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I reported in July that Nadhim Zahawi, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, had founded YouGov using a tax avoidance structure. Zahawi provided an explanation which my detailed analysis showed to be false. Zahawi then shifted immediately onto a different explanation. In my opinion this showed that his first explanation was a lie – and I said so.

Zahawi had a media profile and resources dwarfing a small tax think tank – but instead of using these to explain himself, he instructed Osborne Clarke to write to me demanding that I retract. And their letter claimed that I could not publish the letter, or even tell anyone I’d received it. It was an attempt to silence criticism which had no basis in law, and for which Zahawi and his lawyers should be ashamed.

The Solicitors Regulation Authority this week issued a “warning notice” making clear that this kind of behaviour is unacceptable. I have therefore referred Zahawi’s lawyers, Osborne Clarke, to the regulator.

I’m also asking the SRA to investigate Osborne Clarke more widely. In the end, their actions cost me some legal fees but otherwise failed. But I know there are many others, without my legal background, contacts or financial resources, who have received letters like this (on behalf of Zahawi and others) and been silenced. If the SRA find that people have been silenced by deception and intimidation, then this needs to be put right.

I’ve copied below the text of my letter, with links to the referenced documents. If you prefer a PDF, that is here (but without links).

And more on Mr Zahawi coming soon…

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SRA General Counsel

The Cube

199 Wharfside Street 

Birmingham B1 1RN  

1 December 2022

Sent by email

Dear Ms Oliver

Osborne Clarke – SLAPP – breach of SRA Principles

1. Many thanks for your publication on 28 November 2022 of the new warning notice on SLAPPs. In light of that notice, I wish to make a formal referral to you of Osborne Clarke for several significant breaches of SRA Principles. I believe you will be already aware of a number of the breaches, but you may not be aware of others.

The background

2. I retired from commercial practice in May 2022, and founded Tax Policy Associates; a think tank which works to improve both tax policy and the public understanding of tax. In July 2022, I wrote several articles and social media posts about Nadhim Zahawi. At that time, Mr Zahawi was the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

3. The essence of my writings was that, when Mr Zahawi founded YouGov in 2000, the founder shares (which ordinarily would have been issued to Mr Zahawi) were instead issued to a Gibraltar company, Balshore Investments Limited. I said this looked like tax avoidance. Mr Zahawi’s team responded by briefing several journalists that the reason for Balshore receiving the shares (which I will call the “first explanation”) was that Mr Zahawi’s father, who owned Balshore, had contributed startup capital to YouGov.  

4. I investigated the accounts and Companies House filings and found that the startup capital was contributed by another investor, Neil Copp. Balshore had contributed only a token amount (£7,215). I therefore wrote that either I was mistaken, the filings were wrong, or Mr Zahawi was lying. The key Twitter thread can be found at https://taxpolicy.org.uk/evidence (attached in PDF format as tweet1.pdf).

5. Immediately after this, Mr Zahawi’s team started briefing a different explanation (which I will call the “second explanation”): that Mr Zahawi’s father received the shares in recognition of the significant advice and assistance he had provided to the business. The fact that Mr Zahawi was no longer defending his first explanation suggested to me that I had not made a mistake; in my opinion it suggested that the first explanation had been a lie. I said so. I did not say that the second explanation (“advice and assistance”) was a lie (although it seemed highly implausible). The key Twitter thread can be found at https://taxpolicy.org.uk/lying (attached as tweet2.pdf).

6. On Saturday 16 July 2022, I received an unsolicited direct message on Twitter from Ashley Hurst, a partner at Osborne Clarke (see attachment SRA1). Mr Hurst sought to speak to me on a without prejudice basis. I responded that he should put what he had to say in writing, and that I did not accept without prejudice correspondence.

7. Later that day I received an email from Mr Hurst (see attachment SRA2) asking me to retract my accusation by the end of that day, or I would receive an open letter on Monday.

8. I did not retract. On Tuesday 19 July I received a letter from Mr Hurst (see attachment SRA3). 

Breaches of SRA Principles

9. The Osborne Clarke correspondence bears several of the hallmarks of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) which are identified in your warning notice.

Labelling

10. The email (SRA2) is marked “confidential and without prejudice”. It says:

“I have marked this email without prejudice because it is a confidential and genuine attempt to resolve a dispute with you before further damage is caused. Our client wants to give you the opportunity to retract your allegation of lies in relation to our client.

That would not of course stop you from raising questions based on facts as you see them.

You have said that you will “not accept” without prejudice correspondence. It is up to you whether you respond to this email but you are not entitled to publish it or refer to it other than for the purposes of seeking legal advice. That would be a serious matter as you know. We recommend that you seek advice from libel lawyer if you have not done already.”

11. However, the letter cannot possibly be “without prejudice”, for three (independent) reasons. First, I had specifically told Osborne Clarke I would not accept “without prejudice” correspondence. Second, even if I hadn’t done so, their email was not a genuine attempt to resolve an existing dispute – it offered no concessions, and was therefore not an attempt at settlement.  Third, there was no dispute – as became subsequently clear, Mr Zahawi never had any intention of instigating a claim.

12. The claims that the email SRA2 and subsequent letter SRA3 were confidential were equally false. The content of the email and letter lacked the quality of confidence (as all the information in the documents was already public or obvious). There was nothing in our relationship which suggested that a duty of confidence could be imputed to me – the letter was unsolicited. Even if the letter had contained confidential information, there was a clear public interest in the matters under discussion (which would override the duty of confidence).

13. Hence the claims that the email was “without prejudice” and the email and letter were “confidential” were without merit, an attempt to mislead, and a breach of the SRA Principles.

Aggressive and intimidating threats

14. The email asserts that the “without prejudice” rule prevents me from publishing or even referring to the letter. This is entirely false. It is often tactically unwise for a party to publish without prejudice correspondence, but the “without prejudice” rule is a rule of evidence and does not prevent publication. This was, again, false, and an attempt to mislead. However, it is more serious than that: it is an aggressive and intimidating threat (“That would be a serious matter as you know.”). 

15. The second Osborne Clarke communication, SRA3, also seeks to intimidate me into not publishing the letter. It asserts that doing so would be “improper” (paragraph 1.3) but does not give a legal rationale for this claim – most likely because there is no such rationale. 

Advancing meritless claims – false allegations

16. As you identify in your warning notice, a common characteristic of SLAPP pre-action correspondence is that it advances meritless legal claims.

17. The entirety of the first Osborne Clarke email (SRA2) is meritless. The central allegation is:

“You have relied on comments attributed to YouGov by The Times today to support your view that our client was lying about the extent of involvement of our client’s father in the very early days of YouGov when it was set up in 2000.”

18. This misrepresents the comments I had made. I had specifically alleged that Mr Zahawi lied when he claimed that his father provided startup capital to YouGov (his first explanation). I did not allege that Mr Zahawi’s subsequent explanation was a lie (the second explanation – that Balshore Investments acquired its shareholding because Mr Zahawi’s father was so involved in the running of the business).

19. It is hard to imagine a more meritless defamation action than complaining about an allegation that was not in fact made. 

20. The Osborne Clarke email (SRA2) at no point attempts to respond to my actual allegation. The closest it comes is by saying I omitted to reference that Mr Zahawi’s father paid £7,000 for his second tranche of shares. But I clearly did mention this, in both my Twitter thread (https://taxpolicy.org.uk/evidence) and my longer article (https://taxpolicy.org.uk/zahawi-capital/). The lack of attention Osborne Clarke paid to the facts evidences recklessness and/or a lack of interest in the merits of the case, both of which are identified in the SRA “conduct in disputes” guidance as unacceptable behaviour.

Advancing meritless claims – no legal basis

21. Your risk warning specifically mentions cases where a solicitor pursues a claim despite knowing that a legal defence to their claim will be successful.

22. At the time, Nadhim Zahawi was Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is hard to imagine a topic of higher public interest than an accusation that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had avoided tax and lied about it. Hence Osborne Clarke would have known that a public interest defence under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 would likely have been successful. It is notable that their communications do not mention the public interest defence. 

Advancing false factual claims

23. Another common element of SLAPP pre-action letters is for the solicitor to advance factual claims by their client which are false, and which the solicitor should know are likely false. As your guidance notes, solicitors should take reasonable steps to satisfy themselves that a claim is properly arguable before putting it forward.

24. In this instance, both Osborne Clarke communications (SRA2 and SRA3) assert that Balshore provided £7,000 of startup capital for the YouGov shares it acquired in 2000. See, for example, paragraph 2.4 of SRA3.

25. However, the Companies House form for the share issuance shows that it was signed in October 2002, but backdated to 2000 (see attachment SRA8). My review of YouGov’s accounts and other Companies House filings confirm that the £7,000 was paid in 2002, not 2000 (I can supply evidence of this if that would be helpful).

26. Hence the key factual component of the Osborne Clarke letters was false. Osborne Clarke cannot have made any attempt to verify the matter (given that a cursory review of the Companies House form would have immediately revealed the backdating).

27. There is no duty on a solicitor to conduct detailed due diligence to fully investigate a client’s factual assertions. However, where the solicitor is going to assert factual matters in a letter to a third party, as a central part of a threatened claim against the third party, the solicitor should have some proper basis for doing so. The solicitor’s duty to the third party and the rule of law mean that the solicitor cannot simply advance any factual assertion made by his or her client, without the slightest investigation. A solicitor is not a mere post-box, particularly when serious allegations of defamation are being made. The failure of Osborne Clarke to make any checks on the claim was reckless and a breach of the SRA Principles.

28. The breach subsequently became more serious. I drew Osborne Clarke’s attention to the falsehood of the £7,000 claim, but (now knowing it was likely false) they did not correct the record. At that point Osborne Clarke became complicit in misleading me. I discuss this further below.

No intention of actually commencing litigation

29. A further common characteristic of SLAPPs (mentioned in your guidance) is where a solicitor is acting in a public relations capacity, with a legal veneer but no actual legal content. One example of this is where a solicitor makes a threat of a defamation lawsuit which is a “bluff”. The solicitor and client have no intention of filing an actual defamation claim, either because the client’s case is too weak (for example because the honest opinion or public interest defences will apply), or because the claimant would not want to run the risk of pre-trial disclosure or cross-examination during trial. The solicitor therefore engages in purported pre-action correspondence with the aim of intimidating the recipient into withdrawing their accusation. This is abusive behaviour, damaging to the rule of law. When combined with mislabelling, the overall effect is that people are silenced, with no way for the public or the judicial system to ever know about it.

30. It will often be hard to judge whether a solicitor’s correspondence falls within this category. This,  however, is an unusual case where we can be confident that it does. The key sentence in Osborne Clarke’s email (SRA2) reads:

“Should you not retract your allegation of lies today, we will write to you more fully on an open basis on Monday.”

31. The natural reading of this is that, if I did not retract, Osborne Clarke would send me a pre-action letter, with a view to subsequently commencing defamation proceedings. However when I did not retract, I did not receive a pre-action letter. Osborne Clarke’s subsequent letter (SRA3) is explicit that it is “not a threat to sue for libel”. And when I still did not retract, I received no further correspondence (and no libel claim has been forthcoming).

32. Hence, the evidence suggests that Osborne Clarke was bluffing: this was pre-action correspondence as an end itself – a SLAPP, and a breach of the SRA Principles. It was, perhaps, not pre-action correspondence at all – but Osborne Clarke acting in a “reputation management”/“public relations” capacity of the kind that your 28 November warning identifies.

33. It may be that, if you review Osborne Clarke’s files, you will find that Mr Zahawi had told Osborne Clarke he had no intention of commencing proceedings.

Reason for writing

34. I had not intended to make a formal complaint about Osborne Clarke. However, their behaviour since I called their “bluff” has evidenced a serious misunderstanding of a solicitor’s professional duties and obligations:

35. I wrote to Osborne Clarke on 19 August 2022 (attachment SRA4) alerting them to the fact that their central claim about the £7,000 was false, and inviting them to correct the record. 

36. Their response on 25 August 2022 did not address the point (attachment SRA5).

37. I responded on 31 August 2022 (attachment SRA6) making clear that I expected Osborne Clarke to address the three falsehoods in their correspondence: the false claim Balshore had provided £7,000 of capital, the false claim of confidentiality, and the false claim that the “without prejudice” rule prevented publication. I invited them to justify or withdraw their claims, and pointed out that it was not open to a solicitor to make a false statement and, knowing it was likely false, fail to correct it. Whilst Osborne Clarke may originally have made a mistake, or been reckless, in presenting the false £7,000 claim, at the point they realised it was likely false, and failed to correct the record, they became complicit in misleading me.

38. Osborne Clarke responded on 8 September (attachment SRA7). On my first point (the £7,000 of capital), Osborne Clarke simply said that their professional conduct rules prohibit them from discussing client confidential matters. This is a non-sequitur. If the solicitor becomes aware that he or she has (intentionally or unintentionally) misled a third party then the solicitor must correct the record – otherwise the failure to correct is itself a breach of the SRA Principles. Client confidentiality will in most cases not prevent such a correction (the duty of confidence will not apply if the solicitor is being asked to perpetrate a falsehood). But if there is a conflict then client confidentiality does not simply override other SRA Principles; the solicitor is then faced with a serious ethical dilemma which the solicitor may only be able to resolve by ceasing to act for the client. Osborne’s Clarke’s response was unacceptable.

39. On my second point (the false assertions of confidentiality and without prejudice), Osborne Clarke said that they would address their responses to the SRA. Again, this is a non-sequitur. A solicitor’s duty not to mislead a third party is not owed to the SRA; it is owed to the third party.

40. I had hoped Osborne Clarke would correct the record of their own accord, and I would not need to refer the matter to you. Unfortunately, it is clear they will not do so – it is for that reason I have written this letter.

Wider implications

41. It is my understanding that the key features of Osborne Clarke’s correspondence are commonplace: false assertions of confidentiality and “without prejudice”; an attempt to intimidate the recipient into not publishing the letter; basing a libel threat on a client’s assertion of facts without any attempt to very if those facts are correct.

42. I would, therefore, ask you to review other defamation matters where Osborne Clarke was instructed, to ascertain if they have indeed breached the SRA Principles on other occasions (it may be that this is already underway as part of your thematic review into SLAPP).

43. You will appreciate that I was a very atypical recipient: as a former partner in a large law firm I had the legal knowledge to identify that the claims being made were false, the contacts to obtain expert advice, and the financial resources to pay for that advice. Osborne Clarke’s actions caused me to incur unnecessary legal fees, but had no other adverse consequences and I was not, in the end, silenced.

44. I expect many other recipients of these letters did not have those advantages, and were silenced by meritless claims of confidentiality. The damage to the profession and the rule of law can only be undone if these letters can be identified, and Osborne Clarke and/or the SRA then writes to the recipients making clear that the confidentiality assertions were false. Whether Osborne Clarke’s client permits them to do so is irrelevant: a solicitor’s public interest obligations override their duty to their client.

45. If there is indeed a pattern of behaviour of Osborne Clarke falsely labelling as confidential/without prejudice letters to unrepresented parties, making meritless claims, and making false assertions of facts, then I would ask that you bring Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal proceedings against Osborne Clarke, and seek the most serious sanctions against those involved. 

46. Do please let me know if I can be of any further assistance. I would ask that you contact me by email rather than by post.

Yours sincerely

Dan Neidle

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Photo of Nadhim Zahawi by Richard Townsend

The SRA has warned solicitors to stop sending libel letters which falsely claim to be confidential, and mustn’t be published. This should dramatically change the landscape for everyone from large newspapers to individual tweeters and bloggers. It’s now up to us to take advantage of it.

Back in July, the Chancellor of the Exchequer instructed lawyers to write to me, accusing me of libel and requiring me to withdraw my allegation that he had lied. They claimed their letters were confidential, and warned me of “serious consequences” if I published them. This was tosh. I did not retract, and I published the letters.

I don’t think of myself as particularly naive, but was shocked to discover that fibbing about the confidentiality of libel threats is standard practice in the libel world. It has a chilling effect on free speech in this country – the rich and powerful can silence their critics so completely that we don’t even know they’ve been silenced. It’s a hallmark of SLAPPs – “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation” – which have become distressingly common.

It may come as a surprise to many people, but solicitors are not allowed to tell fibs. The Solicitors Regulation Authority requires solicitors to behave in accordance with the SRA Principles: to act with honesty, integrity, independence, and to uphold the rule of law. Intimidating people into not publishing letters they are perfectly entitled to publish is the very opposite of these Principles.

So I wrote to the Solicitors’ Regulation Authority, asking them to end the practice of solicitors making phoney claims of confidentiality in libel letters. The SRA sent me a promising initial response. At the same time, the Anti-SLAPP Coalition have been pushing for both strong SRA guidance and a change in law – so I am playing a small part in a much wider campaign¹

Yesterday the SRA published their final guidance on SLAPPs – and it could not be clearer. Lawyers cannot attempt to prevent the publication of their libel letters by claiming the letters are “confidential” or “without prejudice” without very good reason.

Here’s the key section:

We expect you to ensure that you do not mislead recipients of your correspondence, and to take particular care in this regard where that recipient may be vulnerable or unrepresented.

One way this can happen in this context is by labelling or marking correspondence ‘not for publication’, ‘strictly private and confidential’ and/or ‘without prejudice’ when the conditions for using those terms are not fulfilled.

We accept that marking a letter with such terms might be necessary if (for instance) an individual needs to disclose private and confidential information in order to disprove facts intended for publication [Dan note: these cases are rare – there was a reason my example involved a rampaging rhinoceros]. If so, it might also serve a purpose in ensuring correspondence is not read by an unintended recipient and/or to inform the recipient that they cannot rely on the defence of consent if they choose to publish any of the relevant material. Recipients might also properly be warned as to the legal risks of publication of such correspondence (which may include aggravation of any damages payable).

However, you should carefully consider what proper reasons you have for labelling correspondence in these ways, and whether further explanation is required where the recipient might be vulnerable or uninformed. Such markings cannot unilaterally impose a duty of privacy or confidentiality where one does not already exist. Clients should be advised of this and warned of the risks that a recipient might properly publish correspondence which is not subject to a pre-existing duty of confidence or privacy.

…

Equally, correspondence should not be marked as ‘without prejudice’ if that correspondence does not fulfil the conditions for that label. You should consider whether the communication represents a genuine attempt to compromise an existing dispute. There should ordinarily be no need to apply it to correspondence which does not offer any concessions and only argues your case and seeks concessions from the other side.

Now compare this with what I received from Zahawi’s lawyers, Osborne Clarke:

“It is up to you whether you respond to this email but you are not entitled to publish it or refer to it other than for the purposes of seeking legal advice. That would be a serious matter as you know.”

And then:

“You have said that you will not accept without prejudice correspondence and therefore we are writing to you on an open, but confidential basis. If your request for open correspondence is motivated by a desire to publish whatever you receive then that would be improper. Please note that this letter is headed as both private and confidential and not for publication. We therefore request that you do not make the letter, the fact of the letter or its contents public.”

I have given Osborne Clarke several opportunities to retract these false claims, and they have declined. I will therefore be writing to the SRA to make a formal complaint. I would urge everybody who’s received a libel letter falsely labelled as confidential/without prejudice to take similar action. This is whether you received the libel letter this morning or ten years’ ago, and whether you’re the Financial Times or a Twitter account with 20 followers². And what action should someone in this position take, particularly if they don’t have access to legal advice? There’s very good news on that front coming soon – I’ll be writing on this in the next few days.

The point isn’t to be vindictive, it’s to change the whole risk/reward calculation for libel lawyers and their clients. Once the wealthy and powerful know they can’t stop a libel threat being published, and there’s a high risk it will receive more publicity than the original accusation, then suddenly the whole idea of sending it becomes less appealing.

If you want to threaten someone with libel: fine³. But you’ll have to face the consequences of everyone knowing what you’re up to.

But this only works if we – the recipients of these letters – act. And that’s about to become a whole lot easier. More to follow!

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Photo from the Anti-SLAPP Coalition conference on 28 November 2022, where I was kindly invited to speak on a panel.

Yesterday, Nadhim Zahawi responded to an innocuous tweet with a libel threat. He refuses to answer any of the many, many questions about his tax affairs. The inevitable conclusion I and many others will reach is that he has something to hide.

UPDATE 31 January 2023: when I received the email below forcibly denying that Zahawi was the subject of an HMRC investigation, I had no idea that Zahawi was not only fully aware of an HMRC investigation, but had recently settled it and paid a large penalty. It seems most unlikely his lawyers knew that. Zahawi probably lied to them. The whole episode is extraordinary.

During the two-hour window between knowing Kwasi Kwarteng had been fired as Chancellor, and knowing Jeremy Hunt had been appointed as his successor, there was some speculation that Nadhim Zahawi was about to be appointed. I posted this tweet:

Fortunately I was right, and she wasn’t. But two hours later, I received this email:

When I was a trainee lawyer, assisting in some long-running piece of litigation, I drafted a response to the other side. I said I was “astonished” at some point they were asserting. The senior partner supervising me was not impressed. “We are never surprised, astonished, perplexed, amazed, stunned or shocked”, he said. Lesson learned.

Well, I am surprised, astonished, perplexed, amazed, stunned and shocked at this email.

The story that Zahawi was under investigation by the NCA was first reported by the Independent. The Guardian then ran another story, apparently independently sourced, that the Cabinet Office’s propriety and ethics team alerted Boris Johnson to an HMRC “flag” over Zahawi before his appointment. The Times then reported that HMRC launched an enquiry after being passed information by the NCA. This has all been widely covered elsewhere. It is surprising, astonishing, perplexing, amazing, stunning and shocking that Zahawi or his lawyers think it can possibly be defamatory to refer to these reports. All the more so when, so far as I am aware, he has taken no action against any of the newspapers involved.

It is also wrong in law¹. A statement is only defamatory if it causes “serious harm” to the reputation of the claimant. These newspaper allegations may well have caused “serious harm” to Mr Zahawi. My repeating them does not – it is a drop in the ocean of harm that Mr Zahawi’s reputation has suffered.

Furthermore, there is a clear and compelling public interest in allegations that a former Chancellor (and current rather less important Chancellor) is under criminal investigation. Before the Defamation Act 2013, tough luck – public interest was no defence to a defamation claim. But, unless my watch has stopped, it is not 2013, and it is.

And my view that Mr Zahawi is almost certainly under investigation by HMRC is informed by my experience as a senior tax lawyer, and head of UK tax for one of the largest law firms in the world, as well as the discussions I’ve had with other tax experts and retired HMRC officials. This is far from being wild speculation. If media reports are correct, then HMRC already had an investigation running at the point I and others started writing about Mr Zahawi’s tax affairs. If the reports are not correct, then HMRC would almost certainly have started an investigation at some point around July 2022 (as if there are credible public reports that a wealthy and high-profile individual may have avoided or evaded tax, then HMRC will normally commence an investigation). There is no reason Mr Zahawi would know about it. An “investigation” is not a formal legal step: it happens behind closed doors, and the taxpayer is not informed. At some point, HMRC would often (but not always) write to the taxpayer raising any questions that the investigation has raised (but would normally not use the word “investigation”). If HMRC then concludes they have enough to launch a formal enquiry then it’s at that point Mr Zahawi would be informed, with the word “enquiry” likely used – and the way that HMRC deadlines work mean that it’s likely they would do so in December 2022 or January 2023.

So I cannot be certain, as a strictly factual matter, that Mr Zahawi is under HMRC investigation – nobody outside HMRC can be. It is, however, my expert and informed opinion that he is almost certainly under investigation (whether he knows it or not). And that is absolutely a matter of public interest. And, unless it is 2013, “honest opinion” and “public interest” are both defences to defamation.

All this means that the email from Mr Zahawi’s lawyers asserts, rather aggressively, legal claims that are baseless, and which a few minutes’ research would have shown to be baseless. These arguments are not particularly obscure or difficult to identify. A couple of good Google searches would have done the trick. But I don’t think Mr Zahawi or his lawyers cared – the point of the email was not to assert a legitimate legal claim, but to stifle public discussion of his affairs. It was, in other words, a SLAPP – a “strategic lawsuit against public participation”. Here’s an excellent summary of what that means:

Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Protection, or SLAPPs, are a growing threat to freedom of speech and a free press – fundamental liberties that are the lifeblood of our democracy.  

Typically used by the super-rich, SLAPPs stifle legitimate reporting and debate. They are at their most pernicious before cases ever reach a courtroom, with seemingly endless legal letters that threaten our journalists, academics, and campaigners with sky-high costs and damages.  

SLAPPs pile on the pressure until investigations into corruption are shut down, and some individuals or corporations are regarded as ‘no go’ zones, because of the risk of legal retaliation.

That’s courtesy of the government, of which Mr Zahawi formed part, as part of its laudable initiative to stamp out SLAPPs. Mr Zahawi should look in the mirror.

It is unethical and improper for ACK Media Law LLP to write emails of this kind, making baseless legal threats. At a time when the Solicitors Regulation Authority has taken a strong stance against SLAPPs, it is also extremely unwise. I have therefore invited them to withdraw; if they do not, I will refer them to the SRA:

I will continue to write about Mr Zahawi, and others should too. It is in the public interest and, post-2013, it is in practice almost impossible for a senior politician to win a defamation claim on a matter of public interest. When Zahawi refuses to answer any of the many, many questions about his tax affairs, and responds to innocuous tweets with libel threats, the inevitable conclusion I and many others will reach is that he has something to hide.

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Photo of Nadhim Zahawi by Richard Townshend – CC BY 3.0