out too early to pick up the latest New York trial evidence (Jamie has added an addendum-of-sorts here). We may see some of that in a documentary on OneCoin which Bjørn Bjercke has been working on, and is due to be released in 2024 – trailer here.

    Thanks also to Trustnodes for their article, and for kindly fixing what was previously a dead link to the Carter-Ruck letter to Coin Telegraph.

    Photo by Ronny Martin JunnilainenCC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

    Footnotes

    1. The “training courses” being an attempt to evade prohibitions on pyramid schemes that don’t actually sell products, and securities regulations that in many countries would prohibit direct sales of OneCoin ↩︎

    2. A side note: Ms Ignatova claimed to have studied European law at Oxford University. A poor quality scan of a degree certificate is available, which purports to show her having studied at St Hilda’s, and received a Magister Juris. There’s an open question if her Oxford qualification is genuine; media reports generally report her degree uncritically, but sources from St Hilda’s are sceptical she was there. I’ve asked St Hilda’s if they can confirm, and I’ll update this if I hear back. ↩︎

    3. The nature of many law firms’ work means they are also covered by anti-money laundering rules, which require more onerous procedures. I expect Carter-Ruck are not in scope of the AML regulations, and therefore this article assumes they were only required to undertake more basic due diligence. ↩︎

    4. OneCoin published a somewhat odd video of Ms Ignatova interviewing the senior partner of Semper Fortis. It comes as no surprise that the audit turned out to be have been written by OneCoin staff. ↩︎

    5. Source: data from Yahoo Finance, chart by Tax Policy Associates Ltd. You can see a more conventional chart of the Bitcoin price here; no amount of cherry-picking dates will create a result like the OneCoin chart. ↩︎

    6. There is much more about this in Jamie Bartlett‘s book, however the Kreisbote article is probably all that would have been easily found by a desktop search exercise in 2017. That should have been enough to raise a red flag. ↩︎

    7. which we’ve made available in more readable form as a PDF here ↩︎

    8. I suppose a possible defence is that “we just said they weren’t directors and that is correct – they weren’t directors”. But if that was indeed the rationale, then this was a deliberate attempt to mislead. ↩︎

    9. As this was 2016, the pre-GDPR position applied ↩︎

    10. I haven’t been able to locate it; the link given by Carter-Ruck was https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmQtWRd_FqU, but that link is now dead ↩︎

    11. “onecoin ponzi”, “onecoin fraud” and so on. I didn’t use any terms which relied upon post-2017 knowledge, e.g. the names of the entities later discovered to be laundering the funds ↩︎

    12. This is all from Spendiff’s testimony at Scott’s trial for money-laundering. I can’t find a primary source, but there is a good summary in this Twitter thread (unrolled here) and in Jamie Bartlett‘s book The Missing Cryptoqueen ↩︎

    13. My source for this is a discussion with Mr Bjercke. ↩︎

    14. In March 2017 law enforcement agencies from around the world had met at Europol’s offices in The Hague to discuss OneCoin. This wasn’t public at the time, but it explains the subsequent acceleration in worldwide enforcement actions. ↩︎

    15. It is also not necessarily the case that OneCoin did not require regulation. Cryptocurrency usually falls outside UK regulatory rules, but in reality OneCoin had no connection to cryptocurrency aside from marketing. Plausibly the correct legal analysis is that OneCoin was a transferrable token issued by a company (OneCoin) – in which case it could well have been regulated in the UK, in the same way as some ICOs. Andrew Penman at The Mirror made this point back in 2020 and I’ve never seen it answered. ↩︎

    16. The SRA may already have investigated Locke-Lord following the conviction of Mark Scott (although I don’t believe he was a partner in their UK firm) and following the revelation that a UK corporate lawyer from Lock Lorde was still writing to Ms Ignatova as late as June 2018 (see chapter 32 of The Missing Cryptoqueen). ↩︎

    17. These extracts from a Hogan Lovells opinion (if genuine) show a disappointing failure to step back and appreciate the “big picture” of what was going on – this was March 2017, and there was already good reason to be highly suspicious of OneCoin. Some of the recommendations in the opinion were unreal; and signs that OneCoin was a pyramid/Ponzi were noted, but then there was a failure to realise what this meant. ↩︎

    18. On the other hand, it is unclear how both firms’ due diligence failed to identify the obvious problems with OneCoin (both firms are AML-regulated). ↩︎

  • Who protects consumers from tax fraud?

    Who protects consumers from tax fraud?

    Currently, the answer is: nobody

    Here are two examples I’ve seen in the last two days. They’re not avoidance schemes. They’re pure nonsense. If you follow the advice, you may be committing tax fraud. The people selling the schemes are either ignorant or scammers.

    This is from LinkedIn today:

    The idea is simple. You’re selling properties, one of which you live in and two which you don’t. Your own residence is exempt from CGT; the others aren’t. So an obvious trick: “tweak” the valuations so most of the capital gain is on your residence, and so exempt.

    The obvious problem: filing tax returns on the basis of false valuations is tax fraud. I pointed this out to the author, and he deleted the post. But – if he’s to be believed – he actually advised someone to do this, and they did it.

    UPDATE: Will Henderson emailed me to say that he has now spoken to an accountant, understands this was not appropriate advice, and has told his client to speamk to an accountant. I accept that he wasn’t trying to scam anyone… but it’s an example of someone with no tax knowledge giving very dangerous advice

    And here’s another, sent to me by a correspondent this morning:

    This is the “GDPR tax credit” scam we reported on earlier this year. The idea is that GDPR fines can be hefty, so you can amend your tax return for last year to book an appropriate reserve, and get an immediate corporation tax refund. This doesn’t work at all for a bunch of reasons, not least that you don’t get tax relief for fines.

    So this is just a scam. A firm called Forbes Dawson had previously published a warning about it. After our report, AccountingWeb and Computer Weekly also ran stories. If you google “GDPR tax credit” now, most of the results are people warning that there’s no such thing. But the people pushing the schemes don’t care.

    This stuff is all over social media – and that’s just the part that’s visible. Plenty else going on under the radar, such as those outfits sending “SDLT refund” letters to people who’ve just bought a house.

    Who is liable if you buy a tax scheme that doesn’t work?

    You are. Always. Even if you were deceived by the adviser. You may then be able to try to recover your loss from the adviser, but that’s not easy – even if they’re still around.

    It has to be this way, otherwise there would be no risk in buying a tax avoidance scheme… you could claim the benefit if it works, and claim you were deceived if it doesn’t.

    Why isn’t HMRC stopping this?

    HMRC’s job is to collect tax. It isn’t a consumer protection body. In many of these cases it will recover tax that was underpaid, but it has at least six years to do this and so can and will take its time. And when HMRC does act, it is required to do so behind the scenes. Only in exceptional cases can it name promoters.

    That means that promoters can continue flogging duff schemes for years before HMRC take action, and sometimes keep on flogging them after HMRC has started to take action.

    What about the professional bodies?

    Many of the people promoting these schemes aren’t qualified or regulated in any way. Will Henderson is one of many “property gurus” selling terrible tax advice as part of their overall package. Research Grant Solutions tell you nothing about who they are, not even the company name.

    When we do see regulated professionals pushing hopeless tax schemes, most of the various professional bodies – Bar Standards Board, Taxation Disciplinary Board, ACCA Disciplinary Board, etc won’t investigate proactively but require a referral (the SRA is the exception: they will investigate cases without waiting for a referral). Complaints typically take over a year to resolve.

    All this means that regulation can’t help most of the cases, and is of limited help in the minority of cases involving regulated professionals.

    So what’s the solution?

    I’m not sure. Creating an elaborate equivalent of the FCA to regulate the detailed content of tax advice would take years and I’m unconvinced how workable it would be.

    So my answer is to instead create powerful economic and legal incentives for people not to provide irresponsible tax advice. More on this soon.


    Many thanks to R for the tip-off.
    Photo by Nicolas Spehler on Unsplash

  • ICAEW complaint: Chris Bailey and Less Tax for Landlords

    ICAEW complaint: Chris Bailey and Less Tax for Landlords

    I have just filed a complaint with the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) regarding Chris Bailey, who co-founded Less Tax for Landlords, and appears to have been responsible for the inexplicable, and perhaps fraudulent, tax positions it took.

    This is an unusual complaint for two reasons.

    First, it seems unusually obvious that Mr Bailey took indefensible positions, contrary to the ICAEW Code. ICAEW would not ordinarily wish to second-guess technical positions taken by advisers, particularly before a court has reached a judgment. However in this case it should be able to conclude, without any difficulty, that Mr Bailey’s advice fell well below the expected standard – the positions he took were inexplicable. The most obvious example is Mr Bailey’s claims that his structure facilitated an inheritance tax exemption for landlords – see, for example, this video:

    We have many more examples of indefensible positions taken by Mr Bailey in our report.

    Second, the matter is now urgent. HMRC have written to LT4L’s clients, suggesting they withdraw from the scheme, make a disclosure by 31 January 2024, and settle their tax affairs. Mr Bailey is continuing to act for those clients, and it looks very much like he will be advising them to fight what is a hopeless case. This is a disgraceful conflict of interest.

    LT4L told clients they had “peace of mind” because they were regulated by the ICAEW: the question is whether the ICAEW will act to protect those clients’ interests, and indeed the ICAEW’s own reputation.

    I should add that Tony Gimple and Malcolm Rose, the other two LT4L founding directors, have denied that LT4L acted fraudulently. Neither has, however, been able to provide any explanation for why LT4L took positions that all the tax advisers we’ve spoken to regard as inexplicable. Mr Gimple says he relied upon Mr Bailey. Mr Bailey has not responded to our queries at all.

    I’ve copied below the full text of my letter. A PDF version is available here.


    ICAEW (Professional Conduct department)

    Metropolitan House

    321 Avebury Boulevard

    Milton Keynes, MK9 2FZ

    UK

    Sent by email: [email protected]/ to [email protected]

    Dear ICAEW

    Complaint re. Christopher Neil Bailey and Less Tax for Landlords

    I am the founder of Tax Policy Associates Ltd, a think tank established to improve tax policy and the public understanding of tax.

    I wish to make a complaint about Mr Christopher Neil Bailey, who is a member of the ICAEW. Mr Bailey founded and provided tax and accounting advice to Less Tax for Landlords Ltd (LT4L). The accounting and tax work for LT4L was undertaken by OCG Accountants Ltd, of which Mr Bailey is a director. OCG Accountants Ltd does not appear to be an ICAEW member firm, but we have seen accounts in which it stated that it was.

    LT4L promoted a tax avoidance scheme – the “hybrid partnership structure”. The scheme was promoted for years, and sold to over 400 clients. LT4L told potential clients they had “peace of mind” because their staff and businesses were regulated by (amongst others) the ICAEW. However the scheme had no reasonable prospect of success, and has now effectively been shut down by HMRC Spotlight 63.

    We set out full details in our report on LT4L, which is available at https://taxpolicy.org.uk/lt4l. Spotlight 63 was published the same day; it says the hybrid partnership scheme does not work and should have been disclosed under DOTAS. The following week, HMRC sent a “one to many” letter inviting users of the scheme to make a disclosure by 31 January 2024.

    I would refer to you our report for the full background and analysis, but in short there are strong grounds for believing Mr Bailey breached the Code in several respects.

    First, Mr Bailey and his firm took a series of positions that anyone with tax expertise would have known were indefensible.

    At best, Mr Bailey failed to act with integrity, professional competence and due care; at worst, he may have committed fraud:

    1. The main supposed benefit of the “hybrid partnership” structure was to reallocate rental property income from an individual member of an LLP to a corporate member, therefore achieving a lower tax rate and interest deductibility. The obvious problem is that the “mixed partnership” rules were introduced in 2014 to counter this, and the transfer of income stream rules also likely apply. In this video, Mr Bailey misdescribes the mixed partnership rules and a recent case on those rules; similar errors/misdescriptions were made in numerous LT4L materials (documented in our report). These are errors that would not be made by anyone with a cursory knowledge of the rules, or who had read the case he cited.
    2. Mr Bailey promoted the LT4L scheme on the basis it could make a rental property business qualify for business relief from inheritance tax. In this video he says that the LLP would “turn into a trading business according to HMRC”. This claim is false, and anyone with even a cursory knowledge of inheritance tax or the “trading” concept would know that it was false. There are numerous other examples in our report of Less Tax for Landlords making the claim that their structure qualifies for business relief.
    3. LT4L make a claim, which we find incomprehensible, that the CGT base cost of assets entering an LLP are rebased. These claims are false, and anybody with elementary knowledge of partnership taxation would know they are false. You can see an example of the claims in this video; there are more examples in our report.
    4. LT4L did not disclose their scheme under DOTAS. When we queried this, they responded with arguments that suggested they had no understanding of DOTAS. We set this out in more detail in our report.

    Each of the above failings: inheritance tax, mixed partnership rules, transfer of income stream rules, CGT, and DOTAS, is specifically identified by HMRC in Spotlight 63 as a failing of the “hybrid partnership” scheme.

    It should be noted that these are not merely technical errors in publicity material; there is good reason to believe LT4L implemented over 400 LLP structures on the basis of these misapplications of the law (we explain this in our report).

    We do not understand how a senior professional could have advanced, for years, a series of technical positions that anyone with tax expertise would have known were false, and to have implemented hundreds of structures on that basis. We have asked LT4L why they took these positions; they have declined to answer. One possibility is that Mr Bailey failed to act with professional competence. Another is that he knew the positions were false, and was committing a fraud on HMRC and on his clients. We do not know which is the case, and there may be other explanations.

    Second, even if the scheme had worked, it would be an artificial tax avoidance scheme contrary to the Code.

    As you are aware, the PCRT Fundamental Principles and Standards for Tax Planning requires that Members must not create, encourage or promote tax planning arrangements or structures that (i) set out to achieve results that are contrary to the clear intention of Parliament in enacting relevant legislation and/or (ii) are highly artificial or highly contrived and seek to exploit shortcomings within the relevant legislation.

    If the hybrid partnership scheme had worked as intended, and provided an inheritance tax exemption and the other claimed benefits, that would have been contrary to the clear intention of Parliament.

    Third, LT4L made a series of false claims about their professional indemnity insurance.

    LT4L claimed they were insured “up to £2m per case”.

    However, as is usual practice, their insurer’s standard terms include an “agglomeration” provision which means that, if LT4L make the same error across all their clients, the £2m will not be “per case”, but will be shared by all the clients.

    Furthermore, their insurer’s standard terms exclude “tax avoidance schemes”, and so it may be that their clients are completely uninsured.

    Finally, LT4L claimed in their marketing that their insurance would pay out if LT4L “lost in court with HMRC”. That is, as you will appreciate, not at all how professional indemnity insurance works.

    These false claims about insurance were specifically used to attract clients with the assurance that the structure carried no risk. We provide examples of the false claims in our report. No ICAEW member should make such false claims.

    Fourth, Mr Bailey and LT4L have an impossible conflict of interest and should cease to act for their clients

    Mr Bailey and LT4L are continuing to act for the clients to whom they sold the hybrid partnership structure. This is an impossible conflict of interest, of the type forbidden by the ICAEW guidance on identifying and managing conflicts.

    We expect it is in their clients’ interests to argue that they were mis-sold a hopeless tax scheme that never had any prospect of success, to disclose to HMRC before the 31 January 2024 deadline, and to reach a swift settlement with HMRC with minimal interest and penalties. It is, however, obviously not in LT4L’s interest to concede any of this.

    At this point an ethical accountant would decline to act, tell their clients that they should obtain independent advice, and assist in handing over files to successor firms.

    A further conflict is raised by the (at best) incompetent nature of LT4L’s prior advice; LT4L clearly do not have the technical tax ability to advise their clients, and should cease to act.

    The deadline

    The upcoming 31 January 2024 deadline makes this complaint urgent. If Mr Bailey and LT4L are permitted to continue mis-advising their clients and, as a consequence, the clients do not reach a favourable settlement with HMRC by 31 January 2024, then many of those clients will suffer significant financial loss.

    I would be grateful if you could acknowledge receipt of this letter. Do please let me know if you would like any further information.

  • Less Tax for Landlords: the £50m landlord tax avoidance scheme that HMRC say doesn’t work, and can trigger a mortgage default.

    Less Tax for Landlords: the £50m landlord tax avoidance scheme that HMRC say doesn’t work, and can trigger a mortgage default.

    Less Tax for Landlords is a high profile firm. They sponsor the National Landlord Investment Show and are promoted by the National Residential Landlords Association. They won the Property Reporter award for “Best Accounting & Tax Services 2023“. They’ve sold hundreds of landlords a “hybrid partnership” structure which is supposed to avoid income tax, capital gains tax, stamp duty land tax and inheritance tax. It’s flown under HMRC’s radar, and so avoided about £50m in tax to date. But in reality the scheme doesn’t work, and triggers significant additional taxes. HMRC have just confirmed this. Worse, the scheme will in many cases default the landlord’s mortgage.

    Our recent report on Property118 described their trust/company scheme as the worst avoidance scheme we’ve seen. The aim was to enable landlords to move their business to a company, and claim relief on their mortgage interest, without any of the commercial or tax downsides that would normally follow from that. The scheme fails, and likely triggers significant additional tax but, more seriously, in our view (and that of UK Finance) it likely defaults the client’s mortgage.

    A plausible explanation was that Property118 is a firm of salespeople with no legal or tax expertise. They are reliant for legal and tax advice on “Cotswold Barristers” – a genuine barristers’ chambers, but a rather peculiar one, with no specialist tax barristers. So it’s not surprising that their attempts to engineer a clever tax avoidance scheme ran awry.

    Less Tax for Landlords is different. On the face of it, they have a large, qualified and experienced team. However their explanations for their structure are nonsensical, and their structures will leave taxpayers in a complex mess – a potentially even worse outcome than Property118’s.

    Here’s the view of Ray McCann, a retired senior HMRC inspector and past President of the Chartered Institute of Taxation:

    “The Less Tax for Landlords structure is nonsense. It lures clients into what they may think are clever interpretations of the law – but actually LT4L are just plain wrong”

    And here’s HMRC’s view:

    HMRC’s view is that this scheme does not work. People who use these arrangements may have to pay more then the tax they tried to avoid as well as paying interest, penalties and high fees for using such schemes.

    Who are Less Tax for Landlords?

    They’re part of the One Consultancy Group, which includes an accounting firm (OCG Accountants), a mortgage broker (OCG Mortgages), an FCA regulated financial services firm (Phare Financial Services) and an SRA regulated law firm (OCG Legal). They say their tax services are provided by qualified professionals – solicitors, ICAEW and ACCA accountants, and STEP (trust and estate) practitioners:

    Less Tax for Landlords (LT4L) have an established industry profile. They sponsored the National Landlord Investment Show, were promoted by the National Residential Landlords Association, and appeared on panels at the Property Investment Show:

    Property Investor Show

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PROPERTY
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"State of The Market"

On the 4th October 2019 at the Property Investor Show, Less Tax 4 Landlords Founding Director Tony
Gimple was joined by Richard Blanco (NLA), David Cox (ARLA) and David Smith (RLA), with the debate
hosted by Kate Faulkner (BBC TV & Radio personality and Managing Director of Property Checklists).
Together they discussed the state of the property market, and you can watch the full debate | -

Each panellist gave their thoughts on key topics including the impact of Brexit on the property
market, issues such as the abolition of Section 21 and there was even a discussion on the pros and cons of
Rent to Rent.

On tax, Tony pointed out that 58% of landlords had reported their 2017-8 tax bill was higher than the
previous year, a direct result of $24. Only one in eight landlords had consulted a specialist tax adviser for
help. This was one area all the panel agreed on; landlords and investors should seek specialist advice as

it’s important to get help before future tax changes come fully into effect.
    Helping Landiords Rud, Run & Grow Professional Property Susinesees

Structure your Property Portfolio as a Business
    @ National Landlord Investment Show
8 March 2023 -@

Last few tickets remaining for our London Show at Old Billingsgate on 14th March sponsored by
Less Tax 4 Landlords. Register for your free tickets here https://tinyurl.... See more

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‘Tax & Estate Planning Consultants:

    They won the Property Reporter award for “Best Accounting & Tax Services 2023”:

    And here’s the typical LT4L scheme. This is from a document sent to a potential client this year:

    This is a very complicated-looking structure for a medium-sized property rental business.

    It is supposed to work like this:

    • The landlords (say a married couple) establish a limited liability partnership (LLP).
    • The landlords become members of the LLP.
    • The landlords declare a trust over their properties in favour of the LLP.
    • The landlords establish a company which becomes a member of the LLP (or, in some cases, the company becomes a member earlier, at the same time as the landlords).
    • The landlords hold A shares in the company, giving them voting rights. Their children acquire B shares in the company, which carry rights to all the increases in value in the company (“growth shares”).
    • The LLP diverts most of its profit to the company.

    The claimed benefits are much more impressive than Property118’s:

    • No need to tell the mortgage lender.
    • After two years, the structure is entirely exempt from inheritance tax thanks to business property relief (BPR).
    • The diversion of LLP profits to the company means rental income is taxed at the corporate rate of 19-25%.
    • The trust means the landlords’ obligation to make mortgage payments “shifts to the LLP”, meaning the company as LLP member obtains full tax relief for mortgage interest. The “section 24” restriction on landlords claiming tax relief is avoided.
    • No CGT or SDLT on establishment, without needing to qualify for any special reliefs.
    • The properties are “rebased” for capital gains tax. In other words, when they’re sold, only the capital gain after incorporation of the LLP is taxed. Pre-incorporation gains disappear.
    • Instead of taking profits out of the LLP, you can take capital out instead, and you won’t be taxed.
    • There’s no need to disclose the structure to HMRC.
    • If the structure triggers unexpected tax, LT4L’s clients are protected by an unusual insurance arrangement:

    In reality, every aspect of the structure fails:

    • Declaring a trust over the rental properties without the mortgage lender’s consent (or even telling them) will in most cases default the mortgage. The structure was described to us by an experienced broker as “almost unmortgageable”.
    • Rental property businesses don’t qualify for inheritance tax business property relief. The LLP structure doesn’t change that.
    • The mortgage obligation doesn’t “shift to the LLP”. It remains with the landlords – who now lose their 20% credit.
    • The “mixed partnership” rules mean you can’t get a tax benefit by allocating profits to a corporate partner in an LLP.
    • The allocation of profits to the corporate partner means there will be up-front capital gains tax. There’s no CGT rebasing.
    • SDLT will be due at the point that income profits are allocated to the corporate member. LT4L’s unusual structuring potentially results in a higher SDLT liability than would result from a simple incorporation.
    • The structure can incur additional SDLT every time the profit allocation changes. LT4L’s clients could have unknowingly racked up years of SDLT liabilities.
    • The structure is disclosable under DOTAS, the rules requiring tax avoidance schemes to be disclosed to HMRC.
    • Members are taxed on profits as they are made; when and how they are taken out is irrelevant. This is a basic principle of LLP taxation.
    • There is no special “written note” from LT4L’s insurers. They just have the usual professional indemnity insurance. To get any benefit from that you have to: lose a dispute with HMRC, sue LT4L (with the insurers arguing LT4L’s case, not yours), and win. This is not easy, even if (as we believe) LT4L’s advice is plain wrong.

    Advisers and potential clients have been challenging LT4L on these issues for years, and – when they have received an answer – it suggests LT4L are making a series of serious legal and tax mistakes. The response we received from LT4L also suggested LT4L are advising in areas where they fundamentally misunderstand the law.

    It’s therefore our opinion that the structure has no realistic prospect of success. It will leave LT4L’s clients in a very difficult position with their mortgage lender and HMRC.

    Given LT4L’s high profile, we set out all these issues in detail below. We will publish any further response we receive from LT4L.

    What is the scale of this?

    Here’s Less Tax for Landlord’s illustration of a typical tax saving:

    That accords with the figures we’ve seen in advice they’ve provided to clients – typical tax savings or (to be more accurate) tax avoided of £40-50k/year.

    Less Tax for Landlords have registered 440 LLPs since 2016:

    That suggests that, over the life of these LLPs, about £50m of income tax has been avoided.

    The mortgage default

    Our report on Property118 set out in detail why declaring a trust over rental properties, without the consent of the mortgage lender (or even telling them) in our view likely defaults the landlord’s mortgage.

    More importantly than our view is the view of UK Finance, the representative body for mortgage lenders:

    “If someone wishes to transfer ownership of a buy to let property they should contact their lender to discuss whether this is permitted under the terms of any mortgage on the property. Transferring ownership of a property into a trust without informing your lender and seeking their consent would most likely be a breach of a mortgage’s terms and conditions.”

    We believe UK Finance are right on this. But even if we didn’t agree, we’d suggest that it’s not a good idea to enter into a structure which your lender believes most likely breaches the terms of your mortgage.

    We put this point to LT4L. They said:

    “Whilst having a similar impact [to Property118], we do not use a declaration of trust, just a simple letter of trust. The relationship between the individual member and the LLP is registered with HMRC via the Trust Registration Service.”

    A “letter of trust” is a “declaration of trust”. Registration with HMRC is irrelevant to the legal analysis. This answer suggests LT4L do not understand the nature of a trust. 

    They go on:

    “The letter of trust operates to ensure that the contractual rights of the lender are preserved and not prejudiced such that the trust operates in a manner that the rights of the beneficiaries are subordinate to those of the lender.”

    This is irrelevant. The question is whether the trust breaches a requirement in the mortgage T&Cs to obtain lender consent. In most cases it will.

    In our experience full disclosure to lenders is always the best policy and our mortgage team constantly discuss with lenders the ever-changing landscape in the mortgage market. Through these discussions we are well aware of which lenders are happy to accept the structure and those that don’t.

    We would never advise a client not to tell their mortgage company. If any client is unsure whether the use of this structure may affect their mortgage conditions they can, and do, ask us, and we will provide professional advice on that matter.”

    Property118 and LT4L have a slightly different emphasis here. Property118 announce with confidence (but wrongly) that there is no need to tell the lender, or obtain its consent. LT4L seem more cautious around the point – they say above that they “never advise a client not to tell their mortgage company”, but the lender wasn’t informed in any of the specific LT4L LLPs we’ve investigated. LT4L’s founder has also made some very bold (and incorrect) statements on the subject.

    This shouldn’t be a surprise, because the entire purpose of the trust structure is to circumvent the need to obtain lender consent. It serves no other purpose. The transaction would be more straightforward if the landlord just sold the properties to the LLP.

    LT4L say their in-house mortgage broker can obtain mortgages for the LLP structure, but they will be specialised products. The unusual combination of a trust and an LLP was described to us by an experienced broker as “almost unmortgageable”.

    Inheritance tax

    Less Tax for Landlords say that a standard company holding rental property is subject to inheritance tax, but their “mixed partnership” structure is not.

    The claims

    Here’s LT4L’s founder, Tony Gimple (now retired):

    “[B]ecause the HMRC recognizes that there is a trading relationship between you all, and that you’ve got a written business plan and that you’re managing it and that your sole purpose is not to avoid tax but to maximize your wealth to tax efficiently as possible, the whole thing becomes inheritance tax free.”

    A trading relationship between the participants, a business plan, not having a tax avoidance purpose – all these things are irrelevant to whether inheritance tax applies.

    This is from a June 2021 webinar:

    “The LLP structure that we set up is not investing in property. It does not own the property. The property is owned by the individuals. The LLP has taken advantage of that ownership and it is available… after two years, that LLP turns into a trading business according to HMRC, not according to us, according to HMRC. And at that point, after two years, the equity of those properties inside that LLP are then outside of the estate for inheritance tax after two years. “

    The LLP does have beneficial ownership of the property. The LLP does not “turn into a trading business”. HMRC has certainly not said that.

    From that same webinar:

    “It is outside of your estate for inheritance tax, as long as you tick various boxes”

    There are no “boxes” you can tick, literally or figuratively. As we discuss further below, whether an inheritance tax exemption applies is a question of substance.

    And:

    Mixed partnership income is not “treated as trading income” (and it would be irrelevant if it was).

    And on their website, right now:

    The reality

    HMRC say this doesn’t work.

    HMRC are, of course, right.

    There is an exemption from inheritance tax for certain business property – business property relief (BPR).

    Under section 105(3) of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984, a business won’t benefit from BPR if it consists wholly or mainly of one or more of the following: dealing in securities, stocks or shares, land or buildings, or making or holding investments. When an individual holds real estate through an LLP, they are treated as if they held the real estate directly.

    Almost all property rental businesses consist of holding “investments” (the real estate), and so fail to qualify for BPR. Taxpayers have failed to qualify for BPR even for an actively managed business of letting holiday cottages; in the words of the recent Grace Joyce Graham judgment, it is only “the exceptional letting business which falls on the non-investment side of the line”. In the Graham case, the deceased “lavished” personal care on guests, including making them home-made food, providing them with fresh crab and fish, arranging linen and towels, making cream teas, and organising weddings and other events. The Tribunal thought this was an “exceptional” case but that, even then, it only “just” qualified for BPR.

    It’s a question of substance, not legal structuring. So, unless the original rental business was itself “exceptional”, the LLP structure won’t benefit from BPR. There is no inheritance tax benefit to the structure.

    This is all well known to tax advisers in this area.

    Here’s a summary of the position from the Chartered Institute of Taxation:

    13.2 Reliefs
There are no special reliefs from inheritance tax for let property.
Business property relief (BPR) can apply to the value of assets used wholly or mainly for the purposes of a business.
However, property letting is not regarded as a business for these purposes. Property held wholly or mainly as an
investment will not qualify for BPR (s 105(3) IHTA 1984).
Although a furnished holiday lettings (FHL) business is a deemed trade, it is unlikely to qualify for BPR. To qualify
for BPR the FHL business needs to provide a level of services over and above that which would be expected from a
landlord. This was explored in Pawson (dec) v HMRC [2012] UKFTT 51 (TC) where the executors of the estate won
the argument for BPR to be given at the First-tier Tribunal, but this was overturned at the Upper Tribunal, and leave
to appeal was refused.
The level and type of services needed to make holiday accommodation into a business qualifying for BPR may be
achieved in the case of a caravan park or seasonal short lets where catering, entertainment and other services are
also provided. However, HMRC are very uneasy about granting such relief and will refer any case concerning FHL
property to their technical team (litigation).
Where the accommodation is merely furnished and no other services are provided to the tenants, HMRC conclude
in their inheritance manual: “In most cases the level of services provided will not be sufficient to weigh the balance
away from ‘investment’” (IHTM 25276).

    Over the years, numerous advisers have challenged LT4L on this point – we’ve seen emails and transcripts of calls where LT4L simply refuse to answer questions on the subject (and there’s a public example of this here).

    We have spoken to numerous inheritance tax specialists – KCs, academics, accountants and solicitors – and they are mystified by LT4L’s claims. One eminent KC described LT4L’s approach as “mad and hopeless”.

    Less Tax for Landlords’ response

    We do not work with all landlords, at least not in relation to a Mixed Partnership structure, and for those we do work with, we look to help them commercialise their operation and introduce more trading activity into their business model.

    The BPR test as you know is about being ‘wholly or mainly’ involved in trading activity.

    You can’t “introduce more trading activity” into a rental property business and qualify for business property relief. The scale and sophistication of the business is irrelevant. Only the “exceptional” property rental business will qualify for BPR ).

    Regarding [their claim that “mixed partnership income is trading income”], we assume that your quote was taken from a slide last used in 2019? It is not a correct statement hence it hasn’t been used for a number of years.

    What is true to say though is that we have had correspondence with HMRC where they have agreed that the partnership income received from the LLP is treated as trading income and as such, the clients pay the appropriate Class 2 and Class 4 National Insurance contributions.

    Despite the denial in that first paragraph, it seems from the second (and the material referenced above) that LT4L do believe their structure somehow creates trading income (it doesn’t), and that trading income means BPR would apply (it wouldn’t).

    It is possible that HMRC might have accepted a position of “trading” for income tax purposes – that would be technically wrong, but HMRC would have no reason to scrutinise the position too heavily. It does not follow that HMRC has accepted BPR status and in any case, the classification of the profit share in the hands of the partner of the LLP for the purposes of his or her national insurance contributions does not automatically extend to other taxes, and has no relevance for the purposes of determining whether BPR will apply for the purposes of inheritance tax.  As a result, any clearance received on the income tax position cannot be relied upon for BPR purposes. All the advisers we spoke to believed HMRC would resist such a claim.

    LT4L have claimed that they have had clients who died and whose estates successfully claimed BPR. Unless those clients were actually managing a hotel (or similar BPR-qualified business), we do not see how that was possible. Either HMRC made a serious mistake or – more likely – LT4L failed to disclose the reality of the business to HMRC. In such a case, HMRC would have at least six years to investigate, and potentially twenty years.

    Mixed partnership rules

    A key element in the LT4L structure is that the rental properties are sold to the LLP by the landlord, who becomes a member of the LLP. The landlord also sets up a company, which becomes a member of the LLP. Then, despite the fact the landlord contributed all the value to the LLP, profits are disproportionately allocated to the company. Which is the LT4L “special sauce” – the company supposedly gets to fully deduct the mortgage interest from its profits.

    The standard LT4L LLP agreement is explicit that profit can be allocated between the members however they like:

    And:

    Most people would describe this as tax avoidance – profits are being artificially allocated to one member of an LLP solely for tax reasons. And rules were introduced in 2014 to counter this – the “mixed partnership rules”.

    These rules (broadly speaking) stop partnerships and LLPs allocating income to different partners in a way that obtains a tax advantage. The effect of the rules is (essentially) to undo any allocation to an LLP member that exceeds a commercial return on the capital or services the member provided. That is a big problem for the LT4L structure, because the corporate LLP member is receiving a large profit share, creating a tax advantage, when it provided no capital and provided no services.

    LT4L clearly sense there’s an issue here, because they created a video to specifically address the point:

    ” In all our cases we ensure that all our LLPs have proper business planning and they have reasons for doing what they do. In simple terms, if these are followed then the mixed partnership rules which were built to stop tax avoidance will not apply to the partnerships because they are used for business purposes. HMRC quite rightly are attempting to stop tax avoidance. “

    That’s their consistent line:

    As I said all the way through my presentation, there are rules that HMRC have put in place to stop people using the structure for tax avoidance reasons. So everything that you do has got to be business generated and has got to be in line with the business objectives where the business is going. If that’s the case, then what’s being referred to here are what’s called the mixed partnership rules that came out in 2014 and those rules relate to people where the main reason for dealing with the structure is tax avoidance. Clearly, it’s not the case with our clients because of because of the business structures that we put in place and therefore, we are outside of those rules.”

    The same approach is set out in a “technical FAQ” that LT4L circulated in 2022:

    And in this recent presentation:

    So, in short, the LT4L answer is that there’s no need to worry about the 2014 legislation, unless there is a “tax motivation”. This is hopelessly wrong as a matter of tax law. It’s also a bit silly, when it’s clear their profit allocation to the corporate member of the LLP is entirely tax motivated.

    The rules don’t contain a motive or purpose test.

    In the LT4L structure, the corporate member provides no capital and no services – it follows that all the profits allocated to it will be reversed by the mixed-partnership rules. The overall commerciality (or not) of the structure isn’t relevant.

    There has been one decided case on the mixed partnership rules, Walewksi. LT4L say they’ve read the judgment “very carefully“, and have a video specifically on the case:

    “the court found that the structure was set up purely for tax evasion or tax avoidance”

    This is false, and suggests LT4L didn’t in fact read the case. The taxpayer’s own advisers said the application of the rules wasn’t dependent on a tax avoidance purpose:

    LT4L appear to believe that it was the lack of documentation which sunk Mr Walewski’s structure:

    This is not correct – the problem was that the allocation of profit to the company didn’t reflect capital or services it had provided. LT4L’s structure has exactly the same problem. Documentation won’t solve this, and you can’t manufacture “real commerciality”.

    We have spoken to numerous advisers who have made these points to LT4L and received no response. There is a typical exchange here.

    None of the positions above are controversial or difficult; they reflect the general view of tax advisers on the mixed partnership rules. We are aware of one instance, soon after the rules came into force in 2014, where an experienced adviser sought a clearance from HMRC on facts somewhat similar to LT4L’s, in the hope that HMRC would not apply the rules literally. HMRC’s response was that they would, and the mixed partnership rules applied.

    And HMRC now has a public statement saying the same thing:

    LT4L’s response

    We asked LT4L why their material referred to the purpose or justification of a structure, when that wasn’t relevant to the mixed partnership rules. We mentioned one example where they had said the rules only apply “where you are doing a hybrid structure purely for tax motivated reasons”. This was their reply:

    “This should not be the words being used and we would look to review any literature to ensure that it is stated correctly.

    GAAR [the UK’s general anti-abuse rule] states that tax arrangements are abusive if they are arrangements, the entering into, or carrying out of which, cannot reasonably be regarded as a reasonable course of action in relation to the relevant tax provisions taking into account all of the circumstances.

    In HMRC’s policy paper published 28/3/2014 it clearly states that the legislation is being introduced to remove the tax advantages gained by tax motivated profit allocations.

    There are always commercial reasons motivating the incorporation into this structure, and the structure provides the Client with options to consider including, but not limited to, commercial opportunities, flexibility, and business continuity.”

    This is all rather alarming:

    • LT4L use the same formulation in dozens of documents that we’ve seen, all of their videos, and a document titled “technical FAQ”. This isn’t a one-off mistake. The most charitable view is that LT4L have completely misunderstood the rules.
    • The reference to the GAAR is irrelevant, and it’s hard to understand why a tax professional would mention the GAAR in this context.
    • In this response and in the FAQ, LT4L refer to a March 2014 policy paper that discussed the mixed partnership rules, then in draft. The legislation was enacted on 17 July 2014, and the final version of the rules was not limited to “tax motivated profit allocations”. Why are LT4L advising clients on the basis of an out-of-date policy paper, and not by reference to the actual legislation?
    • The fact there are “commercial reasons” as well as a tax motive doesn’t escape most anti-avoidance rules. But, for this particular rule, the existence (or not) of a tax motive is irrelevant. The question is whether the return to the corporate member is commercially justified given the capital and services it has provided.

    Transfer of income stream rules

    We would add in passing that the transfer of income stream rules may also apply. LT4L have said the rules won’t apply to a commercial structure, but only to “purely tax-motivated transactions”. We don’t believe that is an accurate way to describe “main purpose” tests, and in any case not all of the rules are subject to a main purpose test. The rules are complicated and, given the LT4L structure has already failed so comprehensively, we won’t go into them in detail, but HMRC agree there is a problem:

    Tax treatment of the mortgage payments

    You can declare a trust over assets. You can’t declare a trust over obligations. This creates a problem when promoters try to circumvent section 24 by using a trust to “move” interest payments from a landlord to a company. We discussed these issues in detail for the Property118 structure.

    In the LT4L structure, the landlord remains the borrower under the mortgage. Property118 argued (incorrectly) the landlord was the company’s agent.

    We have evidence of LT4L saying to another adviser that, under the Letter of Trust, the payment obligation “shifts to the LLP”, hence the members of the LLP can claim a deduction “through” the LLP. This is not possible as a legal matter. Furthermore, there is nothing in LT4L’s standard trust document even purporting to achieve the kind of agency or indemnity result that Property118 claim to achieve:

    Accordingly, at present we see no basis for the LLP members to claim a deduction (even an arguable one). The mortgage obligation remains with the landlords – but as they no longer hold a beneficial interest in property, they lose their 20% credit.

    We would also query several elements of the letter:

    • Why does it say the landlord received the property “free from any and all obligations” when it’s mortgaged?
    • Why does it say the landlord will transfer legal title to the LLP when required, when the mortgage prevents him doing that?
    • Why does it say the landlord won’t present himself to any third party as the beneficial owner, when he will present himself to the mortgage lender, insurance company, tenants, letting agent etc as the beneficial owner?

    All of this adds to the sense that this is an uncommercial and artificial structure.

    Capital gains tax

    The claim from LT4L is that, when the landlord sells the rental properties into the LLP, he’s the only member of the LLP and so there’s no change in ownership and no CGT. Better still, your rental properties are “rebased” so, when the LLP later sells the properties, you’re only taxed on the gain after the LLP is incorporated:

    “Capital gains tax is mitigated or at least seriously reduced on entry to the LLP. Your market value is re-based. Technically it’s done every year but we just focus on the market value on the date of incorporation. So it’s the date when all the legal work takes place and your LLP is up and running and the LLP is now taking responsibility for the accountancy side of the of the business. So when you make that move into the LLP there’s no capital gains or stamp duty to pay at that point. There is no change of title, legal title, so the properties state in your own name.”

    These two claims are contradictory. If there’s no change in beneficial ownership, and the sale to the LLP is a capital gains tax “nothing”, then how can there be a re-basing?.

    Here’s Tony Gimple, again:

    Mixed Partnership Income is treated as trading income

    “Here’s the kicker: mixed partnership Income is treated as trading income. It’s why HMRC say if at some point you ever want to incorporate, go into a partnership first. Because it’s trading income and only trading businesses get Section 162 incorporation relief.”

    These are non-sequiturs. There is nothing special about mixed partnership income which treats it as trading income. You qualify for incorporation relief if you are a “business” – there is no need to be trading. There is no transfer by the LLP, and so no application of incorporation relief. We’re not aware of anyone from HMRC saying anything like “if you ever want to incorporate, go into a partnership first”.

    And here is the same claim on their website:

    CGT SAVINGS ON A WELL-TIMED INCORPORATION
Perhaps counter-intuitively, for those that do intend to reduce debt on their portfolio by selling property in the coming decade, giving up tax-savings today and delaying a business restructure further might make sense.

This is because incorporating a business to a company or limited liability partnership can defer any gains made since acquiring the property from being taxed until you either a) dispose of your interest in the business, or b) die – at which point Inheritance Tax takes over (which can be planned for separately).

This means that property can be sold within the business and the gain taxed based on the value of the property at the date of incorporation, rather than the date of the original purchase.

Such a rebasing of assets could help reduce capital gains tax (CGT) to the absolute minimum for landlords that have the foresight to act sufficiently in advance – typically recommended to be at least 18-24 months or so before any sales.

    None of this is true. Here’s what actually happens:

    • When they allocate partnership income to the corporate partner, that may be a change in the partners’ fractional interests in the LLP’s assets, and that may be a capital gains tax disposal event – the landlord is disposing of part of his interest in the rental properties, and the company is acquiring it. That could trigger immediate CGT for the landlord.
    • There is no rebasing. The individual landlord remains the owner of the properties (save to the extent there’s been an allocation to the corporate partner). When rental properties are sold, it’s just a straightforward CGT disposal by the individual landlord, so she is taxed on all the gain since her original purchase (and the company is taxed on its (probably much smaller) gain since it acquired its fractional interest).

    HMRC agree:

    This is a much worse result than if the landlord simply sold her business to the company in the usual way, because then (subject to qualifying as a “business”) incorporation relief could apply – there would be no up-front CGT and the assets would be rebased.

    Stamp duty land tax

    LT4L say there is no SDLT on the establishment of their structure, because there is no change in ownership – the landlords still own the property “through” the LLP.

    That is, however, not how the rules work.

    The LLP’s beneficial interest in the property means it is a “property investment partnership” for SDLT purposes. That results in a charge to SDLT on a change in income profit sharing entitlement under Finance Act 2003 Schedule 15 paragraph 14 – even if there is no change in the entitlement to capital:

    One might expect the result to be the SDLT the structure is avoiding – i.e. SDLT on the share of profit to which the company is now entitled. However in fact the charge could be much higher than this, especially for high value portfolios holding low value properties, because of the loss of multiple dwellings relief.

    This is a surprising result, so it’s helpful to step through an example.

    A UK resident married couple have a portfolio of 30 let residential properties worth £6m. They wish to put the properties into an LLP with an 80% share of the income profit going to their limited company.

    If they did this directly, the LLP would pay SDLT on chargeable consideration of £4.8m (80% of £6m) which would be:

    • £229,500 if they took the default of applying non-residential rates,
    • but potentially reduced to £144,000 by claiming multiple dwellings relief.

    LT4L think their structure avoids the £144,000. Their strategy involves the following steps:

    • The properties are first introduced by the couple to the LLP.
    • After the property is introduced, the company is added as a member of the LLP.
    • The members subsequently agree that the company is to have an income profits share of 80%.

    Under the SDLT provisions for property investment partnerships, there is chargeable consideration of £4.8m at the point the income profit share is adjusted. HMRC take the view that MDR is not available for this form of charge, so the SDLT would on the face of it be charged at £229,500 (using non-residential rates). This is significant increase on the £144,000 charge if a more direct approach had been taken.

    But it could be much worse. HMRC might go further, and argue that residential rates apply (without MDR still being available). On chargeable consideration of £4.8m this would mean SDLT of £487,250 – more than double the expected charge.

    And even worse: LT4L’s LLP agreement and promotional videos suggest you can flexibly change profit-sharing ratios. Each time you do that, there could be a new SDLT charge under paragraph 14. LT4L’s clients could have unknowingly racked up years of SDLT liabilities.

    This is a terrible result for the landlords – and HMRC could challenge their position at any time in the next 20 years, and then collect the tax, interest, and a tax-geared penalty.

    It would be better for the landlords if HMRC simply applied the SDLT anti-avoidance rule in section 75A Finance Act 2003 – that would just undo the SDLT benefit of LT4L’s two-stage approach, and charge the £144,000 that the structure tries to avoid. However, if we are correct that paragraph 14 applies as above, then section 75A cannot apply.

    HMRC’s Spotlight doesn’t mention the SDLT issues yet, but we expect HMRC will have no difficulty identifying the points.

    Failure to disclose to HMRC

    Most tax avoidance schemes are required to be disclosed to HMRC under the “DOTAS” rules. The idea is that a promoter who comes up with a scheme has to disclose it to HMRC. HMRC will then give them a “scheme reference number”, which they have to give to clients, and those clients have to put on their tax return. It’s the tax equivalent of putting a “kick me” sign on your back, because the expected HMRC response is to challenge the scheme and pursue the taxpayers for the tax.

    For this reason, promoters of tax avoidance schemes typically don’t disclose, even though they should. This is often on the basis of tenuous legal and factual arguments, to which the courts have given short shrift.

    LT4L provided us with both a tenuous factual argument and a tenuous legal one.

    Their tenuous factual argument was to deny that one of the main benefits of their structure is the tax advantage. This is surprising given that the only reason to use an LLP rather than a company is the supposed tax benefits. It is also surprising given the name of their company. They responded that their name was merely a marketing term, and the “Less Tax for Landlords” company doesn’t undertake work itself. This isn’t terribly persuasive.

    Their tenuous legal argument was that LT4L can’t be a “promoter” within DOTAS, because they “are not in any extent responsible for the design of a ‘scheme’”. This is, however, not what the legislation says. The legal test isn’t whether there is a “scheme” but whether there’s an “arrangement”, and any series of transactions is an arrangement. So the LT4L structures are an “arrangement”, and LT4L are responsible for the design.

    Once we’ve established there’s a tax main benefit, and that LT4L are a promoter, the only question is whether one of the DOTAS “hallmarks” is present. There are several candidates:

    In addition: if (as seems likely) one of the main benefits of the structure is gaining an SDLT advantage compared to a vanilla incorporation, then the SDLT disclosure regime may apply (for which there are no hallmarks).

    HMRC’s Spotlight also suggests DOTAS applies:

    If the structure should have been disclosed under DOTAS, then LT4L’s failure to do so means they may be liable for penalties of up to £1m.

    LT4L fail to understand the basic principles of partnership taxation

    An LLP is essentially taxed as a partnership. The essence of partnership taxation is that members are taxed on their share of the partnership’s profits. Whether it’s actually paid out to them is irrelevant, as is the way it’s paid out. Members are taxed when the LLP makes the profit.

    We’ve received reports from advisers who have recently heard LT4L say the opposite: that members are only taxed on profits distributed to them. LT4L then engineer a structure where profits aren’t returned (but capital returned instead) and claim it saves tax. This is “not even wrong“.

    We would find these reports hard to believe, but Tony Gimple, LT4L’s founder, is on record saying that an LLP member is only taxed on distributed profits.

    “Partnerships don’t pay tax on income only on distributed profits. But you have this million pounds sitting on the balance sheet. So instead of taking your 100,000 pounds a year in income, HMRC allows you to treat that as a return of capital. As a direct result of that, it is not subject to income tax. You may choose to take some income in order to pay tax.”

    And that wasn’t a one-off:

    “LLP’s don’t pay tax – it is the recipient of a distributed profit who pays the tax”

    It is incredible that a firm is selling a structure based around an LLP, when its founder doesn’t understand the basics of partnership taxation.

    We are concerned that LT4Ls may have taken “tax free” capital out of their LLPs, not realising that they were fully taxable on the underlying profits.

    Insurance

    Tony Gimple, LT4L’s founder, made this claim about their insurance:

    We provide full insurance for our clients for all services rendered (both fee insurance and Professional Indemnity insurance) and have a written note from our  insurers stating that they are happy to cover all interest, penalties and extra tax (over and above that tax which would have been payable in any case) that is payable if HMRC investigate a business structure and do not agree with the way that it has been set up/conducted.

    This is not at all how insurance of this kind works. If a client follows LT4L’s advice and HMRC do not agree with the tax treatment, then LT4L’s insurers will not simply pay over the tax. The client would have to commence a court claim for negligence against LT4L. The insurers would then (assuming the claim is covered) likely require LT4L to defend the claim (and usually take over the conduct of the defence). Only if the client prevails, and is awarded damages (or achieves a settlement) would the insurers pay. That is, needless to say, not straightforward – professional negligence claims are usually difficult, and proving that the advice was unreasonable is only one part of the claimant’s burden.

    We’ve seen a copy of LT4L’s professional indemnity insurance, and it is completely standard. There is no written note from the insurers saying they are happy to cover everything. Professional indemnity insurance gives you comfort that, if you do pursue and win a claim against your advisers, someone will be there to pay up. It does nothing more than that.

    We asked LT4L about Tony Gimple’s statement. They said they recognised it could be construed as misleading, but the purpose “was to deal with ‘noise’ that was being generated on social media at that time”. It is unclear why dealing with “noise” justifies an untrue claim.

    It is also not a one-off. Gimple said something similar before:

    It is fair to note that Gimple retired from LT4L in 2020. But his claims continue to be repeated – here’s LTFL’s Head of Estate Planning:

    “You also will be covered by our personal indemnity insurance. Our insurance is designed to return you to the place that you would have been had you never engaged with us. So it just ensures that although it won’t pay for example any tax that you would have paid if you didn’t do this. If any additional tax occurs because you engage with us it would cover that. It would cover any fines, any penalties and any further advice and also it would cover us to help you argue if HMRC ever had any issues and looked into this. It would help cover our costs and our fees for us to legally argue and do the work on your behalf.”

    The same false claim – that the insurance would pay out if “any additional tax occurs because you engage” with LT4L.

    And again:

    “And then our insurance, we all have professional indemnity insurance, obviously. We’ve got two types, one PI cover, two million pounds a case. This is if we lose at court with HMRC. We also have what we call fees cover, and that covers any of the extra tax due, it covers any legal fees and it also covers any HMRC things like interest and penalties and everything like that.”

    All these claims are misleading. The insurers do not simply pay out if a client “loses at court with HMRC”. They’re missing the vital detail that you’d have to sue LT4L for negligence, and win.

    The claim that their insurance covers £2m per individual matter is also questionable. It will cover £2m per “claim”, and insurers will usually take the position that, if there are multiple liabilities to different clients, all resting on fundamentally the same point, then this is one “claim”. Often the policy wording expressly says this – here’s a standard form from LT4L’s own insurer:

    It is certainly unlikely that if, say, all 440 LLPs sued LT4L for the same failings, the insurer would agree to cover £880m.

    And LT4L’s insurer’s standard form also contains this exclusion:

    Which would could deny the claim entirely if the insurer can show the claim “relates to a tax avoidance scheme”. The term isn’t defined, but given everything we’ve written above, there must be a significant risk the exclusion applies.

    And finally there are a variety of reasons why the insurer could decline to pay up.

    We asked LT4L why they were making misleading claims about the nature of their insurance. The response was that they are “communicating practically and focusing on outcomes”. We don’t believe that’s fair, because the actual outcome (client has to sue LT4L, this is difficult, and insurers run LT4L’s defence) is entirely missing from their presentations.

    We also asked LT4L if their insurance had the claims and exclusion wording we’ve cited above. They didn’t respond.

    We would add for completeness that LT4L say they have fee insurance which covers taking a dispute with HMRC to the First Tier Tribunal. But LT4L don’t add the obvious point: if the client loses at the FTT and wishes to appeal, the client would have to pay their own fees.

    But LT4L say their clients have never been challenged by HMRC?

    The claim here is typical:

    We don’t know if this claim is true. But it’s hard to believe given the strength of the language in HMRC’s new Spotlight.

    But it is possible for schemes to “fly under the radar” if the true nature of the scheme is never properly disclosed to HMRC, and we expect that is what’s happened here.

    If that’s right, then HMRC would have at least six years to investigate an LT4L structure, and potentially twenty years (given the failure to disclose under DOTAS).

    What if you’ve implemented this structure?

    HMRC suggest contacting HMRC. They really have to say that, but we would instead suggest you first seek advice from an independent tax professional, in particular a tax lawyer or an accountant who is a member of a regulated tax body (e.g. ACCA, ATT, CIOT, ICAEW, ICAS or STEP). Given the potential for a mortgage default, we would also suggest you urgently seek advice from a solicitor experienced with trusts and mortgages/real estate finance (e.g. a member of STEP).

    We would strongly advise against approaching Less Tax for Landlords given their apparent lack of understanding of the rules, and the obvious potential for a conflict of interest.

    We’d also be interested in hearing from you, but unfortunately we cannot provide advice. In some cases we will be able to discuss the technical points discussed in this article with advisers.

    Next steps

    We hope HMRC will now investigate LT4L for what appears to be a serious failure to comply with DOTAS, and open enquiries and/or discovery assessments into its structures (which are easily to identify via Companies House).

    We will be writing to the ICAEW, FCA, STEP and the SRA asking them to investigate those involved for promoting tax avoidance schemes that realistically have no prospect of success.

    We will also be asking to the FCA raising a wider point about regulated firms’ involvement in aggressive and technically hopeless tax avoidance.


    A large number of experienced tax advisers contributed to this report. Thanks to D and J for their inheritance tax analysis, B for the LLP and mixed partnership analysis, P and R for preparing the first draft, G, M and E for their detailed review of the structure, S and Sean Randall (Chair of the Stamp Taxes Practitioners Group and one of the leading advisers on SDLT) for their specialist SDLT input (and S also for exhaustively reviewing for errors), E for challenging potential weaknesses and errors, Pete Miller (who literally wrote the book on many of the taxes discussed in this report) and Ray McCann (former senior HMRC inspector and past President of the Chartered Institute of Taxation).

    Thanks also to all the people who provided us with information and documentation on Less Tax Landlord’s structure. Very little in this report is new – advisers have been making these points for years.

    Footnotes

    1. Less Tax for Landlords Ltd appears to be just used for marketing; all the work is undertaken by employees of other group members. In the interest of clarity, this report will refer throughout to LT4L. ↩︎

    2. The descriptions of LT4L’s structure and approach in this report are based on statements made by LT4L on their websites, videos and web forums, as well as reports with advisers who’ve spoken to LT4L’s representatives, and reports from and documents provided by potential and actual LT4L clients. Our understanding is not complete and, in particular, we do not understand the rationale for the debt that LT4L often puts in place between the LLP and its members – the nature of an LLP is such that this is unlikely to create a tax benefit, and could trigger additional tax (particularly SDLT under the very awkward debt repayment rule in Schedule 15 para 17A Finance Act 2003). ↩︎

    3. We’ve seen numerous almost identical examples going back several years. The only edits we’ve made to this are to mask the figures to protect our source. ↩︎

    4. This is fairly standard planning, provided the “growth” shares only become valuable once a growth “hurdle” is reached, say a 20% increase in the value of the business, measured from the date the shares were issued. That makes it much harder for HMRC to claim the growth shares have value on day one (which could have adverse inheritance tax and CGT consequences). However, in the case of LT4L and Property 118, there is no hurdle, and the structure may well be vulnerable to challenge. ↩︎

    5. The rate is 19% for profits under £50,000, with a “catch-up rate” of 26.5% on profits up to £250,000, so that the overall effective rate smoothly transitions into the full rate of 25%. ↩︎

    6. It is possible that some are “normal” LLPs which don’t use the “hybrid” structure described in this report, but we randomly sampled 20 LLPs and each of their accounts were consistent with the hybrid structure. We excluded the earliest five LLPs, as they appear to be unrelated. ↩︎

    7. The methodology was simply to take each LLP, multiply £40k by the number of years it had been in existence, then total those figures. ↩︎

    8. There will also be a much larger figure of SDLT and CGT avoided on the establishment of the structure. The word “avoided” here is not quite correct, because the structure does not achieve the intended result. “Attempted avoidance” is perhaps more accurate. ↩︎

    9. You can find the full versions of some of these videos on YouTube; most are freely available on the LT4L website once you’ve registered (but that means we can’t link to them). All the videos are © Less Tax for Landlords, and republished by us for the purposes of fair dealing/criticism, and in the public interest. The webinar video was hosted by Benham & Reeves; they asked us to remove their logo from the video, and we agreed to that. Many people in the landlord real estate world cosseted and promoted Less Tax for Landlords; Benham & Reeves are a long way from being the worst offender. ↩︎

    10. Also: The Duke of Westminster case hasn’t been good law for decades. GAAP doesn’t “allow” (or indeed “not allow”) particular business structures. The “D” in DOTAS is not “Declaration”. ↩︎

    11. That’s a considerable simplification: LLPs and partnerships can make the BPR position worse in several respects, but they cannot convert a non-BPR business into a BPR business. ↩︎

    12. Or businesses which use the property as part of a business, e.g. a hotel or, in a recent case, a livery business. ↩︎

    13. The FAQ has other errors too. This is not a “power” of HMRC – it’s a rule that applies as part of the usual self-assessment rules. PwC is not a mixed partnership (and indeed professional partnerships rarely are mixed partnerships). The FAQ also cites the Duke of Westminster case, which hasn’t been good law for forty years. ↩︎

    14. In a case like this, where the individual partner has the “power to enjoy” the profits of the corporate partner, because he is connected to it. The key question is (broadly) whether the profits are being allocated to the corporate partner because of the individual’s control of the company. It is fairly clear that is what is happening. ↩︎

    15. There is a good summary of the case here. ↩︎

    16. The video is full of other errors. In particular, LT4L don’t understand that “power to enjoy” is a defined term which was somewhat difficult to apply to Mr Walewski’s trust, but is very easy to apply to the connected company in their structure. ↩︎

    17. On a similar note, LT4L often say their schemes are “allowed under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)”. ↩︎

    18. See e.g. section 809AZA ITA 2007 via section 809AZF. ↩︎

    19. We believe this is LT4L’s standard form letter of trust; we have received different versions from different LT4L clients, and all are materially identical. ↩︎

    20. We have seen correspondence and attendance notes from discussions between advisers and LT4L which suggests that LT4L may be confusing the FRS 102 treatment with the tax treatment. This video is consistent with that. ↩︎

    21. The counter-argument is that only a change to a capital entitlement has this effect; HMRC may take the contrary view, presumably on the basis that if you are reallocating income then you are changing the value of the capital entitlement. ↩︎

    22. This is because (1) a change in profit-sharing ratios is the “transfer of an interest”, (2) this is then a “type B” transfer, (3) the LLP’s beneficial interest in real estate is “relevant partnership property” unless the exclusions in para (5A), apply, (4) most of the exclusions are irrelevant, (5) exclusion (f) doesn’t apply because there was a para 10/sum of lower proportions calculation when the property was transferred to the LLP. ↩︎

    23. An option under FA03/s116(7); the top marginal rate of SDLT is then 5%. ↩︎

    24. Worked out on the average chargeable consideration per dwelling of £160,000 (80% of  £200,000), so coming in at 3%. ↩︎

    25. Calculated as 80% of the market value, £6m – but if the market value of the properties is different by the time of the change in the income profit shares, one takes the market value at that time. ↩︎

    26. This is calculated at residential property rates without the 3% surcharge. ↩︎

    27. In principle there wouldn’t be if the reallocation is sufficiently small to fall below the £150k de minimis. So, for example, a portfolio was worth £3m then a change in profit share of up to 5% should escape SDLT. However that is subject to the “linked transaction” rule and so, example, a strategy of having six successive changes of 5% to achieve a 30% change in income share, would be viewed together and therefore exceed the de minimis. ↩︎

    28. Potentially there are other bad consequences. In particular, we do not currently understand the rationale for debt that LT4L often puts in place between the LLP and its members. This might, depending on the details, trigger additional SDLT under the very awkward debt repayment rule in Schedule 15 para 17A Finance Act 2003. ↩︎

    29. Because of the failure to file a land transaction return upon the change in LLP profit sharing ratios. ↩︎

    30. See e.g. the Hyrax case, where the tribunal described as “incredible” the claim by one witness that she wasn’t aware that the transaction involved tax avoidance. ↩︎

    31. The “arrangement” in question is the declaration of trust over a mortgage loan in favour of an LLP and subsequent reallocation of profits to the corporate partner. The mortgage loan is one of the specified “financial products”. One of the main benefits of including the loan in the trust/LLP is to obtain a tax advantage. Finally, the arrangements involve contrived and abnormal steps without which the tax advantage could not be obtained (the trust and the reallocation are both contrived and abnormal). ↩︎

    32. The hallmark applies where (broadly speaking) a promoter can be reasonably expected to receive a fee that exceeds the time value of their work. Less Tax for Landlords say their fee reflects the work undertaken, but we doubt that – they charge £18,000 or more for what is a standardised structure (LT4L clients have sent us documentation, and it’s almost identical between the different clients). ↩︎

    33. LT4L’s documentation certainly seems standardised, but it is possible there is sufficient customisation that the hallmark doesn’t apply. ↩︎

    34. We say “may” because one defence would be to argue that the scheme is excluded from disclosure because it was made available (presumably by someone else) before 1 April 2010. We don’t know if that’s the case. On the one hand, it’s an obvious “trick” which may have been used. On the other hand, it has equally obvious problems. ↩︎

    35. Before he retired from the business. ↩︎

    36. LT4L’s founder has suggested that clients can obtain comfort from the fact that LT4L are based in the same building as an HMRC department. That reminds us of something. ↩︎

  • Tax avoidance scheme myths: “we have a KC opinion” and “we’re fully insured”

    Tax avoidance scheme myths: “we have a KC opinion” and “we’re fully insured”

    There are a surprising number of people still promoting tax avoidance schemes. Of course, they say they’re not tax avoidance schemes, but the giveaway is that they are promising a much better tax result than you’d normally get. Often this makes people nervous. Two lines the promoters use to get round this are “we have an opinion from an independent KC” and “don’t worry, we’re fully insured”.

    Here’s why this should make you more, not less, worried.

    The problem with KC opinions

    A KC avoidance scheme opinion in practice provides you, the client, with zero comfort. In fact it potentially makes your position worse.

    1. The opinion is probably wrong

    Most KCs are outstanding lawyers with an excellent reputation – they will give the correct legal answer, whether it’s convenient or not. But there are some who, even when faced with dubious tax avoidance schemes, give the answer the client wants. Jolyon Maugham described them as “The Boys Who Won’t Say ‘No’“.

    And The Boys usually turn out to be wrong.

    The taxpayer has lost almost every single tax avoidance case to come before the courts in the last 25 years. I’m aware of only two cases where the taxpayer won, and the response was to enact the general anti-abuse rule (GAAR) so that it wouldn’t happen again.

    The Boys provided opinions for many of these, and all of them were wrong.

    Mostly we don’t get to see the opinions, or even know which KC issued them, but in some cases we have the details:

    • Robert Venables KC provided an opinion that a contractor loan scheme wasn’t disclosable under DOTAS; the tribunal thought it clearly was disclosable.
    • Here’s a scheme we wrote about, involving the astonishing step of incorporating thousands of UK companies with Filipino directors to escape HMRC scrutiny. The owner of the business ended up admitting fraud. But there was an opinion from Giles Goodfellow KC that it was fine.
    • In one of the many film tax relief avoidance schemes, Andrew Thornhill KC said he “had no doubt” that the entity was trading. It wasn’t.

    KC opinions in general are (in my experience) usually sensible and astonishingly right (i.e. they successfully predict the outcome when the point is later tested in court). So why are these opinions so wrong?

    The charitable answer is that the KCs are advising on the basis of their instructions from the promoter, which usually puts forward the most favourable possible legal and factual position – very possibly making assumptions of fact which don’t apply to your individual case. And it is not uncommon for the structure that the “KC” approved to be markedly different from the structure the promoters end up implementing.

    There are other obvious, but less charitable, answers…

    2. You’re not the client

    You’re not the KC’s client. The promoter is the KC’s client. So, even if the KC is completely wrong, you can’t sue him.

    In that film relief case, even though the taxpayers relied on the KC’s advice, their claim for negligence failed.

    3. The opinion makes it harder for you to sue the promoter

    If everything goes wrong, the only person you can sue is the promoter.

    You’ll sue them for negligence, which means you have to show that no reasonable adviser would have given the advice they gave. That is a harder task if they have a KC opinion, because they can then say they were following the advice of an eminent KC, which (they will argue) must have been a reasonable thing to do.

    The KC opinion can make your position worse.

    4. Normal people don’t need KC opinions

    A KC opinion can be very useful if you’re in a dispute with HMRC, to get an independent view of your prospects of success. And people with complex affairs often have a legitimate reason to seek a KC’s advice (e.g. large companies, very wealthy people with assets all over the world).

    But normal people shouldn’t be doing anything so complicated and uncertain that it requires a KC opinion (I’d certainly never put myself in that position).

    The best approach to tax is to be boring, stick with the crowd, and do what everyone else is doing. That’s true for taxpayers of all kinds. When I was a practicing lawyer, I advised some of the largest and most sophisticated businesses in the world. If I’d told them I had a unique way to save tax, different and better than everyone else’s approach, they would have fired me on the spot.

    The truth about insurance

    This is a typical claim from the “Head of Estate Planning” at Less Tax for Landlords, an adviser/promoter we’ll be reporting on soon.

    “You also will be covered by our professional indemnity insurance. Our insurance is designed to return you to the place that you would have been had you never engaged with us. So it just ensures that although it won’t pay for example any tax that you would have paid if you didn’t do this, if any additional tax occurs because you engage with us it would cover that. It would cover any fines, any penalties and any further advice and also it would cover us to help you argue if HMRC ever had any issues and looked into this.”

    And here’s someone on Property118’s website, who claims to have used the Property118 scheme on the basis of assurances that Cotswold Barristers were insured:

    This all suggests that, if HMRC don’t agree with the tax treatment, you’re not out of pocket… you get immediately reimbursed by the friendly insurers.

    Here’s what actually happens:

    • Initially – nothing. You file the tax return, HMRC’s systems accept it, and you don’t hear anything back.
    • Later, likely years later, HMRC tell you they disagree with your tax position, and claim back years of tax, plus interest and potentially penalties.
    • You and your advisers have a lengthy exchange of correspondence with HMRC, trying to persuade them to back off.
    • HMRC don’t back off – they require you to pay tax on the basis the scheme didn’t work.
    • You disagree and file an appeal with the First Tier Tribunal.
    • You lose that appeal, and possibly make and lose appeals in higher courts.
    • At that point you have to pay up.
    • You then sue the advisor for negligence.
    • The adviser then notifies their insurer and the insurer steps in, but not on your side. The insurer will (in most cases) run the advisor’s defence. Remember, you’re not insured – the adviser is.
    • (Unless the insurer finds a way to argue that the claim isn’t covered. Insurers are good at this. It is, for example, possible that selling a scheme on the strength of the insurance could itself invalidate it.
    • You now have to win the negligence claim (or get a good settlement). This isn’t easy – many professional negligence claims fail. In short, you have to show (1) that the advice was so unreasonable, no reasonable advisor would have given it, (2) that it was reasonable for you to rely on their advice, (3) that you wouldn’t have entered into the arrangement if they’d given you correct advice, and (4) that you took reasonable steps to mitigate your loss..
    • Clients/victims of the various avoidance schemes of the last 20 years have generally had very little success getting recovery from their advisers.
    • There will be lots of arguments about “quantum” – how much you are entitled to recover, and how much tax you would have paid anyway, if you hadn’t entered into the scheme. The best you can hope for is interest, penalties, and additional taxes the scheme created. You’ll never get back the tax you thought you’d saved with the scheme – this is gone for good.
    • Once you win, the insurer then pays out. Even in this happy scenario, you’ve still been out of pocket for the (likely) years it took to pursue the negligence claim.

    And it could be worse than this. Promoters often say they are covered for £2m (or more) “per claim”. But that is very different from “per client”. Imagine a promoter sells 500 basically identical schemes, and the same point goes wrong on all of them. The insurance may well contain wording like this:

    In which case the insurer won’t be liable for 500 x £2m, but only a maximum of £2m total, across all 500 schemes. £4,000 each.

    Finally, professional liability insurance often has this exclusion:

    Which would could deny the claim entirely.

    Even in a best case scenario, the only benefit of the insurance for a client is that it protects you against the adviser going bust or disappearing (if it’s “run-off” insurance, which it may not be). That’s not nothing… but it absolutely doesn’t make it easier for you to recover any tax you have to pay to HMRC.

    When I was in practice, I never assured a client that they didn’t need to worry, because we had insurance. We certainly had insurance – a very serious policy with a very large amount of coverage. But my clients knew that the insurance is primarily there to protect the advisers, not the client. Insurance is not a guarantee that the adviser is correct.

    My advice

    You should expect your adviser to explain and stand behind their own advice. Promoters’ use of KC opinions and insurance is just a sales tactic. You want a competent technician, not a magician or a salesman. Remember, tax is supposed to be boring.


    Image is © HMRC.

    Footnotes

    1. the SHIPS 2 case, essentially because the legislation in question was such a mess that the Court of Appeal didn’t feel able to apply a purposive construction, and D’Arcy, where two anti-avoidance rules accidentally created a loophole. ↩︎

    2. Video is © Less Tax for Landlords Ltd, and excerpted by us as fair dealing for the purposes of criticism and review. ↩︎

    3. At least for income and corporation tax; for some other taxes (e.g. VAT) you have to pay up before you apply for the first appeal. ↩︎

    4. My apologies to any tort lawyers reading this on a horrible over-simplification ↩︎

    5. We’d make an exception for one tax adviser we know who’s a member of the Magic Circle ↩︎

  • Property118: a tax avoidance scheme for buy-to-let landlords that defaults their mortgage and increases their tax bill

    Property118: a tax avoidance scheme for buy-to-let landlords that defaults their mortgage and increases their tax bill

    Property118 is an unregulated adviser which works in a “joint venture” with a barristers chambers called Cotswold Barristers. They promote a tax avoidance scheme aimed at buy-to-let landlords. But nobody involved appears to have any tax qualifications and in our view the scheme fails spectacularly.

    This report explains the scheme, and explains why in our view, and that of the mortgage lenders’ industry body, it is likely to default the landlord’s mortgage. We also set out a detailed analysis of the serious tax problems with the structure. We are going into more technical detail than usual given the widespread promotion of this scheme in the market. Anyone who has entered into these arrangements should seek independent advice.

    UPDATE: 16 September. Property118 have responded to this report. Despite having two months’ notice of our findings, their response contains no response to any of the points we’ve made, just assertions that their structure is fully compliant, and that HMRC and lenders have never challenged it. As we note below, we doubt the structure has ever been properly disclosed to HMRC or lenders. Now HMRC and lenders is aware of the structure we expect challenges over the coming months and years.

    UPDATE: 22 September. We’ve a further report on another aspect of Property118’s planning.

    UPDATE: 5 October. See also our report on Less Tax for Landlords. A different scheme, but with some commonalities; in many senses an even worse scheme than Property118’s.

    UPDATE: 24 October. Mark Smith of Cotswold Barristers published a response on the s162 point, but one which does not address the key problem with the structure. We’ve updated the text below.

    UPDATE: 9 November. The analysis below is of the structure Property118 intended to implement. Our review of their actual documentation reveals several critical implementation failings which means the actual position of their clients is likely significantly different, and significantly worse. We analyse this here. This means that much of what follows below is likely academic.

    UPDATE: July 2024: HMRC have issued a “stop notice” making it a criminal offence for Property118 to continue to promote the structure.

    The sales pitch

    Most buy-to-let landlords hold their properties personally. So they pay income tax at 40% or 45% on the rental income. Until 2017, their mortgage interest was deductible, meaning a result something like this:

    George Osborne changed that, replacing interest relief with a 20% credit. That makes a big difference:

    Many landlords view this as unfair, because the £2,400 tax is more than their £2,000 net income (although the purpose of the rules was expressly to discourage buy-to-let mortgages, so this rather punitive outcome is actually the point).

    The obvious move is to hold the properties in a company. Corporation tax is less – below 25%, for a small company and companies get full tax relief for mortgage interest.

    But it’s not easy for a buy-to-let landlord to move their properties into a company. There can be capital gains tax and stamp duty land tax (SDLT) on the way in. And – most seriously – the mortgage lender won’t allow the existing individual mortgage to move to a company. You could get a new mortgage, but mortgages for companies are significantly more expensive than buy-to-let mortgages.

    Advisers therefore frequently caution clients that the increased interest cost of moving properties to a company can easily exceed the tax saving. It’s often a mistake to be over-focused on tax savings.

    The Property118 solution

    Wouldn’t it be wonderful if you had all the tax benefits of moving to a company, but could keep your existing bargain-price mortgage?

    Property118 say you can, with what they call the Substantial Incorporation Structure:

    • The landlord – let’s call him X – sets up a new company (which I’ll call the Company), and sells the properties to it, getting shares in return
    • But “completion” of the sale is deferred – X remains the registered owner of the properties. A trust is created, with the landlord as trustee, and the company as beneficiary.
    • This is invisible to the world – and to the mortgage lender. So X doesn’t ask the mortgage lender for consent, or even tell the mortgage lender about it.
    • Property118 claim that, because the transaction creates a trust, it’s not a breach of X’s mortgage.
    • They claim that “incorporation relief” applies so there’s no capital gains tax.
    • Often they say that X and their spouse were in a partnership, so SDLT partnership rules apply and there’s no SDLT to pay either.
    • X continues to make mortgage payments to the lender but, behind the scenes, the Company agrees to reimburse/indemnify X. The Company claims tax relief for those payments. So – claim Property118 – it’s just as good as if the Company had borrowed itself.
    • But it’s better – because they say this isn’t just a company – it’s a “Smart Company“. The idea is that the Company issues shares to X’s children which supposedly have no initial value, but will grow in value over time. So future increase in the value of the property portfolio will fall outside X’s inheritance tax estate.

    The end result is that, by signing a piece of paper, X gets a dramatically better tax result with no downside:

    What actually happens – the short version

    The structure doesn’t work.

    The sale likely puts the mortgage into default. The mortgage terms usually require consent for the sale to the Company, and that wasn’t obtained.

    We asked UK Finance, the trade association for mortgage lenders, and they said:

    “Transferring ownership of a property into a trust without informing your lender and seeking their consent would most likely be a breach of a mortgage’s terms and conditions.”

    The tax will also go badly wrong.

    Property118 have forgotten that X is still there, still paying £8k to the bank, but now receiving £8k of new income in the form of the indemnity payments. Those indemnity payments are fully taxable, but the bank interest isn’t deductible for him (because X no longer has a property business; he has no basis to claim any tax relief).

    So the structure increases the overall tax bill by 50%.

    It gets worse. There is potentially also a large up-front tax hit of a large amount of CGT and SDLT when the structure is established. That could amount to hundreds of thousands of pounds.

    And then an ongoing requirement to file an annual tax on enveloped dwellings (ATED) return, which is easily missed – failure to file creates late-filing penalties of £1,600 per year.

    In our opinion this structure is a disaster.

    We’ve set out the legal analysis of these issues in detail below.

    Is this tax avoidance?

    Yes.

    The “Substantial Incorporation Structure” has no benefit to the landlord other than (supposedly) saving tax. It will therefore be regarded as tax avoidance by a number of statutory anti-avoidance rules, which will potentially negate the tax benefits (if there are any, which there probably aren’t).

    This is by contrast with a normal incorporation, which absolutely does have other benefits for the landlord. In particular, it segregates legal liability: if the landlord is sued by the lender or by a tenant, then if the properties are held in a company, that liability will normally not attach to the landlord personally. A normal incorporation is not usually tax avoidance, even if it has tax benefits.

    However, the substantial incorporation structure does not achieve legal segregation. As far as the lender, the tenants, and the world are concerned, the landlord remains personally the owner of the properties and therefore as a legal matter remains personally liable.

    Property118 and Cotswold Barristers

    Property118 and Cotswold Barristers often charge fees of over £40,000 to relatively small landlords earning less than £100k/year. They’re set up to get referrals from other websites, paying £2,000 for a click that results in new business – meaning that they’re widely promoted by other firms (for example here).

    For £40,000 you could expect to instruct a well-known accounting or law firm, staffed by qualified tax lawyers/accountants.

    But neither Property118 nor Cotswold Barristers appear to have any members or employees with tax qualifications or experience. Property118 is entirely unregulated. I had a very confusing exchange of emails with Mark Alexander, head of Property118, in which he didn’t appear to have even heard of the two main tax qualifications: ATT and CTA.

    The head of Cotswold Barristers, Mark Smith, is a generalist whose practice ranges from business law, to tax, to criminal defence work, to private prosecutions (including one where he was suspended by a month by the Bar Standards Board for acting negligently and “failing to act with reasonable competence“). His profiles in 2017 and 2020 don’t include tax in his areas of practice.

    Barristers chambers usually list their members – the members being the whole point of the chambers. Cotswold Barristers is unusual in not doing this. It did at one point – and included as part of its team a fake barrister with a dubious past who was jailed for conning a dying woman out of her life savings. There is no suggestion that Cotswold Barristers was aware of his actions, but Cotswold Barristers does appear to have been responsible for listing him as part of its team.

    Property118 and professional standards

    Property118 say this to clients:

    Property118 in association with Cotswold Barristers
© August 2022 - Property118 Limited in association with Cotswold Barristers - Page 14
Due diligence and risk mitigation to keep you safe
As discussed during your video conference, Property118 and Cotswold Barristers are a Joint Venture
in the delivery of services to clients. We have worked very closely together since 2015 in developing
the strategies we recommend and the Barristers that service our clients are specially trained, qualified
and experienced in property and tax law.
As a Property118 Consultant, I act under ‘delegated authority’ of Cotswold Barristers, which means
that I am preparing the groundwork for a case to be taken on by a Barrister-at-Law. I am therefore
bound by the same professional standards as the Barrister and our service to you falls under the
protection of their regulatory body, the Bar Standards Board.
If you engage Cotswold Barristers, your Barrister will advise on, adopt and execute my
recommendations as their insured legal advice.
Cotswold Barristers are regulated by the Bar Standards Board and each of their fully qualified and
suitably experienced Barristers carries £10,000,000 of Professional Indemnity Insurance per client,
meaning that you are shielded from financial risk should you appoint them to implement any of my
recommendations.

    The reference to “delegated authority” is strange. The claim that a non-barrister could be bound by Bar professional standards and be subject to the Bar Standards Board has perplexed all of the barristers we’ve spoken to.

    We put this to Mark Smith of Cotswold Barristers. He said:

    “Barristers must disclose, to the BSB and clients, any associations they have with people or entities in their provision of legal services. This is a code of conduct requirement. This was complied with at the outset of our relationship with Property 118 (P118). It has recently (Jan-Mar 2023) been re-examined by the BSB as part of a routine audit of Cotswold Barristers (CB) following an update of the BSB’s Transparency Rules. We had correspondence with the BSB about this, and they were and are satisfied our association is compliant. We did review the wording relating to ‘delegated authority’ at that point, as it was ambiguous. P118 has since amended this portion of their materials, so it makes it clear their consultants only work under delegation when the client has engaged with CB. Again, so long as it is made clear to the client, and the barrister is ultimately responsible, sub-contracting of work is permitted under the Code of Conduct.”

    We don’t see an ambiguity: we think the claim that Property118 are bound by Bar professional standards, and subject to the BSB, is false. We asked Mr Smith to explain this claim, and he did not respond.

    We’re writing to the Bar Standards Board to see if they can cast any light on these issues. We are also asking them to look into the wider question of why Cotswold Barristers are giving legal and tax advice that is obviously wrong.

    Professional indemnity insurance

    Property118 say that their barristers’ professional indemnity insurance means their clients are “shielded from financial risk”:

    That’s not at all how professional indemnity insurance works. If the tax structure turns out to be the disaster we think it is, and the client wants to recover their loss, they have to successfully sue the barrister for negligence. That’s never a straightforward undertaking; not least because the barrister would presumably deny causation on the basis that you would have followed Property118’s advice even if Cotswold Barristers hadn’t been involved. And Property118 aren’t regulated, are unlikely to have any insurance, and probably aren’t good for the money (its owner lives in Malta).

    The mortgage problem

    Property118 say their structure is “fully compliant for mortgage purposes”:

    However this appears to rely significantly on not telling lenders that their security has become the subject of a trust:

    We asked UK Finance, the representative body for mortgage lenders, what they thought of the structure. They said:

    “If someone wishes to transfer ownership of a buy to let property they should contact their lender to discuss whether this is permitted under the terms of any mortgage on the property. Transferring ownership of a property into a trust without informing your lender and seeking their consent would most likely be a breach of a mortgage’s terms and conditions.”

    We believe UK Finance are clearly right on this. But even we didn’t agree, we’d suggest that it’s not a good idea to enter into a structure which your lender believes most likely breaches the terms of your mortgage.

    Property118 and Cotswold Barristers seem to be in denial. They tell their clients:

    IIn June 2016 Mark Alexander (founder of Property118) won a representative
action case in the Court of Appeal which provides useful case law on this point.
A crucial element of the case established whether mortgage lenders can call in
loans if the borrower is in default. The Court of Appeal ruled they CANNOT.

    The idea a lender can’t require repayment of a mortgage when it is in default is very strange. The 2016 Court of Appeal case they cite concerned whether a lender could require repayment of a mortgage when there was no default. We don’t understand how Property118 can make this claim when their own founder was the claimant in the case.

    The problem with the trust

    Property118 do seem aware there could be an issue with declaring a trust that shifts beneficial ownership to a company without telling the mortgage lender. They say:

    Therefore, it is important to establish whether your mortgage terms contain
conditions precluding the transfer of beneficial ownership. To date, such
conditions have only been discovered in the Terms & Conditions of one
mortgage lender; Capital Homeloans CHL.

    There’s a similar theme on the Property118 website:

    There are only two mortgage lenders I know of whose T&C’s specifically prohibit the transfer of beneficial interest for privately owned properties. They are CHL and Fleet mortgages.  Clauses prohibiting Limited Companies from transferring beneficial ownership are slightly more common in mortgage lending contracts (for example TMW have such a clause) but I cannot think of a single reason why a Limited Company would wish to transfer beneficial ownership anyway.

    Is this an accurate reflection of most mortgage T&Cs?

    One of our team undertook a very fast and incomplete review of major mortgage lender BTL T&Cs, carried out in about one hour.

    She found specific prohibitions in Investec:

    When we can require you to repay the loan immediately
We may require you to repay the full amount owing immediately if any of the following occur (we call these ‘enforcement events’). Your Loan Offer will set out the period when an early repayment charge might apply to your loan. If an enforcement event occurs during this period you will also need to pay us an early repayment charge:
    you transfer, let, grant a trust over or create a new interest in the whole or any part of the mortgage property without our consent;

    And Clydesdale:

    We have the right to demand repayment of the entire mortgage from you. If we do this then you must repay to us the
full amount outstanding when you receive the demand for repayment. We will only do this if:
    you sell or create a further interest (such as a lease or trust) in the land, which forms the subject matter of the
Security, unless we have consented in writing to you doing this; or

    So the specific claim there are only two lenders with prohibitions is false.

    But the larger problem is more basic. This is the key claim made by property118 (highlighted in blue):

    There are only two mortgage lenders I know of whose T&C’s specifically prohibit the transfer of beneficial interest for privately owned properties. They are CHL and Fleet mortgages.  Clauses prohibiting Limited Companies from transferring beneficial ownership are slightly more common in mortgage lending contracts (for example TMW have such a clause) but I cannot think of a single reason why a Limited Company would wish to transfer beneficial ownership anyway.

The bottom line is that unless your mortgage contract specifically prohibits the transfer of beneficial ownership then you can do it. Therefore, my advice is simple; ask an experienced, qualified, regulated and fully insured Barrister-At-Law to advise you on whether your mortgage lenders T&C’s prohibit the transfer of beneficial interest or not.

    The “Barrister-At-Law” will be Mark Smith of Cotswold Barristers. He takes the same approach: “as a matter of law, unless it says specifically in the terms and conditions [that] you can’t do it, then you can”.

    This is not how English law security documentation works. The mortgage terms don’t need to have a specific prohibition on declaring a trust. All that’s required – and this is common – is to simply prohibit the sale or transfer of the property, and define “property” so it includes all interests, meaning the beneficial interests that would be transferred by a trust.

    Here’s NatWest:

    If on a sale of the Property the net sale proceeds are
insufficient to repay us in full, you must still pay the
shortfall with interest. The Property means the
property given as security under the mortgage,
and includes any part of it and all interests in it.
    3.4 You will obtain our permission in writing before:
• selling or transferring the Property (or any part of it)
to anyone else;

    Or The Mortgage Works (aka Nationwide):

    The property described in the mortgage or any part or parts of it together with all your estates, rights, title and other interests in such property and all buildings, structures, fxtures and fttings and the fxed plant and machinery and all fxed apparatus goods materials and equipment from time to time on or belonging to it. And where there is more than one such property, references to the property are to each and every property (and any part or parts of each and any property).
    not without our previous written consent convey assign, transfer, mortgage or otherwise dispose of the property

    Other lenders have a general transfer of ownership prohibition which is drafted broadly enough to capture trusts and sales of beneficial interest. For example, TSB:

    When you must ask for our permission
You must get our permission before you do any of the following things relating to the whole of your property, or any part of it.
•
Sell your property, give your property away or transfer the ownership of your property in any other way. You do not need our permission if you pay off everything you owe before or at the time you do this.

    After undertaking this review, we spoke to a series of experienced real estate finance lawyers, who act for lenders and borrowers on everything from small domestic conveyancing transactions to the largest commercial real estate transactions. It was their unanimous view that, one way or another, a trust would be prohibited by most and possibly all mortgage T&Cs.

    We put this point to Property118 and Cotswold Barristers, and specifically gave one of these mortgage terms as an example. They declined to explain their position as a legal matter, instead asserting that large conveyancing companies agreed with them, and that no bank had ever raised the point. That, again, does not answer the question. The large conveyancing firms are built to handle straightforward conveyancing at scale, not to answer technical queries on unusual trust arrangements. Mortgage lenders will not raise the point unless they become aware of it. Until now, we don’t believe they were. However, we briefed the mortgage lenders’ representative body, UK Finance, on the structure, and their view is now clear:

    “Transferring ownership of a property into a trust without informing your lender and seeking their consent would most likely be a breach of a mortgage’s terms and conditions.”

    It is therefore reasonably clear that entering into this arrangement without the consent of the lender likely defaults the mortgage.

    Legal and tax analysis – capital gain

    X probably has a large latent capital gain in the properties. For example, if X’s acquisition cost of the portfolio was £4m, and X sold it now for current market value of £8m, X would have a £4m capital gain, and pay £1.12m CGT.

    But Property118 claim their Substantial Incorporation Structure means that CGT incorporation relief applies.

    That would have two very nice outcomes for X. First, there’s no CGT at all to pay on the transfer to the Company. Second, the capital gain is “rolled over” into the shares in the Company, so that any sale of the shares is subject to CGT broadly as if X had held them all along. The latent capital gain of the properties themselves is eliminated – the properties are “rebased” to current market value. So if the Company sold the properties for £8m, there would be zero tax to pay.

    However, there is considerable doubt whether incorporation relief will apply.

    The legislation requires that “the whole of the assets of the business” move to the Company. And that’s not happening

    The problem here is that legal title in the properties is being left behind. This is not some minor legal formality; legal title over real estate has reality and value to it. You can’t borrow without legal title. You can’t refinance. You can’t sell. In many “bare trust” cases this is a distinction without a difference, because the beneficiary can call for legal title at any time. Here they cannot, because the consent of the mortgage lender would be required. The Company’s inability to acquire legal title is a real constraint on its business – and that demonstrates that it did not in fact acquire the “whole assets of the business”.

    Another way of putting the same point is that there is no transfer of a “business as a going concern”, just an economic transfer under a trust. The “business” is operated by the person with the legal title, as it’s that person who has all the dealings with the tenant, bank, service providers, etc. This “business” isn’t moving at all.

    So our view is that incorporation relief likely does not apply.

    (In many cases there will also be doubt as to whether X’s activity as a landlord is enough to constitute a “business”.)

    UPDATE: Mark Smith finally published a specific response to this point on 20 October 2023. He makes the obvious point that capital gains tax normally looks to beneficial ownership, not legal ownership, when considering whether a disposal has been made. But section 162 is not looking at whether a CGT disposal has been made – it uses the terms “whole assets of the business” and “transfers… a business as a going concern”. We read these as factual tests. And, factually, significant elements of the business remain with the landlord. Only the landlord can deal with the lender, the tenants, letting agents, and other contractual parties. The business of the company is very different – it’s just a passive investor. We made this point above; Mr Smith does not attempt to respond to it.

    Mr Smith again makes the claim that HMRC have accepted the position. This would only be relevant if the true nature of the structure was disclosed to HMRC, and the s162 point above specifically drawn to HMRC’s attention. We doubt that is the case, but even if it was, it would only provide comfort to the taxpayers specifically covered by that correspondence. HMRC would not be bound for other Property118 clients.

    There is therefore, as ever, no substitute for properly considering the legal position.

    Legal analysis – SDLT

    On the face of it, SDLT is due on the transfer of the properties by X to the Company, on the full market value at a marginal rate of up to 15%. That’s potentially a huge up-front cost. There’s a relief for partnerships incorporating, but not for individuals incorporating.

    In many cases, SDLT would make the Substantial Incorporation Structure uneconomic, with a large up-front tax cost. Here’s the Property118/Cotswold Barristers solution:

    It’s to claim that, where a husband and wife run a property rental business together, in fact they’ve always been a partnership, and partnership relief is available. They do this, even in cases where there was no partnership agreement, no partnership tax returns, and no extraneous evidence of any kind that a partnership existed. Technically that does not make it impossible that there was a partnership – it’s a question of fact. But the recent SC Properties case shows just how difficult is to establish a partnership in such circumstances – and the burden of proof is on the taxpayer. It is usual for a married couple to manage their financial affairs together, but that does not normally mean there is a partnership in the legal sense. Relations between spouses are very different from the business relations of partners in a partnership.

    If SDLT were payable (because the properties are not partnership property), then interest and penalties for late filing would be due. Although multiple dwellings relief would usually be available to reduce the SDLT charge, this relief is unavailable if it is not claimed in a return or an amendment to a return. And an SDLT return cannot be amended more than one year after the filing date for the transfer. If any of the properties were occupied by X or his relatives (or not held for a qualifying business purpose) the SDLT rate on that property would be 15%.

    In our view, it will only be in rare cases that this strategy succeeds, and SDLT relief applies – and HMRC guidance suggests that HMRC are likely to contest the point.

    Finally, although no annual tax on enveloped dwelling (ATED) would be payable to the extent that the properties are let out to third parties, ATED relief must be claimed. It is unclear to us if Property 118 advise their clients to file ATED returns (our sources have not seen such advice). Failure to file triggers late-filing penalties of up to £1,600 per return per year. For companies that used these arrangements over five years ago, it might come as quite a shock that they are liable to £8,000 of penalties even though no ATED is due.

    Legal and tax analysis – taxation of the interest payments

    Property118 and Cotswold Barristers say:

    What about making the mortgage payments?
The legal owner will continue to make the mortgage payments on behalf of the
company, which will have covenanted with the original borrower to service the
mortgage. The company appoints the legal owner/borrower as its clearing
agent to make payments, much like a landlord might instruct a letting agent to
pay contractors. The landlord will only pay tax on money received from the
company to service mortgage payments payments made for acting as the
agent of the company. If no payment is taken for acting as clearing agent for
the company then no tax is due.

    They make a slightly different claim in the video below: that the “legal owner continues to make mortgage payments (as nominee of the beneficiary) and claims the payments back from the beneficiary as out of pocket expenses, which are tax free”.

    But that is not right at all. X, the legal owner, is not the “agent” or “nominee” of the Company under the loan – X remains the borrower under the loan in their own right. You cannot declare a trust over obligations. What is actually happening is that the Company is making indemnity payments to X, which pays the mortgage lender (and this is the case as a legal matter even if, as I suspect, there are never any cash payments from the Company to X). X therefore remains taxable.

    When we look at the actual legal and tax analysis that follows from this, the entire structure falls apart.

    Deductibility of interest payments for the Company

    Mark Smith says in this video that the payment is “deductible in accordance with normal corporation tax principles”. That’s not correct.

    The corporation tax treatment of debt is governed by the loan relationship rules in Part 5 of Corporation Tax Act 2009. For these rules to apply, the Company must have a “loan relationship”, for which it has to be “standing in the position of debtor under a money debt” which must “arise from a transaction for the lending of money“. But the Company doesn’t have a money debt and never borrowed any money – it’s just making indemnity payments. There is only one loan, and that was from the mortgage lender to X – and it’s still there.

    So the Company doesn’t have a loan relationship and will not achieve a deduction under the loan relationship rules.

    It might achieve a deduction under the general rules for a company carrying on a UK property business. That requires the indemnity payments to be recognised in the accounts and for the indemnity payments to be regarded from a tax perspective as income of the property business and not as further consideration for the capital transaction of the original acquisition of the beneficial interest. We don’t think either is a straightforward point.

    So it cannot be assumed that the Company will achieve a deduction for its indemnity payments. If it doesn’t, we are in a worst-case scenario for X which looks like this:

    More than doubling X’s original £2,400 tax bill. Not a good result.

    Even if the Company does achieve a deduction, the result is still worse than the original £2,400 of tax:

    We put this point to Cotswold Barristers. They asserted that the payment was deductible but were unable to explain how or why.

    Taxability of indemnity payments

    We can immediately dismiss the explanation in the video – that X is receiving tax-free out-of-pocket expenses. That would be the case if the loan had been entered into by X as trustee for the Company. But it wasn’t – the loan was simply entered into by X and X alone, and the trust can’t change that). The payments X makes to the lender are not trust expenses – they’re X’s personal expenses. And no agreement X signs with the Company can change this – you can’t transfer an obligation, or create a trust over an obligation.

    That’s a big problem. X no longer has a property business (because he is a mere trustee). So X has zero basis for claiming a deduction on the interest he pays the bank. But he is now receiving a stream of indemnity payments under a legal obligation. They will be taxable (perhaps as “annual payments“, perhaps as “miscellaneous income“). That creates a large tax charge for X – it’s the worst-case outcome we show above.

    We see only one potential counter-argument: to say that the indemnity payments actually form part of the consideration for the original sale, and so are capital and not revenue items. If so, and the original sale was exempt from CGT, then there’s no additional tax to pay; but the consequence of this argument is that the Company absolutely won’t get a tax deduction for its indemnity payments (because they must be capital payments too). That results in this, which we think is the best-case outcome of the Substantial Incorporation Structure:

    Note that the best-case outcome here (which we’d expect HMRC to resist) is still worse than the original £2,400 tax bill. You’d have been better off doing nothing.

    Or, if the original sale was subject to CGT then probably each indemnity payment is subject to CGT at 28%, resulting in this bad-but-not-quite-worst-case outcome:

    We put this point to Cotswold Barristers. They were unable to explain why the indemnity receipts weren’t taxable, but said that HMRC had never raised the point. We expect that is because the issue has never been properly disclosed to HMRC.

    Back in 2019, Mark Smith gave a mystifying explanation in a now-deleted video:

    “Finance costs accrue to the beneficiary, the company pays the expense of running the mortgage and it’s deductible on normal corporation tax principles. You don’t even have to change your direct debit or standing order payments, because you are allowed to receive the money for the mortgage repayments from the company as their agent without it being taxable in your hands, as long as at some point it flows through the company books, the company bank account, it’s only taxable by the company. You only receive the money as their agent, you make the payment as the company’s agent. And there’s a fallback position. Even if HMRC tried to tax you on it, you only pay tax at trustee rates, which basically washes out any impact of having to pay tax on it because you get the tax credit back again at 20% basic rate.”

    This is gobbledygook. The individual is not the company’s agent when making mortgage payments – the individual entered into the mortgage as principal. The mortgage doesn’t form part of the trust – you can’t declare a trust over an obligation. The trust rate (and associated credit rules) apply to settlements, not bare/simple trusts – they cannot apply to this structure (and if the arrangement was a settlement there would be an array of other consequences, mostly adverse).

    Legal and tax analysis – inheritance tax

    Cotswold Barristers send clients materials presenting them with extraordinarily large (and unrealistic) inheritance tax calculations. We’ve seen one projecting that a client’s portfolio of under £10m would be worth £200m in ten years’ time, so with a potential inheritance tax bill of £80m. This is, at best, sharp practice and, at worst, misselling.

    They say that the advantage of their Smart Company solution is that:

    You can decide which classes of share will carry dividend rights. Different classes can carry different dividend rights. For example, you might allot shares to a parent in the lower rate tax band, for school fee planning. It is also possible to create a class of share that has a nominal initial value, because they carry no voting or dividend rights, but to which all capital appreciation can be attributed, for IHT planning purposes. The growth in value of the business would then fall outside the IHT estate.

    So you say the property portfolio is currently worth £10m, and issue shares which are worth the value of the portfolio minus £10m. Those shares are therefore worth £0 today (you claim), and you can give the shares to your children with no inheritance tax or capital gains consequences. But if the portfolio did become worth £200m in ten years’ time, the shares would be worth £190m. More magic.

    The flaw in this is that the shares plainly aren’t actually worth £0 when created. It’s easy to test this: would they sell them to Tax Policy Associates for £1,000? That’s a fantastic deal for them, if the shares are really worth nothing. But obviously, nobody would take up that offer – because there’s a large expected capital appreciation embedded in the value of the shares. And that’s the tax conclusion too: the shares have a large current value equal to the discounted expected capital appreciation. We’re aware of two cases where shares of this kind have been litigated, and the contention that the shares were valueless failed (with, in one case, the Tribunal actually giving the shares a seven-figure value).

    That means this structure probably has immediate inheritance tax and capital gains tax consequences (possibly also consequences under the “employment related securities” rules).

    A further twist:

    Cotswold Barristers and Property118 often advise putting these shares in a discretionary trust. We’ve seen them recommend “Creation of a Discretionary Trust controlled by you via a Letter of Wishes to shelter all future capital growth in the portfolio from Inheritance Tax”.

    A “discretionary trust controlled by you” isn’t a trust – it’s a sham.

    And another twist:

    Part of the idea seems to be that shares are being created for children, so they can receive dividends and pay less tax than the parents (because of their allowances and lower tax rates). But there are specific rules that stop this.

    DOTAS

    Given that the main (and perhaps sole) purpose of Property118’s scheme is tax avoidance, it seems likely that their structures should be registered with HMRC under DOTAS – the rules requiring disclosure of tax avoidance schemes.

    Cotswold Barristers told us that HMRC considered this point in 2021 and did not take it forward.

    We would query if Cotswold Barristers made HMRC aware of the size of their fees. A “premium fee” (being a fee which is more than the time value of the work carried out) is one of the hallmarks which can trigger DOTAS.

    Another DOTAS “hallmark” is where it is reasonable to expect a promoter would wish an element of the arrangements to be kept confidential from any other promoter. Property118 sent us correspondence refusing to explain elements of their structure, because it was “valuable intellectual property”. That may amount to an (accidental) admission that the confidentiality hallmark applies.

    The “standardised tax product” hallmark may apply as well. Property118 boast about their “suite of documentation”.

    Failure to comply with DOTAS can result in fines of up to £1m.

    More strange Property118 advice

    The Property118 website has other examples of tax planning that raises alarm bells, because it has no reasonable prospect of success. We’ll mention just two examples:

    Capital gains value shifting

    The capital gains tax avoidance below ignores the existence of a specific anti-avoidance rule:

    Further opportunities for tax planning at the point of incorporation
Where equity in a property rental business is greater than the capital gain a further tax planning opportunity exists. This is achieved by increasing the liabilities of the businesss to the acquisition cost plus capitalised improvements of the business prior to incorporation.

Here’s an example:-

Acquisition cost of property portfolio
£3,000,000
Current value
£5,000,000
Current liabilities
£2,000,000
In this scenario the landlord could increase liabilities to £3,000,000 to fund the withdrawal of the £1,000,000 of investment capital tied up in the business.

When the landlord then incorporates, £2 million of shares created offsets the £2 million of capital gains.

The landlord could then lend the £1,000,000 of capital withdrawn prior to incorporation to the company.

The company could then reduce its liabilities back to £2 million.

The net result is that the company now owes the landlord £1,000,000. Repayment of a loan from a company to landlord incurs no income tax. Therefore, the landlord can now withdraw the next £1,000,000 of profits from the company in the form of loan repayments without incurring any additional income tax liability.

    An entirely artificial step is used to reduce the capital value of the shares, and then immediately re-inflate it. There are very longstanding rules to counter such “value-shifting” transactions (as well as a plethora of other statutory rules, plus common law anti-avoidance principles).

    The structure as presented in our view has no reasonable prospect of success.

    UPDATE 22 September: after this report was published we found more details of this scheme, and it turns out to be rather different from the description above, and much worse. We’ve written a short analysis of this here.

    SDLT avoidance

    This page suggests that SDLT can be reduced when acquiring a “house in multiple occupation” (HMO), i.e. where many people have separate bedrooms but there is one front door and usually one living room. The idea is that “multiple dwellings relief” applies.

    That is, however, wrong – MDR applies only where there are separate dwellings, and a bedroom is not a dwelling. That was fairly obvious when the page was written in 2020. It is more obvious now, as an Upper Tier Tribunal has ruled on the point.

    What if you’ve entered into a Property118 scheme?

    We would strongly suggest you seek advice from an independent tax professional, in particular a tax lawyer or an accountant who is a member of a regulated tax body (e.g. ACCA, ATT, CIOT, ICAEW, ICAS or STEP). Given the potential for a mortgage default, we would also suggest you urgently seek advice from a solicitor experienced with trusts and mortgages/real estate finance (e.g. a member of STEP).

    We would advise against approaching Property118 given the obvious potential for a conflict of interest.

    Property118 and Cotswold Barristers’ response to this article

    It is common practice to give the subject of a report or investigation 24 hours to respond. The response we received from Property118 was unusual in several respects. We set it out below in full.

    The initial response was a request from the CEO of Cotswold Barristers to join a recorded Zoom call: “Why won’t you come on video and ask your questions? The public deserve to make their own assessment”.

    Property118 then failed to respond to any of the technical questions we asked.

    Cotswold Barristers responded, but leant very heavily on the claim that their approach has been accepted by HMRC and other accounting firms. We are sceptical that full disclosure was ever made to HMRC; if you approach HMRC for a clearance but don’t mention all the facts, or all the technical issues relevant to the clearance, then any clearance you get cannot be relied upon. And HMRC clearances can never be relied upon where there is tax avoidance.

    The final response was a vague legal threat: “Your continued blackmail is noted and our response to any damages caused to our businesses by your future actions will be dealt with accordingly.”

    In the interests of transparency, we set out the correspondence in full below. The thumbnails should expand when you click on them. Alternatively, the correspondence can be downloaded as a PDF here.

    Our original query:

    The initial response from Property118, including HMRC correspondence, customer testimonials, a complaint about the timescale and a vague legal threat:

    The clerk/CEO of Cotswolds Chambers responded by suggesting a recorded Zoom call, because that’s “what the public would expect in 2023”:

    We then received a letter from Mark Smith. This responds to our queries about the unusual relationship between Property118 and Cotswolds Barristers by referring to a recent BSB audit (discussed further above). Mr Smith responds to our CGT incorporation relief criticism by misunderstanding the s28 deeming rule; otherwise there is little in the way of technical content. For the most part, the response is “no one else has complained“:

    We asked for a specific response to the technical points we had made:

    Smith asks for two weeks to respond to our email. When we say that’s not realistic, and these are points they should already know the answers to, Mark Alexander sends a somewhat intemperate response:

    Then a more detailed response, with a long list of people he works with (names redacted out of fairness to the individuals):

    And finally a vague legal threat and accusation of blackmail:


    Many thanks to G and S for bringing this to our attention. Thanks to J, T, F and BM for their help with the mortgage aspects, as well as UK Finance. Thanks to E for trust law expertise, T for insurance law input, H, S and O for the barrister conduct issues, A and Sean Randall for the specialist SDLT input, and C for advice on the direct tax/indemnity point. Thanks to Pete Miller, who wrote on the incorporation relief point three months ago, and independently reached the same conclusion as us. Pete and Sean also kindly reviewed a draft of this report, and provided invaluable feedback. J kindly provided some technical corrections after the initial version of this report was published. And thanks to Ray McCann (former senior HMRC inspector and past President of the Chartered Institute of Taxation).

    We rely upon the goodwill and expertise of a large number of tax professionals, only some of whom we can name. As ever, Tax Policy Associates takes sole responsibility for the contents of this report.

    Landlord image by rawpixel.com on Freepik. House image by new7ducks on Freepik. Bank image by Freepik – Flaticon

    Footnotes

    1. The rate is 19% for profits under £50,000, with a “catch-up rate” of 26.5% on profits up to £250,000, so that the overall effective rate smoothly transitions into the full rate of 25% ↩︎

    2. Obviously you will want to get the money out at some point, but being able to defer and roll up low-taxed income is valuable in itself ↩︎

    3. Because a landlord can walk away from a company in a way that they cannot walk away from a personal mortgage ↩︎

    4. We have established this is their structure from published information on the Property118 and Cotswold Barristers websites (e.g. this brochure, and here, here, here, and here) as well as copies of their advice we received from our sources. ↩︎

    5. This is perhaps the most likely of a number of possibilities, all discussed further below ↩︎

    6. In the interests of concision, we don’t go into one somewhat difficult point: the effect of a sale when that sale is prohibited by another contract (the mortgage). The Don King v Warren case is general authority for the proposition that such a sale will still be effective in equity, and we expect that will be the case here. However the issues are not straightforward; and if we’re wrong, and the sale is not effective in equity, then essentially nothing has happened from a tax perspective, and it’s as if the transaction never happened. No tax benefit, but also none of the unfortunate results we go into below. ↩︎

    7. the landlord may be able to recover from the company under the indemnity, but if the companies’ assets are insufficient, the landlord will remain on the hook. There are, therefore, no liability advantages from the substantial incorporation structure, compared to, if the landlord just held the properties personally. ↩︎

    8. In an earlier (and unrelated) LinkedIn discussion, Mark Smith, head of Cotswold Barristers, hadn’t heard of the term “tax set” – i.e. he was unaware that there were specialist tax barristers’ chambers. ↩︎

    9. Not to be confused with Mark Smith, the respected extradition barrister. ↩︎

    10. This is from a document they sent to a client a few months ago ↩︎

    11. Caveat: our team only had English expertise; the law is different in Scotland and Northern Ireland and therefore none of the analysis in this section applies to it; however given that Property118’s English lawyers get the English law position wrong, it would be optimistic to assume that they have the Scots and Northern Irish position right ↩︎

    12. The original version of this report also discussed the potential for the trust to invalidate the buildings insurance of freehold property, which would be another mortgage default. Our was undertaken by insurance specialists but has been questioned by others with expertise in insurance law. This report is intended to reflect a consensus view of relevant experts, and therefore (given there is at least some doubt as to the position) we have removed that text. The general point about mortgage defaults (for both freehold and leasehold property) remains, and it is this point that UK Finance are referring to. ↩︎

    13. An additional problem is that the liabilities of the business are not being transferred; rather they are being covered by an indemnity from the Company, and that means the consideration does not just consist of shares (which s162 requires). On the face of it, that prevents incorporation relief applying. There is an HMRC concession that HMRC do not take this point (ESC D32). That is very convenient (and necessary) for the Substantial Incorporation structure. But two important niggles: (1) there is no technical basis for ESC D32 and therefore, following the Wilkinson case, it’s unclear how HMRC can continue to apply it, and (2) a taxpayer engaged in tax avoidance cannot rely upon any HMRC concession or published practice (a point HMRC go out of their way to stress in their guidance). ↩︎

    14. Similar issues may arise with other assets of the business which are staying put as a legal matter but (presumably) purportedly being assigned in equity: e.g. buildings insurance policies, tenancy agreements, letting agent agreements, the right to recovery of . The legal title that is being left behind is an asset, and not a valueless one. A business that only has equitable title to the core elements of its business is not the same as a normal business. A landlord is also subject to a large number of regulatory requirements around deposit protection, fire safety, etc – and these obligations will remain with the landlord as legal owner. ↩︎

    15. Cotswold Barristers’ response was that there was a deemed CGT disposal of legal and beneficial title day one, and so the whole assets of the company were deemed to be transferred. We don’t think that’s defensible. Section 28 is a rule which sets the time of a disposal for CGT purposes. It is not some wider deeming rule which deems an asset to have been actually transferred on a different date. Incorporation relief refers to “transfer” (the legal/commercial concept) and not “disposal” (the CGT concept). This is therefore a misreading of section 28. The courts have always held that deeming rules should be restricted to their statutory purpose.) UPDATE: Property118’s own KC ended up agreeing with us on this point ↩︎

    16. See the Elizabeth Ramsay case, and HMRC commentary here. ↩︎

    17. or the equivalent devolved taxes if one or more of the properties is in Scotland or Wales ↩︎

    18. That’s including the 3% surcharge for purchases of dwellings by companies. In some cases we would also need to add the 2% increased rate for non-resident transactions. ↩︎

    19. Section 2(1) of the Partnership Act 1890 is clear that joint ownership is not enough, and sharing profits is not enough. It’s the relationship between the parties that is key. This is something that Smith and Property118 appear to overlook. ↩︎

    20. Plus the 2% increased rates for non-resident transactions, if applicable). ↩︎

    21. There may be other potential attacks on the “retrospective partnership” strategy using anti-avoidance legislation and principles ↩︎

    22. The obvious way to test the loan relationship point is to ask whether the Company can be sued by the mortgage lender; the obvious answer is that it cannot. Note that whether there is a “loan relationship” or not is a legal test, not an accounting test – even if the accounts here show the Company as party to a loan, it won’t have a loan relationship ↩︎

    23. One correspondent raised a plausible argument to the contrary: condition C in s330A CTA 2009 applies on the basis that there was a “transaction which [had] the effect of transferring to the company all or part of the risk or reward” of the mortgage (this is not an argument Property118 has made; there is no evidence they are aware of any of the provisions of the loan relationships rules). We are, however, doubtful that an indemnity has that effect – it is cashflows which are (economically) transferred, not risk/reward. An indemnity is economically and legally distinct from defeasance. Financing cost indemnities are often seen on commercial transactions, and the idea s330A applies to such arrangements would be novel. It is, furthermore, unclear if X would benefit even if s330A applied. It seems likely that the main purposes of the arrangement are to enable the Company to obtain a tax advantage; on that bass, s455C would apply to deny the deduction ↩︎

    24. A better argument Property118 could make is that the company doesn’t need a deduction for the indemnity payment, because under the trust it’s only entitled to the net rent (after mortgage payments are made). That, however, is contrary to the nature of a bare trust – see e.g. the HMRC guidance here ↩︎

    25. Property118’s actual implementation is unclear. We have seen some documentation which states that the indemnity payments are consideration (which we expect is the intended outcome). However we have also seen a legal advice note from Mark Smith in which he says that the consideration is the issue of shares equal to the market value of the property (i.e. with no deduction for the debt) – we do not know if this was a on-off mistake, or reflects a general confusion as to the legal character of the transaction ↩︎

    26. “Probably” because we think the uncertainty as to how long the mortgage will remain in place probably makes the stream of indemnity payments “unascertainable future consideration”, charged to CGT when each payment is made. But there’s a risk that, at least in some cases, it’s not unascertainable (for example, if the mortgage doesn’t have long to run). In that case, the stream of indemnity payments would have to be calculated and added to the original disposal consideration, with no discount applied – potentially a really bad result ↩︎

    27. There is also a technical problem with the claim on this page, which Sean Randall (an experienced SDLT adviser and Chair of the Stamp Taxes Practitioners Group) explained here – with an unconvincing response from Property118. ↩︎

    28. The leading case here is R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p. MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd, which held that a taxpayer must “put all his cards face upwards on the table”. ↩︎

    29. Which had a peculiar feature; however given that it could identify the client, we are not publishing it ↩︎

  • CRS implementation as at June 2023​

    CRS implementation as at June 2023​

  • Pillar Two implementation as at June 2023​

    Pillar Two implementation as at June 2023​

  • The Post Office scandal – why the compensation scheme still has a tax problem

    The Post Office scandal – why the compensation scheme still has a tax problem

    I wrote in February about some serious tax problems with the way the Post Office was compensating the victims of the Post Office scandal. At the Post Office inquiry last Thursday, the Department for Business and Trade said that the problems have been resolved. I am concerned that is not correct.

    UPDATE: as of 19 June 2023, it looks very much like this has now been solved

    Between 2000 and 2013, the Post Office falsely accused thousands of managers of theft. Some went to prison. Many had their assets seized and their reputations shredded. Marriages and livelihoods were destroyed, and at least 59 have now died, never receiving an apology or recompense. These prosecutions were on the basis of financial discrepancies reported by a computer accounting system called Horizon. The Post Office knew from the start that there were serious problems with the Horizon system, but covered it up, and proceeded with aggressive prosecutions based on unreliable data. It’s beyond shocking, and there should be criminal prosecutions of those responsible.

    Now, finally – ten years after the Post Office almost certainly knew that it had wronged these people, it is paying compensation. However, the way the compensation is being paid to 2,000 postmasters under the “historic shortfall scheme” (HSS) is creating serious tax problems for them.

    The key issues are:

    • Compensation is being paid for years of lost earnings. This is paid as a lump sum – often a very large lump sum – and so is taxed at a much higher rate than would have been applicable had the earnings been paid properly at the time. For example: a postmaster earning £30k would ordinarily have taken home about £25k after tax. But if that same postmaster receives compensation for ten years’ lost earnings in one payment, of that £300k they’ll take home not £250k, but £170k. The “compression” of many years of income into one year costs them £80k more tax. That’s an unjust result, and one that compensation would normally adjust for, by paying additional compensation so that the postmaster receives (on these figures) £250k after tax. The Post Office didn’t do that.
    • As the claimants’ loss was many years ago, a large amount of interest is often due. This is fully taxable. The Post Office has correctly deducted 20% tax from its interest payments, but then failed to give a clear warning to claimants that they would have additional self assessment liability, taking the overall tax rate on the interest up to 40% or 45%. The Post Office also failed to provide any tax support to postmasters, or pay for tax advice – so postmasters would unlikely to be aware of the tax liability, and could easily fall into default with HMRC.

    I suggested back in February that the solution was a statutory exemption for HSS claimants. Since then, an exemption has been created for postmasters claiming under the Overturned Historic Convictions (OHC) scheme and the Group Litigation Order (GLO) scheme. But nothing for the HSS scheme, despite a promising initial response from the responsible Minister.

    Tax on compensation payments was discussed at the Inquiry on Thursday 27 April, and we now have at least a partial explanation. The video is available in the link above, and the full transcript is available here.

    On the two remaining issues:

    Loss of earnings

    The Post Office’s explanation last Thursday was that the GLO and OHC schemes paid compensation for lost earnings on a hypothetical net basis. In other words, a GLO claimant in the same position as in my example above would have received £250k compensation from the Government. The Government paid that amount on the expectation that a tax exemption would be created, as indeed it was. So the claimant retained the £250k, and received the correct amount.

    But there’s an important caveat. Whilst that result is consistent with paragraph 4.2 of the GLO scheme, the postmasters I’ve spoken to aren’t clear that’s what happened in all cases. It would be helpful if the Inquiry requires the Government to confirm precisely how tax was treated in the GLO scheme payments.

    However, let’s assume for the moment that the Post Office is right on how the GLO and OHC payments dealt with tax. How do the HSS payments compare?

    • If the Post Office had treated HSS payments in the same way as GLO/OHC payments then my example postmaster would have received £250k.
    • But, inexplicably, the Post Office actually paid the postmaster £300k, so that after-tax she retains £170k (and often the Post Office operated PAYE).
    • That leaves the postmaster £80k out of pocket compared to their GLO equivalent.
    • But if the Government enacts an exemption for HSS payments then the postmaster will retain £300k, and be £50k better off than their GLO equivalent.

    So the Post Office has created a mess that is difficult to resolve. The Department for Business and Trade (DBT) reasonably want to achieve parity between claimants under the different schemes, and there is now no easy way to do that.

    What’s being proposed is that the Post Office will pay “top-up” amounts so that claimants end up with the right amount, after tax. Those top-up amounts are themselves taxable, so will have to be quite large. They will also have to take account of the particular tax position of the postmasters in each of the relevant years, which will not be easy.

    The alternative would be for HMRC to create a complicated special rule, which taxes claimants as if they’d received the funds in each of the years to which they relate. That is probably a worse option.

    It should go without saying that the Post Office should pay for claimants to receive tax advice, both at the point of settlement and when they subsequently file their tax return. To date they’ve paid almost nothing to cover tax advice, and that has to change.

    I’d conclude from this that DBT were correct to reassure the Inquiry that there is a solution for loss of earnings compensation, but proper thought does need to be given to how postmasters receive tax advice.

    Interest and other compensation payments

    As the harm suffered by the postmasters was some time ago, interest is due on their compensation – and for large settlements it will come to a large amount. This is fully taxable. They will also often receive other types of compensation (e.g. loss of reputation, stress, exemplary damages), and whilst that probably won’t be taxable, this won’t always be straightforward to determine.

    The new tax exemption for OHC and GLO claimants mean they don’t need to worry about these issues – they are just exempt from tax on interest and everything else. The Post Office doesn’t appear to have adjusted their payments to reflect the tax exemption. It hasn’t deducted tax from interest payments (see paragraph 4.2.4 of the GLO scheme terms). This seems the right result to me. Personal injury compensation and interest is tax-exempt, and it feels entirely appropriate that this is too.

    But, on the basis of DBT’s announcement at the Inquiry, HSS claimants will pay tax on interest, and potentially other compensation payments too (and will certainly have to obtain tax advice on the treatment of those other payments). Which means that this assurance from DBT to Sir Wyn was not correct…

    … as things stand, HSS applicants are not being treated in the same way as GLO claimants. The obvious solution is for the Government to enact a tax exemption for HSS claimants covering interest and other compensation amounts except loss of earnings (assuming the Post Office are right in what they say about GLO compensation payments).

    That exemption creates the parity between claimants that DBT are rightly seeking. It will also avoid the scenario that most concerns me – postmasters being misled by the wording in the Post Office’s settlement offer, not realising they have to self-assess tax on the interest, and falling into default with HMRC.

    I have provided a copy of this article to the Inquiry.


    Footnotes

    1. Although important people at the Post Office surely knew well before 2013, albeit that the details of “who knew what when” remain unclear ↩︎

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